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Stellingen 
1. De inkomenseffecten van een gedwongen inkrimping van de veestapel zijn groter 
voor de toeleverende en verwerkende industrie dan voor de primaire landbouw omdat 
laatstgenoemde wordt gecompenseerd door de waarde van de productierechten. 
Dit proefschrift. 
2. Ten gevolge van bestaande verstorende belastingen kan de introductie van een 
kleinverbruikershefring op energie leiden tot een welvaartsverbetering. 
Dit proefschrift. 
3. Verruiming of afschaffing van melkquota in Nederland leidt tot een geringere 
productie in de overige dierlijke sectoren ten gevolge van een oplopende schaduwprijs 
voor fosfaat- en nitraat emissies in de landbouw. 
Dit proefschrift. 
4. De in 1987 geïntroduceerde mestproductierechten per diersoort en de huidige 
(voorgenomen) dierrechten impliceren een beperkte verhandelbaarheid van emissie-
rechten en zijn derhalve economisch inefficiënt. 
5. Het verdient geen aanbeveling de invoering van een energieheffing te verdedigen met 
als argument dat de efficiëntie van het belastingsysteem verbetert. Een belasting-
hervorming, waarbij rekening gehouden wordt met de verstorende werking van 
bestaande belastingen, is hiervoor een beter middel. 
6. Een stelsel van mestafzetcontracten in combinatie met een gebruiksnorm per hectare 
heeft hetzelfde milieueffect als een stelsel van verhandelbare emissierechten. Echter, 
in het eerste geval valt de waarde van de eigendomsrechten toe aan de grond-
eigenaren; in het laatste geval aan de producent van de emissies. 
7. Beleidsanalyses met modellen lopen achter de feitelijke ontwikkelingen aan doordat 
de eerste afgeleide van het beleidsontwikkelingsproces naar de tijd groter is dan de 
eerste afgeleide van modelontwikkeling naar de tijd. 
8. "Models are to be used, not believed". 
(H. Theil, In: A. Przeworski (1991). Democracy and the market: Political economie reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.30). 
9. Doordat de aanzet tot een referendum wordt bepaald door een kleine groep direct 
betrokkenen, moeten vraagtekens gezet worden bij het democratisch gehalte van zo'n 
stemmingsprocedure. 
10. Het progressieve belastingtarief in het huidige Nederlandse belastingstelsel werkt 
denivellerend omdat de hypotheekrente tegen het marginale tarief wordt afgetrokken. 
11. Zij die anderen ervan betichten weinig oog te hebben voor cultuur, passen een te enge 
en op zichzelf gerichte definitie van cultuur toe. 
12. De ervaring leert dat de stelling: "Als het begint te vriezen, dan ontdooien de Friezen", 
niet alleen opgeld doet voor het daarin genoemde volk. 
13. "A classical paper is a paper that everyone refers to, but nobody reads". 
(John Roberts, NAKE workshop Groningen, 1997). 
14. Net als economische modellen zijn fotomodellen een abstractie van de werkelijkheid. 
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Abstract 
The purpose of the research described in this thesis is to quantify the economy-wide environmental 
and economic effects of agricultural and environmental policies and the interaction between these 
policies in the Netherlands. The basic tool used in this thesis is a static, single-country applied general 
equilibrium (AGE) model for the Dutch economy, in which environmental relations are incorporated 
explicitly. Important policy issues dealt with are: (1) the manure policy; (2) the introduction of a 
small-user energy tax; (3) the reduction of emissions contributing to the environmental indicators 
eutrophication, the greenhouse effect, acidification and waste accumulation; and (4) the increase of 
milk quota under a nitrogen emission restriction in agriculture. The simulation results provide insight 
into the linkages between the economy, agriculture and the environment, the nature of the different 
environmental problems and the economic consequences of government intervention. The results of 
the research can be useful for policy makers and interest groups in the Netherlands in designing and 
evaluating policy. 
The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research and the Foundation for Economic Social-Cultural 
Geographical and Environmental Sciences (NWO-ESR) is acknowledged for funding this research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
There is a growing awareness of actual and potential threats to the natural environment in the 
form of exhaustion of natural resources, pollution of air, land and water resources, and 
deterioration in bio-diversity. As in most industrialised countries, concern for maintaining or 
improving environmental quality has taken a firm place on the policy agenda in the 
Netherlands. Hence, for policy makers and interest groups, it is important to understand the 
nature of different environmental problems, the linkages between the economy and the 
environment, and the economic and environmental consequences of government intervention. 
The Dutch economy, agriculture and environment are highly interrelated. Agriculture, 
industries directly related to agriculture (agribusiness) and international trade in agricultural 
and food products form a substantial part of Dutch economic activity. Moreover, agricultural 
production causes a number of specific environmental problems, primarily related to the use 
of industrial inputs like fertiliser and pesticides. In addition, agriculture also contributes to 
some general environmental problems like the greenhouse effect, acidification and 
eutrophication. 
In the Netherlands, European Union (EU) price and income support are declining in 
importance, while EU agri-environmental policies (Potter, 1998) and national environmental 
policies are coming to the fore. The freezing of support prices since 1984/85 and a substantial 
reduction in intervention prices in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform of 1992 
facilitated the agreement that concluded the Uruguay Round in 1993. Continuing market 
imbalances, the EU enlargement and budgetary constraints and the ongoing negotiations 
under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) create a need for further reform of the CAP, 
which has led to the Agenda 2000 reform in 1999 (Tracy, 1997; Agra Europe, 1999). 
Moreover, awareness of environmental problems due to farming practices has led to the 
integration of environmental considerations into the CAP (Brouwer and van Berkum, 1996), 
with agri-environmental policies and agricultural support subject to environmental conditions 
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(NRLO, 1998)1. Finally, Dutch agriculture faces an increasing number of national 
environmental regulations related to a variety of environmental issues (e.g., pesticides, 
minerals, acidification, greenhouse effect, nature and landscape conservation, etc.). Hence, 
the importance of environmental policy in Dutch agriculture is increasing relative to other 
policies. 
The Netherlands is a small open economy. Since trade plays an important balancing 
role between production and consumption, it influences the environment mainly in an indirect 
way, because the environmental effects of economic activity depend largely on resource use, 
production technology and consumption (Anderson, 1992a and 1992b; Anderson and Black-
hurst, 1992; Whalley, 1991). At the same time, environmental regulation can influence 
comparative advantage of (agricultural) production and thereby influence the costs and 
location of production (Siebert, 1974; Cropper and Oates, 1992). The Uruguay Round 
Agreement in 1993 and the ongoing CAP reform, have put issues of trade and the 
environment high on the policy agenda. Hence, there is a growing need for information on 
and analysis of these issues (NRLO, 1994; Perroni and Wigle, 1994). 
Three relevant categories of policies can be distinguished that stress the changing 
policy environment of agriculture and the linkages between the economy, the environment 
and agriculture: (1) environmental policies that are specific for agriculture; (2) general 
environmental policies that affect agriculture; and (3) agricultural policies that entail 
environmental effects. Moreover, given the interrelationships, interactions between these 
policies can also be expected. Manure policy is an example of an environmental policy 
specific to agriculture. General environmental policies that will influence agriculture are 
policies to reduce emissions that cause the greenhouse effect (e.g., an energy tax) and policies 
to reduce emissions that cause acidification. Examples of agricultural policies that might 
affect the environment are the CAP and its Agenda 2000 reform. For policy makers and 
interest groups it is important to know how these policies should be modified to harmonise 
their sets of objectives with respect to production, income formation, prices, trade, emissions 
and welfare. Hence, there is a need for empirical research to better understand the interface of 
agricultural and environmental policies and to consider prospects for policy co-ordination 
(Just and Antle, 1990; Just and Bockstael, 1991; Johnson et al., 1990). 
1 The Agenda 2000 reform of the CAP provides the possibility to link direct payments to environmental 
criteria (cross compliance). The specific conditions are to be set by member states, so that varying national 
circumstances can be taken into account (European Commission, 1999). 
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1.2 Objective and methodology 
The objective of this thesis is to determine the economy-wide environmental and economic 
effects of agricultural and environmental policies and the interactions between these policies, 
in the Netherlands. Some of the most important policy issues are dealt with in this thesis. 
Policy simulations are: (1) the manure policy; (2) the small-user energy tax; (3) the reduction 
of emissions contributing to the environmental indicators eutrophication, the greenhouse 
effect, acidification and waste accumulation; and (4) the increase of milk quota under a 
nitrogen emission restriction. The manure policy implies a restriction of intensive livestock 
farming in the Netherlands, which is intended to reduce the environmental problems linked to 
the excess supply of minerals. The energy tax simulation follows the introduction of the 
small-user energy tax in the Netherlands in 1996, which has potential effects on energy-
intensive industries in agriculture and agribusiness. The reduction of environmental 
indicators reveals the linkages between economic activity and environmental problems, to 
some of which agriculture is an important contributor. Finally, the milk quota increase under 
a nitrogen restriction is an example of a simulation where the interaction between an 
agricultural and environmental policy is shown. The thesis aims to quantify policy effects at a 
detailed level, providing insight into the nature of the different environmental problems, the 
linkages between the economy and the environment, and the economic consequences of 
government intervention. In doing so, the results of the research can be useful for policy-
makers and interest groups in the Netherlands in designing and evaluating policy. 
The basic tool used in this thesis is a static, single-country applied general equilibrium 
(AGE) model for the Dutch economy, in which environmental relationships are explicitly 
incorporated. Given the linkages described and the economy-wide and trade effects that can 
be expected from agricultural and environmental policies, using an AGE for a small open 
economy model is appropriate (Hertel, 1990). Moreover, the availability of new 
environmental data at a very disaggregated level for the Netherlands makes it possible, and 
from a scientific point of view interesting, to link environmental data in a proper way to 
economic activity in an AGE model. Finally, an AGE model provides useful information on a 
variety of variables. 
Numerous AGE models have been built over the last two decades to deal with a large 
number of policy issues (see for an overview e.g., Robinson, 1989; Gunning and Keyzer, 
1995; and Shoven and Whalley, 1992). This thesis complements the existing AGE literature 
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in several respects 2. Firstly, the thesis analyses the economy-wide effects of specific 
environmental policies for agriculture in the Netherlands. Rendleman (1991) and Rendleman 
et al. (1995) look at the effects of reducing fertiliser and pesticide use in the United States 
(US). Hrubovcak et al. (1990) show the economy-wide effects of reducing the use of 
agricultural chemicals in the US. Komen et al. (1997) and Brockmeier et al. (1993) analyse 
the effects of reduced pesticide application for the Netherlands and Germany, respectively. 
Secondly, there is scope for studies that analyse the effects of general environmental 
policies on agriculture in the Netherlands. Examples of AGE studies on general 
environmental policies in the Netherlands are Dellink and Jansen (1995) and Centraal 
Planbureau (1992 and 1993) that focus on the effects of an energy tax. Although agriculture 
as a whole is identified in these models, results are not distinguished for the individual 
agricultural industries. In addition, the effects on the environment are not analysed. Boyd and 
Uri (1991), Boyd and Krutilla (1992) and Boyd et al. (1995) are examples of AGE models for 
the US with four agricultural industries that analyse the effects of reductions in emissions of 
SO2 and NO x , SO2 and CO2 respectively. This thesis also contributes to bridging the gap that 
exists in the literature on empirical economy-wide analysis of the environmental effects of 
agricultural policies. Agricultural AGE model studies with a limited environmental 
component that are, however, not specifically directed towards analysing the effects of 
environmental policies in agriculture are for example Burniaux et al. (1990), Folmer et al. 
(1995), Harrison et al. (1995), Peerlings (1993), Hertel (1997) and SOW-VU (1998). 
Finally, this thesis proposes a way of including emissions and indicators of 
environmental quality into an AGE model, linking emissions to inputs, output and 
consumption at a very detailed level. A high level of disaggregation is adopted with respect to 
industries that are the main contributors to environmental problems. The way of linking and 
the level of detail exploit the substitution possibilities that exist within an AGE model. In 
addition, an alternative way of technology specification is considered in which an industry is 
represented by a series of different technologies where each technology is characterised by a 
different emission-input-output mix. Using the mixed complementarity approach (see also 
Rutherford, 1995; Folmer et al., 1995; Gunning and Keyzer, 1995), technology switches are 
modelled that make it feasible to reduce emissions without necessarily reducing output. 
2 It is recognised that the literature on environmental and agricultural policy analysis is much broader than the 
AGE based contributions. Attention to some of this literature will be paid in the subsequent chapters. 
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1 3 Organisation 
This thesis consists of seven chapters, starting with the introduction. Chapter 2 presents and 
discusses the AGE model and data used in this thesis. Since in the different policy 
simulations different modifications of the model and data are used, the description of the 
model will not be exhaustive. Modifications of the model, used in the different policy 
simulations, are dealt with in the relevant chapters. A complete description of the basic model 
is presented in appendices. The chapter also deals with the economic and environmental data 
used. Data obtained from own calculations (e.g., detailed environmental data and 
disaggregation of agricultural data) are summarised in appendices. 
In Chapter 3, the focus is on a typical environmental policy directed at agriculture, of 
which economy-wide effects can be expected. The chapter analyses the effects on the Dutch 
economy of a reduction in livestock production. Such a reduction is seen as a possible 
solution to the environmental problems linked with the excess supply of minerals to the 
environment. In the policy simulations, it is assumed that the mineral surplus in the Nether-
lands can be avoided by reducing livestock production in pig and poultry farming. 
Assumptions about factor mobility and trade are explicitly dealt with by means of a 
sensitivity analysis. The analysis shows the economic effects on agriculture and the important 
linkages that are present with the rest of the economy. 
Chapter 4 deals with a general environmental policy that also has consequences for 
individual agricultural industries. To achieve the CO2 emission target that was the result of 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), in 1996 the Dutch government 
implemented an energy tax on fossil fuels for heating and electricity by households and 
'small' energy users. Moreover, the revenues of the energy tax are used to lower the pre-
existing distortionary taxes related to labour supply. The research shows the detailed 
environmental and economic effects of the current Dutch unilateral environmental tax reform 
with (partial) exemptions for particular energy users. Horticulture under glass is one of the 
exempted industries for the use of natural gas. Special attention is paid to the double-dividend 
argument that the introduction of a small environmental tax reform not only improves the 
environment but might also raise non-environmental welfare, due to an improvement in the 
efficiency of the tax structure. 
The Dutch government has developed environmental policy targets, specified in terms 
of environmental indicators that measure phenomena like the greenhouse effect, acidification, 
eutrophication, and waste accumulation. Typically, each policy target entails a reduction in 
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emissions that cause the environmental problem measured by the indicator. Chapter 5 
analyses the environmental and economic effects of restricting these indicators, using a 
system of emission permits for the Netherlands. Agriculture is an important contributor to 
these environmental problems. The analysis focuses on the different effects of restricting 
single environmental indicators, the effects of restricting different environmental indicators 
simultaneously and the tradeability of emission permits. Although the policy simulations in 
this chapter are hypothetical, the main causal relationships linking the economy and the 
environment are quantified and shadow prices of restrictions on different environmental 
indicators are determined. Moreover, the relationships between the different environmental 
indicators are revealed. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the environmental and economic effects of an agricultural policy 
change. It analyses the effects of an increase in milk quota in the Netherlands when nitrogen 
(N) emissions are restricted. The AGE model applied in this chapter is written in mixed-
complementarity format (AGE-MC model), in which dairy farming is represented by a series 
of different Leontief technologies. Each technology is characterised by a different emission-
input-output mix. Consequently, technology switches make it feasible to reduce emissions 
without necessarily reducing output, which would be the case if emissions were related to 
output using a well-behaved neoclassical production technology. Under the policy change, 
inactive N-extensive technologies in dairy farming might become active and (partly) replace 
N-intensive technologies. 
Finally in Chapter 7, methodological issues and results are discussed and conclusions 
are drawn. 
CHAPTER 2 
MODEL AND DATA SPECIFICATION 1 
Abstract 
This chapter presents the basic version of the applied general equilibrium (AGE) model and 
data used in this thesis. A complete description of the model is provided. The model contains 
a high level of disaggregation with respect to agriculture, related industries and 
commodities. It is possible to analyse various agricultural and environmental policy changes 
with the model developed. In particular the effects on inter-industry transactions, factor 
demand, income, trade and the environment can be determined. The model results are 
conditional on model and data characteristics that are typical for AGE models in general or 
for the specific model used in this thesis. Some of the specific model characteristics and 
limitations are discussed. 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the basic version of the applied general 
equilibrium (AGE) model and data used in this thesis. Since in the different policy 
simulations different modifications of the model and data are used, the description of the 
model in this chapter will not be exhaustive. Modifications of the model, used in the different 
policy simulations are dealt with in the relevant chapters. In Section 2.2, the basic version of 
the model is described. A complete description of the basic model can be found in 
appendices. Section 2.3 deals with the economic and environmental data on which the 
simulations in this thesis are based. Data obtained from own calculations (e.g., detailed 
environmental data and disaggregation of agricultural data) are summarised in appendices. 
Finally, Section 2.4 provides a discussion of some specific characteristics of the model and 
data that are relevant for the simulations in this thesis. 
This chapter is partly based on Komen and Peerlings (1996). 
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2.2 Description of the AGE model 
The model used in this thesis is a static, single-country AGE model of the Netherlands. In this 
section the theoretical background and the most relevant characteristics and assumptions of 
the model will be elaborated. Equations mentioned between parentheses correspond to the 
complete mathematical representation of the model, given in Appendix I. A discussion of 
some specific characteristics of the AGE model is postponed to Section 2.4. 
2.2.1 Theoretical background and general structure 
A general equilibrium model is a model in which markets for each commodity and factor in 
an economy are specified and consistent optimisation by agents occurs as part of the 
equilibrium. Households maximise utility subject to their budget constraints, leading to the 
household demand for commodities and supply of factors. Market demands for commodities 
and factor supply depend on all prices, are continuous, non-negative, homogenous of degree 
zero in prices and income and satisfy Walras' Law. That is, at any set of prices, the total value 
of household expenditure equals household income or, stated differently, the value of excess 
demands equals zero at all prices. Producers maximise profits, leading to the demand for factors 
and commodities (inputs) and the supply of commodities (outputs). In equilibrium, prices are 
such that the required equihbrium conditions hold. Demand equals supply for all commodities 
and factors (Walrasian equilibrium), and in case of constant-returns-to-scale production 
technology, zero-profit conditions are satisfied for each industry. Zero homogeneity of demand 
and supply in prices implies that only relative prices are of any significance in such a model. 
Hence, a price numéraire has to be chosen to determine the actual price level. A discussion of 
general equilibrium theory can be found in most advanced micro-economic textbooks (for 
example Mas-Colell et al., 1995) or in more specialised literature (Ginsburgh and Keyzer, 1995). 
The aim of AGE modelling is to convert the above-described Walrasian general 
equilibrium structure from an abstract representation of an economy into realistic models of 
actual economies. The idea is to use these models to evaluate policy options. The advantage of 
AGE models is that a computer removes the need to work in small dimensions and thus much 
more detail and complexity can be incorporated than in simple analytical models (Shoven and 
Whalley, 1984 and 1992). For a more exhaustive discussion of AGE models see Shoven and 
Whalley (1992), Gunning and Keyzer (1995) and Robinson (1989). A discussion of dynamic 
models, multi-country (trade) models and models with scale economies and imperfections in 
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commodity or factor markets lies outside the scope of this thesis. There are several surveys 
on these topics, including Gunning and Keyzer (1995) on dynamics and imperfect 
competition, Shoven and Whalley (1984) on multi-country models and Devarajan and Rodrik 
(1989) and Harris (1984) on imperfect competition and scale economies. 
2.2.2 Specification of the model 
In an AGE model as applied in this thesis, the whole economy is modelled explicitly. The 
flows of commodities and factors of production in the AGE model used in this thesis are 
presented in Figure 2.1. 
industries rest of the world 
commodities 
5 £ 
households 
5 £ 
investment 
1. Factor demand 
2. Output 
3. Intermediate input demand 
4. Exports 
5. Imports 
6. Household demand 
7. Investment demand 
Figure 2.1 Flows of commodities andfactors in the A GE model 
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Industries produce output (2) using intermediate inputs (3) and factor inputs (1). 
Commodities produced (or imported (5)) can be exported (4), used as an intermediate input 
(3), consumed by households (6), or used as an investment good (7). Opposite to the flows of 
commodities and factors go expenditure and income flows (not shown in Figure 2.1) 
Producer behaviour 
In the model (see Appendix I) aggregate output in each industry is produced according a 
nested production structure (see Figure 1.1 in Appendix I) using Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) production functions with constant returns to scale. The nested production 
structure applied in the model is rather standard (see: Shoven and Whalley, (1992), for an 
overview of studies using alternative nesting structures; Kemfert, (1998), for tests among 
different nests of capital, labour and energy). To emphasise the substitution possibilities 
between intermediate energy inputs, a separate nest has been chosen for intermediate energy 
and materials inputs. Hence, the aggregate output is composed of three hypothetical 
aggregate inputs: aggregate energy input, aggregate materials input and aggregate factor 
input. The energy aggregate consists of electricity and fossil fuels (other than fuels for 
vehicles) while the materials aggregate consists of all other intermediate inputs and fuels for 
vehicles2. The aggregate factor input is composed of labour and capital. Labour in the 
agricultural industries is composed of mobile (hired) labour and immobile (self-employed) 
labour. Labour in the non-agricultural industries is assumed mobile. Cost minimisation yields 
the demand functions for aggregate inputs (1.1,1.2 and 1.3), intermediate energy inputs (1.4), 
intermediate materials inputs (1.5), factors (1.6), mobile labour (1.7 and 1.9) and immobile 
labour (1.8) by industry. 
From the aggregate output, individual commodities are produced according a Leontief 
product transformation function (1.10). This specification allows for an industry to produce 
more than one commodity and one commodity to be produced by different industries. This 
approach is preferred above the more standard approach where industries and production 
have a one to one relation because the latter contradicts reality. Total domestic production of 
each commodity is obtained by aggregation over industries (1.11). 
CES functions are rather restrictive to describe the production structure of the Dutch 
economy (see: De Boer, 1981; Lesuis, 1991). Functional forms that are less restrictive than 
CES functions are for example the Constant Difference of Elasticity (CDE) function (see 
2 Hence, fuels for vehicles that is related to transportation are considered not to be direct substitutes for the 
other fossil fuels and electricity. 
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Hertel et a l , 1991) or the translog function (see Nakamura, 1984). Using these functional 
forms, however, requires more parameters to be specified which are not available at the 
aggregation level applied in this thesis. Moreover, flexible functional forms like the translog 
function cannot deal with large changes since global convexity is then no longer assured (see 
Chambers, 1988, p.177). 
Trade 
In the model the Armington assumption for modelling trade is used (see de Melo and Tarr, 
1992, ch.2; Shoven and Whalley, 1992, ch.9 and de Melo and Robinson, 1989). The 
Armington assumption states that commodities imported and exported are imperfect 
substitutes of domestically produced and used commodities. The Arrnington assumption is 
adopted to be able to deal with two-way trade that is present in the observed trade statistics at 
the aggregation level used in the AGE model. Moreover, it avoids specialisation, which, 
following the law of comparative advantage, will generally result in only as many 
commodities being produced under free trade as there are factors of production (de Melo and 
Robinson, 1985). 
The imported (exported) and domestically produced (demanded) commodities are (dis) 
aggregated into new composite commodities using constant returns to scale CES (Constant 
Elasticity of Transformation; CET) functions. Cost minimisation yields CES demand 
equations for domestic production (1.12) and imports (1.13) and revenue maximisation yields 
CET supply equations for domestic use (1.14) and exports (1.15). Hence, the levels of imports 
and exports depend on domestic and world market prices and the degree of substitutability 
between domestic and foreign commodities. 
The consequence of a high level of disaggregation for agriculture is that some 
commodities can be distinguished that are internationally homogeneous. For these 
commodities, which have small import or export shares, the Armington assumption is not 
valid. Consequently, homogeneity is modelled by defining net trade as the difference between 
domestic production and domestic use (1.16). In this thesis, the homogeneity assumption is 
applied for the trade in pigs and eggs. 
Import supply and export demand are assumed to be perfectly price elastic which 
implies that world market prices are constant (1.38,1.39 and 1.40). Hence the Netherlands is 
treated as being a small country and is assumed to have no effect on world market prices. 
This implies that national policies will not entail terms of trade effects. With respect to the 
rest of the world, a fixed net trade surplus is assumed (1.64) while equilibrium is achieved by 
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an endogenously determined exchange rate. Although a fixed exchange rate might better 
reflect the current economic situation for the Netherlands, a fixed net trade surplus is 
preferred to make the welfare analysis more transparent. Given that world market prices are 
also fixed, a fixed net trade surplus implicitly means that foreign welfare is fixed3. 
Factor supply 
In the model, two factors are distinguished: capital and labour4. Total capital supply is 
perfectly price inelastic5. Total labour supply is price-elastic through a labour leisure choice 
(see household behaviour). In agriculture, self-employed labour is assumed immobile. 
With respect to factor mobility there are two extreme possibilities (see also Kilkenny 
and Robinson, 1990). The first extreme is to assume industry specific factors (as is the case 
for self-employed labour in agriculture). The second extreme is to assume perfectly mobile 
factors. Perfect factor mobility equalises factor rewards between industries. The first 
approach is relevant in a short-term model, the second in a long-term model. In this thesis an 
intermediate approach is assumed: factors are imperfectly mobile (see Keller, 1979; 
Cornielje, 1990; Peerlings, 1993; Rendleman et a l , 1995). Hence, factor prices differ 
between industries. Factor supply to industries is modelled using CET supply functions 
resulting from revenue maximisation (1.17 and 1.18). The degree of factor mobility is 
determined by the magnitude of the transformation elasticity. Revenues from labour supply 
determine labour income (1.49). Gross capital income (1.50) corrected for a proportional 
capital depreciation (1.52) equals net capital income (1.51). 
Household behaviour 
There is one representative private household whose income (1.53) is given by capital 
income, labour income and domestic income transfers6 corrected for income taxes, 
expenditures on leisure 7 and the balance of exogenous income transfers with the rest of the 
world (e.g., income from foreign assets). Future consumption (savings), leisure and current 
3 The welfare change expressed as the change in the value of trade using base year prices is zero when world 
market prices and the trade surplus with the rest of the world are assumed to be fixed. 
4 Land is not considered as a third factor (see also discussion in Section 2.4). 
5 In the static model used in this thesis it is assumed that investments entail a spending effect but no capacity 
effect Moreover, capital is assumed immobile internationally. Hence, the total capital stock is assumed 
fixed. 
6 Domestic income transfers are mainly social security benefits, paid lump sum by the government to 
households. 
7 Employment and leisure are calibrated by assuming an unemployment rate (including voluntary 
unemployment) of 20 per cent 
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consumption determine the private household's welfare according a nested CES utility 
function. In the first stage of the multi-stage budgeting (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), a 
choice is made between future consumption (savings) and a composite of leisure and current 
aggregate consumption (1.54 and 1.55). In the second stage, the budget is divided into leisure 
and aggregate consumption (1.56 and 1.57). Total labour supply (1.58) hence results from a 
labour leisure choice and is price elastic8. In the last stage, expenditure on current aggregate 
consumption is divided into demand for individual commodities according CES 
uncompensated demand functions (1.19). 
The multi-stage budgeting is rather standard when leisure and savings are taken into 
account in the utility function (see Shoven and Whalley, 1992). The disadvantage of CES-
demand functions is that income elasticities for all commodities are equal to one. Although 
other functional forms (e.g., LES-AIDS: see Michalek and Keyzer, 1992; Folmer et al., 1995; 
LES-CES: Peerlings, 1993) would make the model less restrictive, selecting parameters of 
these functions requires more data and will enlarge the model significantly. Since the focus of 
this thesis is mainly on industries, the more simple CES function is chosen. 
Government behaviour 
The model incorporates the most important features of the Dutch tax system (product-related 
indirect taxes and subsidies, non-product related taxes and subsidies, value-added taxes, 
labour taxes (employer's and employee's share), a capital tax (tax on dividends and 
corporation tax) and an income tax. Tax revenue (1.59) corrected for the balance of income 
transfers with the rest of the world (e.g., development aid) and a government deficit9 (1.60) 
determine the government budget (1.61). The government budget is proportionally divided 
over domestic income transfers and expenditures on public goods (1.62). Government 
demand is modelled by CES uncompensated demand functions (1.20). 
Investments 
Total gross savings in the economy equal the sum of private savings and capital depreciation 
corrected for the government deficit and the surplus on the balance of trade. The model has a 
neo-classical closure rule in the sense that total savings, corrected for non-product related 
8 In the model the substitution elasticity between leisure and consumption is chosen such that the 
uncompensated elasticity of labour supply with respect to the wage rate is positive, i.e. the substitution effect 
dominates the income effect. 
9 The government deficit is assumed to be a fixed percentage of the total government budget. 
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taxes on investment (e.g., investment subsidies) determine investment (1.63). In case saving is 
seen as buying a capital good by households, the government and the rest of the world to 
store wealth, investment demand for individual commodities is the input demand of a 
hypothetical capital goods industry that produces this (aggregate) capital good (see Keller, 
1979; Cornielje, 1990; Peerlings, 1993). This neo-classical closure rule implies that 
investments (savings) only have a spending effect, but no capacity effect. Investment 
demand is modelled using Leontief input demand functions (1.21). Leontief instead of CES 
input demand functions are used because in the initial situation, demand is sometimes 
negative (reduction of stocks). 
Equilibrium conditions and price equations 
In a general equilibrium model, all input and output markets are in equilibrium. Hence, total 
domestic use equals the sum of intermediate, private household, government and investment 
demand (1.48). The same equilibrium conditions are implicitly assumed at the markets for 
factor inputs, imports, exports and investment. In addition to these market equilibrium 
conditions, zero profit is assumed, implying that the value of the inputs equals the value of 
outputs (1.22 up to and including 1.32). Homogeneity of the production and transformation 
functions concerned (CES, CET and Leontief) guarantee that the zero profit conditions hold. 
Market margins (trade and transportation services) are produced by different industries. 
The use of these market margins (1.33 and 1.34) is incorporated in the buyers' prices of each 
commodity at three levels in the model: exports (export margins), total domestic use 
(wholesale margins) and household demand (retail margins). At each level a constant market 
margin rate for each commodity is assumed, being the share of market margins in the value 
of the transaction at sellers' prices. Indirect taxes and price reducing subsidies are 
incorporated in the buyers' prices, creating, together with the market margins, a price wedge 
between sellers' and buyers' prices (1.35 up to and including 1.40). Indirect non-product 
related taxes, value added taxes and direct taxes also drive a wedge between the buyers' and 
sellers' price of total private consumption (1.41), investments (1.42), aggregate factor input 
(1.43) and factors (1.44 up to and including 1.47). 
Because in the AGE model all equations are homogeneous of degree zero in prices, a 
price numéraire has to be chosen to determine the actual price level. Since the focus of the 
thesis is mainly on industries, the Laspeyres index in output prices is chosen as price 
numéraire (1.65). Hence, price changes as result of policy simulations have to be considered 
relative to this price index. 
Model and data specification 15 
Environment 
The model includes nine emissions to take environmental effects of policy simulations into 
account (1.66). In order to represent a clear relation between emissions and economic activity, 
emissions should be dependent on quantities. In this thesis, emissions are assumed to be linked 
to intermediate inputs, outputs, consumption of specific commodities and aggregate 
consumption. Nine different emissions are taken into account: carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrogen 
oxides (NO x), sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4), ammonia (NH3), 
nitrogen (N), phosphate (P) and waste. The link of emission data to the economic data is 
discussed in Section 2.3.3. 
Welfare 
AGE policy analyses generate a wide range of outcomes, for example changes in emissions, 
inter-industry transactions, factor demand, income, trade and tax revenues. Moreover, AGE 
models are especially suitable for welfare analysis given that all households, commodities and 
factors are explicitly modelled. Usually the equivalent variation (EV) can be used as a welfare 
measure if utility maximising behaviour is considered. The EV is the difference in expenditures 
on a household consumption bundle between optimal utility levels in two equilibria (e.g., before 
and after a policy change), using the prices of the initial equilibrium. With other words, the EV 
asks (Shoven and Whalley, 1992, p.125): "How much money is a particular change (that has 
taken place between equilibria) equivalent to?" In the model used in this thesis, the EV can be 
derived at all (sub) utility levels of the multi-stage budgeting by the private household (1.67,1.68 
and 1.69) and the government (1.70). 
A disadvantage of using the equivalent variation in the AGE model in this thesis is that it 
does not account for the welfare effects of savings that are not explicitly the result of optimising 
utility (i.e. capital depreciation, government deficit and the balance of trade). Hence, the 
equivalent variation would represent the welfare change of the whole economy only if those 
savings had been held constant. An alternative welfare measure, for example suggested by 
Dervis et al. (1982) that is used in this thesis, is the Laspeyres measure of real income 
change. This measure compares commodity bundles between two equilibria (e.g., before and 
after a policy change), using the prices of the initial equilibrium (I.71) 1 0. This welfare 
measure has the advantage that it allows for the calculation of the welfare effect of savings 
A necessary condition for welfare to have improved is that the Laspeyres index of real income increases. In 
general, the Laspeyres index of real income will constitute an 'upper bound' to the underlying change in 
welfare (Dervis et al., p. 242-243). 
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other than the private savings of which the underlying optimising behaviour is not modelled 
explicitly. 
23 Data specification 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the data that form the basis for the model 
applications in the subsequent chapters. In Section 2.3.1, the Social Accounting Matrices for 
1990 and 1993 are presented. Section 2.3.2 presents the make and use tables that represent 
the origin and destination of commodities. Special attention is given to the elimination of 
hidden data, the disaggregation of agriculture and the meat industry, and the disaggregation 
of margins and indirect taxes/subsidies. Section 2.3.3 describes the construction and 
incorporation of environmental data. Finally, Section 2.3.4 deals with elasticities and 
calibration issues. 
2.3.1 Social Accounting Matrices 
The data for an AGE model can be presented in a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). A SAM is 
a square matrix that represents the transactions in an economy, in which for every income there 
is a corresponding outlay or expenditure. The matrix is structured such that each transactor or 
group of transactors has its own row and column, where rows and columns are identically 
ordered. By convention, receipts recorded by origin are entered in rows and expenditures by 
destination are entered in columns (Pyatt, 1988). The totals of the rows (the receipts) equal the 
totals of the columns (payments). As the basis for the SAMs that show the transactions and 
income flows in the Dutch economy in 1990 and 1993 (see Appendix U), aggregated national 
accounts matrices are used (CBS-1, various years and Keuning and de Gijt, 1992). To be 
compatible with the AGE model, the SAM is adjusted in several respects. Complex transactions 
due to income redistribution or financial sectors, which are not part of the AGE model, are 
simplified or aggregated. In addition, mutual lump-sum transfers between transactors are 
cancelled out. Relevant tax transfers, however, are maintained since they represent distortions in 
the economy that are modelled accordingly. 
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2.3.2 Make and use tables 
The main part of the SAM is formed by make and use tables. A make table shows the origin of 
the commodities that are distinguished in the model: domestic industries and imports. A use 
table shows the destination of the commodities: domestic industries, private and public 
consumption, investments and exports. This representation of the input-output structure in the 
SAM is different from usual SAMs because there is no one to one relation between industries 
and outputs. Dairy farming, for example, is producing six different outputs. Moreover, 
commodities can be produced by more than one industry. Dairy products, for example, are 
produced by the dairy industry but also by dairy farming. To construct make and use tables 
compatible with the AGE model used in this thesis, several additional data manipulations and 
calculations are pursued. In this section, the most important issues are dealt with, i.e. the 
elimination of hidden data, the aggregation level of industries and commodities, and the 
division of margins and indirect taxes/subsidies. 
Elimination of hidden data 
Since the focus of the model is on agriculture and related industries, a high level of 
disaggregation is desired with respect to these industries. For this purpose, use is made of so 
called 'extended' make and use tables (CBS-3, various years), in which a more disaggregated 
level is applied than in the data that has been published officially (CBS-2, various years). 
However, the disadvantage of the extended data sets is that the tables contain hidden rows 
(commodities) and columns (industries). These hidden table entries are created in order to hide 
particular industries and commodities that could be identified easily when just a few large 
suppliers of certain commodities are active. Some hidden industry-commodity entries, however, 
for which a clear one to one relation exists, can be eliminated (see Appendix HI for the 
procedure). Using this procedure, in the make and use table of 1990, 41550 (84%) and 959 
(56%) mln guilders (1990), respectively, on hidden data are eliminated. For 1993, these numbers 
are 28910 (85%) and 1277 (68%) mln guilders (1993), respectively. The most important 
elimination for agriculture concerns the elimination of hidden output data of the fertiliser 
industry (1889 mln guilders in 1990 and 1403 mln guilders in 1993). 
Aggregation level of industries and commodities 
The original data set of about 230 industries and 650 commodities is aggregated into a smaller 
data set of 37 industries and 45 commodities in which agricultural and food commodities ana 
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industries are dominant. In addition, special attention is paid to highly polluting industries, 
energy producing and distributing industries and energy sources (see Appendix IV for a list of 
commodities and industries). The energy sources distinguished in the model include coal, raw 
materials energy (e.g., crude oil), fuels for vehicles, natural gas, distributed gas, other fuels 
for heating and electricity. The only agricultural industry that was present in the original data 
set is disaggregated into six different agricultural industries, i.e. dairy farming, pig farming, 
poultry farming, arable farming, horticulture under glass and other horticulture. This subdivision 
is made because of the different features of the agricultural industries, which are relevant, when 
policy simulations are performed. A limitation of this procedure is, however, that agriculture is 
specified as six specialised industries. In reality, part of agricultural production is observed on 
mixed farms. To avoid peculiar model results, the single meat industry present in the original 
data set is also disaggregated in three meat industries: poultry meat industry, pig meat industry 
and beef and other meat industry1 1. 
Although subdivision of the make table is rather straightforward (e.g., milk is produced by 
dairy farming, pigs by pig farming etc.), subdivision of the use table requires additional 
information. The cost structure of the distinguished industries is revealed using data from 
various sources (LEI/CBS, various years; LEI, various years; CBS-2, various years; CBS-4, 
1993; CBS-5, 1991; Konijn and de Boer, 1994; IKC, 1991; and PMVO, 1995). The make and 
use tables for 1990 and 1993 are summarised in Appendix V. Agricultural and meat industries 
are fully represented in these tables. 
In agriculture, production and prices can be volatile due to, for example, uncontrolled 
natural factors. Hence, the use of a data set for a single year could give untypical estimates 
for cost and revenue shares, and therefore for elasticities in the model (see also Adams, 
1987). In addition, when output prices are low, a negative residual factor income might result. 
Although average cost and revenue shares for a number of years could solve these problems, 
this approach needs significant additional data efforts and is not applied in this thesis. 
Margins and indirect taxes/subsidies 
The supply of commodities (make table) is valued in sellers' prices and c.i.f. import prices. The 
demand of commodities (use table) is valued at buyers' prices and f.o.b. export prices. The 
1 1 Consider the case of one meat industry, processing all types of meat. If, for example, a specific policy 
reduced output by pig farming, it might be the case that due to less input of pigs, the single meat industry 
reduces output and thereby also the input of poultry. Indirectly this might lead to a reduction of poultry 
farming. 
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difference in valuation between the make table and use table consists of the market margins and 
the indirect product-related taxes and subsidies. These market margins and indirect 
taxes/subsidies are included in the make tables (see Tables V.l and V.3), which ensures equality 
between the totals of the make and use tables. It is not known to which transactions market 
margins and indirect taxes/subsidies are related. However, using additional data (CBS-1 and 
CBS-2, various years) market margins can be distinguished at three levels: export (export 
margins), total domestic use (wholesale margins) and household demand (retail margins). 
Equally, product-related taxes and subsidies are distinguished for exports, total domestic use and 
imports (see Appendix VI for the margin and tax tables for 1990 and 1993). 
2.3.3 Environmental data 
In this thesis, emissions are defined as the net discharge of substances that contribute to a 
commonly recognised environmental problem. For example, nitrogen and phosphate emissions 
contribute to eutrophication. In agriculture it should be taken into account that part of the 
nitrogen and phosphate discharge by livestock does not contribute to emissions since it is 
utilised by crops. 
The emission data used to extend the economic model (see Appendix VÏÏ) are taken from 
the National Accounting Matrix including Environmental Accounts (NAMEA) for the 
Netherlands (see for a discussion: de Haan and Keuning, 1996). To be useful, the emission data 
from the NAMEA (CBS-6, 1996) are adjusted to the level of aggregation of the model 1 2. 
Moreover, since emissions are not modelled as economic inputs, emissions have to be related to 
the relevant variables that are present in the economic model. 
In this section, the emission matrix is described for 1993 (see Tables VII.6 to VU. 12). 
Due to lack of information at the time of composing, the emission matrix for 1990 is slightly 
different and less detailed. Several additional data sources are used to compose the emission 
matrices (CBS-7, 1992; CBS-8, 1993; CBS-9, various years; CBS-10, various years; CBS-11, 
1997; CBS-12, various years; CBS-13,1992; MVROM, 1995). 
C 0 2 , NO x , S 0 2 , N 2 0 and CEU emissions (see Tables VII.6 to VII. 10) are related to three 
1 2 The totals of the emission matrix presented in this section are exactly equal to the totals presented in the 
officially published NAMEA for most emissions. However, since it was discovered that a significant 
systematic error was made in the accounting of the N and P statistics for agriculture, these emissions are 
adjusted in the 1993 emission matrix. A mineral balance for N and P is composed for each agricultural 
industry to determine the surplus of these emissions (see appendix VIII). Communicating this error with the 
data source (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Netherlands) resulted in adjustments for these statistics 
since 1999. 
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different types of sources: processes, burning of fossil fuels in stationary sources and burning 
of fossil fuels in mobile sources. Process emissions are not related to a specific commodity 
but result from the technical production process as a whole. In the model, such emissions are 
assumed proportional to output by industries. Emissions that result from the burning of fossil 
fuels in stationary sources in production and consumption are assumed to be proportional to 
the use of natural gas, distributed gas, coal and/or other fuels used for heating, using different 
emission coefficients by energy source and industry. Emissions resulting from mobile sources 
are assumed to be proportional to fuel use by vehicles as well for consumers as for industries. 
N emissions (Table VTI.il) are also related to three types of different sources: air 
emissions, water emissions and soil emissions. N emissions to the air originate from N O x and 
NH3 emissions and hence are indirectly dependent on the variables to which these emissions 
are related. N emissions to water mainly originate from sewage that is assumed to vary with 
output in industries and aggregate consumption. N emissions to the soil, including nitrogen 
leaching to the groundwater, are relevant in agriculture. For each agricultural industry, a 
mineral balance for nitrogen is composed to determine the mineral emission (see Appendix 
Figure VJJJ.1). Part of the N emissions are linked to input of fertiliser and part is related to 
the production of manure that is linked to output 1 3. 
For P emissions (Table VTI.ll) also a distinction is made between water and soil 
emissions. P emissions to water are assumed to be related to consumption and intermediate 
input use of cleaning products. P emissions to the soil in agriculture are calculated identically 
as N emissions (see Appendix Figure VTII.2). 
Emission of NH3 and waste (Table VTI.12) are assumed to be related to output by 
industries and aggregate consumption by consumers. Finally, part of the NH3 emissions in 
agriculture is related to the input of fertiliser. 
2.3.4 Elasticities and calibration 
The parameter values of the functions are crucial in determining the results of policy simulations 
generated with AGE models. The procedure to select parameter values is called calibration. The 
parameters of the model are chosen such that the economy under consideration is assumed to be 
in equilibrium, a so-called "benchmark' equilibrium. Because the benchmark data only give price 
1 3 The nitrogen originating from N 2 0 and N 2 due to denitrification from the soil is not included in the nitrogen 
emissions to the air, since the determination of these emissions is still uncertain (CBS-10, 1997). Hence, 
nitrogen emissions to the soil are slightly overestimated. 
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and quantity observations associated with a single equilibrium, estimates of elasticities are also 
required. The specification of elasticities can be thought of as determining the curvature of 
isoquants and indifference surfaces, with their position given by the benchmark equilibrium 
data. The parameter values that are generated by the benchmark data and elasticities can then be 
used to solve for alternative equilibria associated with different policies, so-called 
'counterfactual' equilibria. 
If the parameters in the model had been estimated by econometric methods, 
econometric tests could be used to validate the model. However, this is not possible if 
parameters are selected by calibration. Sensitivity analysis has to provide insight in the 
correctness of the model specification and the sensitivity of the model results for different 
values of the exogenous variables and substitution and transformation elasticities (see 
Harrison et al., 1993). Few researchers have tried to evaluate the performance of their AGE 
model (for an exception, see Kehoe and Sancho, 1991). 
In the model CES production and CET product transformation functions are used which 
implies that substitution and transformation elasticities (see Appendix DC) have to be 
specified exogenously (Shoven and Whalley, 1992). Most of the substitution and 
transformation elasticities used in this thesis for the production, consumption and trade 
functions are directly taken from Zeelenberg et al. (1991). However, since the industry and 
commodity division do not match, some adjustments are necessary. When in the AGE model 
two or more industries (commodities) are aggregated for which different elasticities are valid, 
a new elasticity is calculated by aggregating the original elasticities using the share of the 
individual industries (commodities) in the relevant CES or CET composite as weights. The 
substitution and transformation elasticities for trade in agricultural and meat products are 
chosen to be higher than the elasticities reported in Zeelenberg et al. (1991), since for these 
commodities a higher level of disaggregation is applied. At the level of aggregation applied 
in this thesis, substitution and transformation elasticities are not available from the literature, 
transformation elasticities used to indicate labour and capital mobility are based on own 
approximations. The sensitivity of the model results with respect to trade elasticities and 
factor mobility is analysed in sensitivity analyses in various chapters. 
The different simulations in this thesis are based on an AGE model that is calibrated 
using data for 1990 or 1993. Due to changing definitions and developments in data 
accounting (e.g., the relatively recent collection of environmental data), the data of the 
different years are not perfectly comparable. In addition, it is recognised that the outcomes of 
the model should be interpreted carefully when 'old' data are used. Although a more recent 
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data set would increase the policy relevance of the model results, additional investments in 
another data set do not take priority in this thesis. 
2.4 Discussion 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a static AGE model for the Netherlands. It is 
possible to analyse various agricultural and environmental policy changes with the model 
developed. In particular the effects on inter-industry transactions, factor demand, income, 
trade and the environment can be determined. The model results are conditional on model 
and data characteristics. Some of them are model specific; some are typical AGE model 
features. Discussions on general AGE model characteristics like the specification of agents, 
dynamics and equilibrium conditions can be found in Gunning and Keyzer (1995), Shoven 
and Whalley (1992) and Peerlings (1993). This section discusses some of the specific 
characteristics and limitations of the way factor markets, trade and the environment are 
calibrated and modelled, which are relevant for the simulations in this thesis. 
Factor markets 
In the basic model, two factors of production are distinguished: labour and capital. Labour 
income is determined statistically by wages including social premiums that is paid for hired 
labour. Capital income is usually determined as a residual income. This would imply, 
however, that the reward for self-employed labour is part of capital income. Since self-
employed labour is an important immobile factor of production in agriculture, it is 
distinguished from capital income in the model. Using a market-based reward for capital, 
immobile self-employed labour is the residual factor income 1 4. A third factor of production 
that could be distinguished in agriculture is land. If land were distinguished from the other 
factors using market prices, however, a negative residual factor income would result. Since it 
is not necessary to consider land as a separate factor in the model simulations in this thesis, it 
is considered as part of the factor capital. 
Total capital supply is exogenous in the model, which has important implications when 
1 4 This same reasoning can be made for self-employed capital on farms that is, at least in the short term, 
immobile. In fact, in the data set for 1993 self-employed capital was considered as part of the immobile 
factor input to avoid a negative reward (as result of low output prices in pig farming that year). The 
immobile factor input in agriculture in 1993 therefore included both self-employed labour and self-employed 
capital. 
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environmental policies are considered. In modelling saving and investment, the approach 
taken by Keller (1979) is followed. The private household buys an aggregate of (newly 
produced) capital goods as saving. In case the production of capital goods is energy intensive, 
the introduction of an energy tax will increase the price of aggregate capital. This has a 
negative effect on savings, since future consumption is more expensive. However, since in 
the static model investments only have a spending effect but no capacity effect, an energy tax 
will not affect the capital stock. Another implication of a fixed capital supply is that a tax on 
capital is not distortionary and hence equivalent to lump sum taxation. 
Trade 
The small country assumption implies that the Netherlands is assumed to be small on world 
markets and therefore cannot affect its terms of trade. This is relevant in this thesis when 
environmental or agricultural policies affect domestic prices. The Armington assumption, on 
the other hand, implies that domestic prices are no longer rigidly linked to world prices. Since 
introducing product differentiation violates the small-country assumption, Dervis et al. (1982) 
therefore call this a weaker form of the small country assumption in the sense that the 
assumption of fixed world market prices still holds. Dervis et al. (1982) also mention some 
different implications on the import and export side when the Armington assumption is 
combined with the small country assumption. As they argue, on the import side, the small 
country assumption implies that a small fraction of the market for commodities produced in 
other countries is constituted. Hence, the Armington assumption does not contradict the 
assumption of infinitely elastic foreign supply curves. Maintaining the small-country 
assumption on the export side, however, is quite different. When a country is selling a 
differentiated product, it may no longer be small in the market for that product. Hence, the 
demand for exports will be less than infinitely elastic and the small-country assumption no 
longer holds. Another implication of the Armington assumption on the export side is that 
output of different industries is assumed to be homogeneous domestically but heterogeneous 
when there is a choice between domestic use and exports. In this thesis, the problem of 
combining the Armington and small country assumption on the export side is partially solved 
by distinguishing commodities that are internationally homogeneous (see also Komen, 1995). 
These commodities are either exported or imported, which is revealed by trade statistics. 
Exports of other commodities are still modelled using the Armington assumption, since 
specifying export demand functions requires additional information on parameters, which is 
not available. For these commodities, an increase in domestic prices due to policy changes 
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will partly be transferred to the rest of the world. 
The specification of a single rest of the world is too restrictive when trade and trade 
policy analyses are considered explicitly. Given the importance of trade for the Netherlands, 
in that case a division into EU and the rest of the world has to be considered for all 
commodities, as is a more explicit modelling of world markets. The same holds when the EU 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is considered. Taking all the CAP instruments into 
account requires a significant additional modelling and data effort for as well the instruments 
as the budgetary flows between the Netherlands and the EU (see for such an effort: Gohin et 
al., 1998; Jongeneel, 2000). Since the focus of this thesis is not primarily on EU CAP 
instruments or trade policies, they are not explicitly taken into account in the basic version of 
the model. 
Environment 
Since the environment is a central part of the model simulations in this thesis, the incorporation 
of emissions into the AGE model needs some attention. 
Although emissions are taken into account at a very detailed level, there are still some 
improvements possible. Due to insufficient information, it is assumed that some emissions by 
industries are related to aggregate output, while it seems clear that part of it is related to 
certain inputs. In addition, not all the harmful emissions are taken into account (e.g., 
pesticides, dioxin, heavy metals, etc.). Moreover, abatement functions are not present in the 
model. In the basic model, a reduction of emissions can therefore only take place by reducing 
inputs and aggregate output by industries and consumer goods and aggregate consumption by 
consumers. In some other studies, abatement functions are taken into account based on ad hoc 
assumptions (e.g., Bergman, 1991; Verbruggen et al., 1999) or embedded in the SAM (e.g., 
Nestor and Pasurka, 1995). At the level of detail applied in this thesis, however, data is 
lacking to derive a consistent set of abatement functions for all emissions by all activities. 
It is recognised that the emission numbers produced by the model simulations should be 
interpreted with care, due to the static and single country nature of the model. Emissions are 
considered as being flows while some emissions are only harmful after reaching a certain 
stock (e.g., the accumulation of phosphate into the soil). Moreover, international flows of 
emissions are not taken into account. 
Finally, in the AGE model in this thesis, environmental quality is not part of the utility 
function of the households. Hence, the welfare measures do not take into account a welfare 
change resulting from a change in environmental quality. Different ways of incorporating 
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environmental quality in welfare measures are possible. In what is called a 'net benefit analysis', 
Boyd et al. (1995) adjust the conventional welfare measures like the EV by monetary estimates 
of environmental benefits. Another approach is to incorporate environmental quality in the 
utility functions of the households. In the models by Piggott et al. (1992) and Perroni and Wigle 
(1994), the utility function is separable in commodities and environmental quality. Espinosa and 
Smith (1995), and Smith and Espinosa (1996) assume that the utility function of households is 
non-separable in commodities and environmental quality. In case of both separability and non-
separability, additional information, for example expenditure on environmental quality, is 
required. For this purpose Espinosa and Smith (1995) and Smith and Espinosa (1996) make use 
of existing non-market valuation estimates of morbidity and mortality effects of several 
emissions. However, given the difficulty of obtaining good estimates, environmental quality is 
mostly omitted from welfare analysis, as is the case in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESTRICTING INTENSIVE LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION: 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MINERAL POLICY FN THE NETHERLANDS 1 
Abstract 
This chapter examines the effects on the Dutch economy of a reduction in intensive livestock 
production using an applied general equilibrium model. A reduction is seen as a possible 
solution to the environmental problems linked with the excess supply of minerals to the 
environment. Results show that a decrease in pig and poultry production to achieve a 
maximum permitted phosphate loss of 30 kg/ha will decrease income of pig and poultry 
farming by 2.6 and 1.0 per cent, respectively. The compound feed, pig meat and poultry meat 
industry are seriously affected. Results for trade show a reduction in net exports of livestock 
and meat and a reduction in net imports of feed stuffs. 
3.1 Introduction 
The high level of agricultural support in the European Union (EU) has increased the use of 
feed imports and raised livestock densities. This has led to a high pressure on the 
environment through an excess supply of minerals (Koopmans, 1987; Bonnieux and Rainelli, 
1988). This excess supply causes denitrification and leaching to the soil of phosphate and 
nitrogen, polluting surface water and ground water. The emission of ammonia from stables 
and manure spreading also contributes to acidification. Therefore, to an increasing extent, 
mineral policies are being implemented in the EU (Vermersch et al., 1993). A reduction in 
livestock production is a possible strategy. 
Economic research on the consequences of mineral policies has focused mainly on the 
consequences at farm level (see among others: Fontein et al., 1994; Vermersch et al., 1993; 
Johnsen, 1993). Koopmans (1987) and Klaassen (1994) focused on the EU level while 
Nieuwenhuize et al. (1995) look at the national level in the Netherlands using an input-output 
This chapter is based on Komen and Peerlings (1998). 
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model. However, input-output analysis is not a useful tool for mineral policy analyses 
because it can only handle changes in final demand for livestock and it includes no price 
relationships. Moreover, an important aspect of reducing livestock production is the effect on 
production, income formation and employment both in livestock farming and other industries 
(e.g., compound feed and meat industries) but also on trade and welfare. Finally, there might 
also be feedback effects from outside the industries primarily concerned. If economy-wide 
consequences remain unidentified, the lack of knowledge may lead to less adequate policies. 
In order to deal with these economy-wide effects and to allow for price changes and 
substitution, using an applied general equilibrium (AGE) model is appropriate. 
In this chapter, it is assumed that the mineral surplus in the Netherlands can be avoided 
by reducing livestock production in pig and poultry farming. In addition, a reduction in pig 
numbers alone is considered, since it might be argued that poultry production should not be 
reduced because the manure that is produced by this industry is more appropriate to export. 
Reducing dairy production is not considered because dairy farming has a relatively low 
production of phosphate per hectare and because of the self-regulating consequences of the 
milk quota. 
Section 3.2 deals with mineral problems and policies in the Netherlands. Section 3.3 
provides information on the model and data characteristics, as far as they differ from the 
version described in Chapter 2. Policy simulations are in Section 3.4. Some of the results are 
elucidated and discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 provides a sensitivity analysis with 
respect to some critical parameters. Finally, in Section 3.7 a summary and conclusions are 
provided. 
3.2 Mineral problems 
In this thesis, livestock is divided into cattle and other animals, pigs and poultry. Dairy 
farming (milk, cattle and other animal production), pig farming (pig production) and poultry 
farming (poultry and eggs production) are the main suppliers of livestock. Of the total gross 
value added at factor cost generated by Dutch agriculture in 1990 (17,800 mln guilder) dairy, 
pig and poultry farming had a share of 32, 12 and 5 per cent respectively (see also Table V.2 
of Appendix V). 
Herd sizes increased during the 1970s and early 1980s (see Table 3.1). In 1984, the 
introduction of the milk quota system reduced dairy cow numbers. In the years after 1984, the 
national dairy herd decreased further because of additional quota reductions and an increased 
Restricting intensive livestock production 29 
productivity of dairy cows. At the same time the number of suckler cows, fattening cattle and 
sheep increased because dairy farmers were looking for alternatives to milk production. 
Table 3.1 Composition of the Dutch livestock population (total numbers in 1000 heads) 
Cattle Pigs Poultry Sheep 
1970 4314 5533 55400 575 
1980 5226 10138 81155 858 
1984 5516 11146 83368 766 
1988 4710 13934 93127 1169 
1992 4920 14161 99361 1954 
1996 4551 14419 91441 1627 
1997 4411 15189 93106 1465 
1998 4283 13446 98692 1394 
Source: LEI/CBS (various years). 
The increase in livestock production (in particular pigs and poultry) was made possible 
by a growing international demand for animal products and a favourable EU (common) 
agricultural policy. Due to price support for cereals in the EU and the absence of import 
levies on imported feedstuff's, import of, for example, tapioca, soy, citrus pulp and maize 
gluten became attractive for Dutch farmers, who exploited their proximity to the port of 
Rotterdam. The positive trade balance in feedstuff's led, in turn, to surpluses of minerals, 
especially phosphate and nitrogen. These surpluses cause denitrification and leaching to the 
soil of phosphate and nitrogen, polluting surface and ground water. The emission of ammonia 
from stables and manure spreading also contributes to acidification. 
In the 1980s and 1990s the Dutch government introduced some policies to reduce 
mineral problems (MLNV-2, 1995). One of these policies involved limiting the amount of 
phosphate from manure that can be produced (phosphate production rights) and applied to 
land 2, depending on soil type, land use and the period of the year. These limitations 
stimulated the processing of manure or its transport to areas with deficits. Moreover, 
restrictions on the ways manure is stored and applied on land aim to reduce the emission of 
ammonia. However, total production rights were set at a level higher than actual phosphate 
2 The government chooses phosphate as a basis for its policy since the phosphate content of manure is rather 
stable, contrary to the nitrogen content In other European countries the focus is more on nitrogen (Vermersch et 
al., 1993). However, due to European legislation with respect to drinking water, in the future a specific nitrogen 
policy in The Netherlands will also be required. If administratively set fixed proportions between manure and 
nitrate had been used, it would of course make no difference whether one focused on phosphate or nitrogen. 
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production. Therefore, they have proven to be not very effective in reducing the production of 
phosphate. Table 3.2 shows the development of the production of minerals by Dutch 
livestock. 
Table 3.2 Production of minerals by Dutch cattle, pigs and poultry (in mln kilograms) 
1970 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 1997 1998 
Phosphate (P 20 5) 170 230 254 238 221 192 190 189 
Nitrogen (total N) 356 483 564 559 583 560 536 531 
Potassium (K 20) 401 534 623 619 644 614 599 588 
Source: LEI/CBS (various years). 
The Dutch government (TKSG, 1996) decided in 1996 to fix limits for permitted 
phosphate losses, instead of permitted phosphate use, per hectare. This permitted phosphate 
loss would be 40 kg/ha in 1998, 30 kg/ha in 2002, 25 kg/ha in 2005 and 20 kg/ha in 2010. 
The losses have to be calculated from a mineral (phosphate and nitrogen) bookkeeping 
system. In this system, the deliveries of minerals to the farm in the form of livestock, feed, 
manure and fertiliser, and the removal of minerals from the farm in the form of products and 
manure are recorded. The difference is the mineral loss for which a levy has to be paid (see 
also Oude Lansink and Peerlings, 1997)3. 
Given assumptions about distribution, exports and technological solutions (new 
feedstuff's and additives in feed) this would result in a national surplus in 1998 and 2002 of 8 
mln and 18 mln kg phosphate, respectively (see Section 3.4). The government intended to let 
this surplus disappear by buying up phosphate production rights itself and siphoning off part 
of the production rights traded amongst producers. 
3 3 Model characteristics 
The model applied in this chapter is calibrated on the 1990 data set. This section gives a 
concise account of the model and data used for the analysis in this chapter. First, some 
differences in the main characteristics with respect to the basic version of the model 
described in Chapter 2 are provided. Secondly, this section deals with the specific 
adjustments of the model that are necessary for the simulations in this chapter. 
3 Since the introduction of the mineral bookkeeping system, some adjustments were made. Currently (2000) 
the focus is not only on phosphate but also on nitrogen. In addition, the permitted mineral losses scheduled 
for 2010 are advanced to 2008. Although the use of fertiliser is not yet considered in calculating the levy, it 
will very likely be taken into account in the near future (MLNV-3,2000). 
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3.3.1 General model characteristics 
The model used in this chapter is slightly different from the model described in Chapter 2. 
The differences are dealt with in this section4. 
Firstly, in this chapter, aggregate output is composed of two aggregate inputs: an 
aggregate intermediate and an aggregate factor input. No distinction is made between an 
aggregate materials and an aggregate energy input. 
Secondly, contrary to the basic version of the model, total labour supply is exogenous. 
In this chapter, a more simple two-stage structure is adopted to represent consumer 
preferences. In the first stage, private household income is distributed over household 
expenditures and savings according a Cobb-Douglas function. This implies that household 
expenditures, savings and non-product-specific indirect taxes (mainly VAT payments) form a 
fixed share of private household income. In the second stage, household expenditures are 
divided over individual commodities according CES uncompensated demand functions. 
These assumptions imply that there is no labour/leisure choice in the model. Hence, a change 
in leisure is also not taken into account in the welfare measure. 
Finally, in the 1990 data set used in this chapter, emissions are not explicitly taken into 
account. Also, a less detailed aggregation level is applied for commodities and industries that 
are related to energy 5. 
3.3.2 Supply quota in an AGE model 
In this chapter, it is assumed that reductions in phosphate surpluses are induced by means of a 
supply quota for aggregate output by intensive livestock farming. A supply quota is a 
quantitative restriction on aggregate output. Since aggregate output is restricted a 'quota rent' 
occurs, which is equal to the difference between the market value and shadow value of 
aggregate output (see Hertel and Tsigas, 1991). It can be modelled equivalently as a variable 
ad valorem tax rate that induces a level of output, Yr, equal to the quota. The 'tax revenue' of 
such a tax equals the quota rent. The quota rent for each restricted industry r (RENTr) enters 
4 The model version used in this chapter was completed before the basic version of the model described in 
Chapter 2 that is slightly more complicated. 
5 In this chapter, 38 commodities and 34 industries are distinguished. In the following chapters, where 
emissions are explicitly taken into account, more industries and commodities that contribute to emissions are 
distinguished. 
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the AGE model, ensuring that the zero profit conditions for restricted industries still hold. 
Hence, the zero profit condition in the basic model (equation 1.22 in appendix I) is adjusted 
accordingly6: 
WYrYr = WAINr.AINr + WAPRr.APRr + RENTr VreR (3.1) 
with 
RcB: subset of restricted industries. 
The quota rent divided by output gives the price of the quota right per unit of output. If quota 
rights are tradeable, the quota price is a market or lease price. If quota rights are not 
tradeable, it is the shadow price of quota that is equivalent to the market price (see also Boots 
et al., 1997). In this chapter, quotas are assumed not tradeable. Since quota rents equal the 
difference between the value of output and inputs, they can be treated as an ordinary source 
of income for owners of the quota rights. In the model, quota rents are part of capital income. 
Hence, equation 1.50 is replaced by: 
Igcap = WTPR2JPR2+J^RENTr (3.2) 
3.4 Policy simulations 
In Table 3.3 national phosphate surpluses after exports (calculated in: MLNV-1, MLNV-2, 
(1995)) are used to calculate the reduction in pig and poultry production necessary to achieve 
a situation without surpluses. In calculating the surplus, it is assumed that the phosphate 
production per animal reduces in time due to technological improvements. Therefore, total 
production of phosphate decreases over time. Moreover, it is assumed that the production of 
phosphate by the dairy herd decreases, because the dairy herd becomes smaller. This is due to 
a combination of the milk quotas and an increase of the milk production per cow. 
The phosphate balance sheet presented in Table 3.3, shows a surplus of 92 mln kg 
phosphate at farm level in the case of a permitted phosphate loss of 40 kg/ha in 1998. Of this 
surplus, 69 mln kg will be distributed to farms and areas with deficits, while 15 mln kg will 
6 In this chapter materials and energy inputs are not distinguished. Hence, in equation (3.1) AINr is the single 
aggregate intermediate input of materials and energy. 
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be processed and exported. Hence, a permitted phosphate loss of 40 kg/ha results in a 
national surplus of 8 mln kg phosphate. Consequently, a reduction of 8.5 per cent in livestock 
numbers is necessary if pig and poultry production are both reduced by equal proportions, 
while a reduction of 12.5 per cent is necessary if only pig production is reduced 7. When the 
environmental standard is tightened to a permitted phosphate loss of 30 kg/ha, reductions are 
20.5 and 31.0 per cent, respectively. In the model, the reductions in phosphate surpluses are 
induced by means of a supply quota for intensive livestock. Quota rents are treated as a 
source of income for the industries concerned. To avoid an increase in phosphate production 
by poultry farming in the cases where only pig production is reduced, production by poultry 
farming is fixed at the base year level. Milk quota are taken into account by setting dairy 
production fixed at the base year level in all simulations. 
Table 3.3 Phosphate production, distribution and surplus (in mln kg phosphate) and calculated 
production reductions in 1998, 2002 and 2005 
Permitted phosphate loss per ha 40 kg (1998) 
30 kg 
(2002) 
25 kg 
(2005) 
Production 200 190 185 
- Dairy 106 102 100 
-Pigs 64 58 55 
- Poultry 30 30 30 
Surplus at farm level 92 87 86 
-/- distribution 69 49 49 
National surplus 23 38 37 
-/- processing plus exports 15 20 20 
National surplus after exports 8 18 17 
% reduction" in: 
Pigs and poultry 
Pigs 
8.5 
12.5 
(=8/94) 
(=8/64) 
20.5 
31.0 
(=18/88) 
(=18/58) 
20.0 
30.9 
(=17/85) 
(=17/55) 
Own calculations. 
Source: MLNV-1 (1995); MLNV-2 (1995), table 5.1. 
3.5 Results 
In this section the effects on production, income formation, commodity prices and trade for 
the Dutch economy of a reduction in pig and poultry production, necessary to achieve a 
situation without phosphate surpluses, are determined. The effects are calculated at different 
7 Hence, it is implicitly assumed that phosphate emissions are related to output. In later chapters, this 
assumption is relaxed when more information is used to relate emissions explicitly to both inputs and 
outputs. 
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levels of permitted phosphate losses. The results of a reduction in livestock production in the 
four different simulations are summarised in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. 
Table 3.4 Effects on trade and prices of selected commodities of reducing pig and poultry 
production (% change from benchmark) 
Variable* Reduction pigs and poultry 
Permitted phosphate loss (kg/ha): 40 kg 30 kg 
Reduction pigs only 
40 kg 30 kg 
Producer prices 
Pigs 
Poultry 
Grain 
Grain substitutes 
Compound feed 
Pig meat 
Poultry meat 
Export 
Pigs (966) 
Poultry (223) 
Eggs (743) 
Grain (169) 
Grain substitutes (1037) 
Compound feed (917) 
Pig meat (4546) 
Poultry meat (1406) 
Import 
Poultry (82) 
Grain (1943) 
Grain substitutes (1915) 
Compound feed (383) 
Pig meat (327) 
Poultry meat (315) 
Miscellaneous 
Balance of trade surplus (fixed at 19758) 
Exchange rate (in 1990 guilders/dollar) 
0.2 
2.4 
0.2 
-0.4 
-1.5 
-1.1 
0.2 
1.2 
-53.4 
-16.1 
-12.7 
-1.7 
-1.3 
-0.7 
0.1 
-7.9 
1.0 
-2.8 
-7.4 
-10.9 
-0.0 
-3.0 
0.00 
0.19 
2.3 
6.6 
0.5 
-1.0 
-3.6 
-2.6 
1.3 
3.3 
-100.0 
-37.1 
-30.6 
-4.0 
-2.9 
-1.7 
-7.0 
-19.6 
3.8 
-6.5 
-17.0 
-24.6 
-2.3 
-7.1 
0.00 
0.48 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
-0.5 
-1.5 
-1.1 
0.2 
0.2 
-78.6 
-0.0 
0.0 
-1.8 
-1.4 
-0.7 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
-2.9 
-7.5 
-11.2 
-0.0 
-0.1 
0.00 
0.20 
5.7 
0.5 
0.5 
-1.1 
-3.7 
-2.7 
3.3 
0.4 
-119.6 
-0.0 
0.2 
-4.2 
-3.0 
-1.7 
-19.0 
0.2 
0.0 
-6.9 
-17.6 
-25.5 
-5.3 
-0.2 
0.00 
0.50 
Base year quantities, in mln 1990 guilders, between parentheses. 
Table 3.4 shows that a reduction in pig production alone to achieve a permitted 
phosphate loss of 40 kg/ha does not lead (except for an exchange rate change) to a price 
change for pigs. The perfect homogeneity assumption equalises the domestic and export 
price. The fall in domestic production leads to a drop in exports of 78.6 per cent. If pig 
production alone is reduced to achieve a permitted phosphate loss of 30 kg/ha, the 
Netherlands becomes a pig importer. This shift leads to an increase in the domestic price (5.7 
per cent), because it is the import price instead of the lower export price that determines the 
domestic price. There is a difference between the import (c.i.f) and export (f.o.b.) price 
because of market margins. When both pig and poultry production are reduced, in line with a 
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permitted phosphate loss of 30 kg/ha, there is no trade in pigs. The domestic price happens to 
lie between the import and export price. 
Table 3.5 shows that a decrease in both pig and poultry production, to achieve a 
phosphate loss of 30 kg/ha, will decrease income (including rents) in pig and poultry farming 
by 2.6 and 1.0 per cent, respectively. The small income decreases of pig and poultry farming 
result from the fact that reductions in income excluding rents of 42.9 and 40.8 per cent, 
respectively, are compensated for a large part by rents of 886 and 353 mln 1990 guilders, 
respectively. Income (including rents) and the size of the rents is determined by output prices 
and prices and use of intermediate and factor inputs. Prices of pigs and poultry production 
increase by 2.3 and 3.9 per cent, respectively, because pig and poultry supply falls. The price 
of the aggregate intermediate input is largely determined by the price of compound feed. This 
price falls because of the smaller demand for feed by pig and poultry farming. The price and 
use of the aggregate factor input is largely influenced by the degree of factor mobility and the 
substitution possibilities between the aggregate factor and intermediate input. The reduction 
in production leads to a smaller demand for the aggregate factor input. However, with a small 
degree of factor mobility, demand cannot fall much, which triggers a relatively large 
reduction in price. Due to substitution between the aggregate intermediate and factor input, in 
combination with low factor mobility, a reduction in production leads to a relatively large 
reduction in aggregate intermediate input use. If pig production alone is reduced to achieve a 
phosphate loss of 30 kg/ha, income (including rents) of pig farming will decrease by 4.8 per 
cent. In poultry and dairy farming, rents are created even without a reduction in production 
(quota levels are set at the old production level). This is caused by a fall in feed costs 
(compound feed prices fall) and a small increase in output prices. 
The effects on factor input use, income and trade for the meat industry are strongly 
determined by the price of livestock and the availability of livestock, which is determined by 
domestic production (fixed at quota levels) and trade. For example, both the production and 
income for the pig meat industry hardly change at a permitted phosphate loss of 40 kg/ha, 
because the price of pigs does not change. However, at a phosphate loss of 30 kg/ha 
(reducing pigs only), production and income will fall by 13 and 15 per cent, respectively, due 
to the 6 per cent higher price for pigs. The effects on the compound feed industry are nearly 
independent of the way livestock production is reduced, because of the fixed relation between 
phosphate production and feed input. 
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Table 3.5 Effects on the Dutch economy and selected industries of reducing pig and poultry 
production (% change from benchmark) 
Variable" Reduction pigs and poultry Reduce pigs only 
Permitted phosphate loss (kg/ha): 40 kg 30 kg 40 kg 30 kg 
-8.5 -20.5 -12.5 -31.0 
-8.5 -20.5 0.0 0.0 
-5.7 -13.4 -5.9 -13.9 
0.0 -4.7 0.0 -12.7 
-5.8 -14.5 0.0 0.1 
0.2 2.3 0.2 5.7 
1.4 3.9 0.2 0.5 
-1.0 -2.3 -1.0 -2.4 
0.2 1.3 0.2 3.1 
1.1 3.1 0.2 0.4 
-10.3 -24.1 -15.0 -35.7 
-10.3 -24.2 0.1 0.2 
-6.0 -14.0 -6.1 -14.5 
0.0 -5.2 0.0 -13.7 
-6.5 -16.0 0.0 0.0 
-0.7 -1.3 -0.8 -0.6 
-1.0 -2.5 -1.1 -2.7 
-0.3 -0.8 -0.4 -0.9 
0.2 2.0 0.2 5.2 
2.3 6.2 0.2 0.4 
-3.6 -9.1 -5.4 -14.5 
-4.8 -12.1 -0.1 -0.3 
-3.5 -8.4 -3.6 -8.7 
0.1 -1.8 0.1 -5.3 
-2.4 -6.2 0.1 0.2 
-17.1 -37.2 -24.2 -51.1 
-14.6 -32.7 -0.6 -1.5 
-6.5 -15.2 -6.6 -15.7 
0.1 -3.7 0.1 -9.9 
-4.7 -11.7 0.1 0.2 
-0.4 -1.0 -0.4 -1.1 
-20.1 -42.9 -28.2 -58.2 
-18.8 -40.8 -0.7 -1.8 
-9.8 -22.3 -10.0 -23.1 
0.2 -5.4 0.2 -14.7 
-7.0 -17.1 0.2 0.4 
0.4 1.1 0.5 1.2 
-1.8 -2.6 -4.1 -4.8 
0.4 -1.0 2.5 6.2 
-0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.14 
-192.5 -623.9 -189.8 -795.5 
50.2 125.9 51.7 135.0 
403.1 885.7 531.1 1173.8 
170.3 353.4 28.6 71.2 
Quantity production 
Pig farming (7673) 
Poultry farming (2558) 
Compound feed industry (9283) 
Pig meat industry (8814) 
Poultry meat industry (2245) 
Price production 
Pig farming 
Poultry farming 
Compound feed industry 
Pig meat industry 
Poultry meat industry 
Quantity aggregate intermediate input 
Pig farming (5241) 
Poultry farming (1596) 
Compound feed industry (7485) 
Pig meat industry (7209) 
Poultry meat industry (1708) 
Price aggregate intermediate input 
Pig farming 
Poultry farming 
Compound feed industry 
Pig meat industry 
Poultry meat industry 
Quantity aggregate factor input 
Pig farming (2151) 
Poultry farming (878) 
Compound feed industry (1418) 
Pig meat industry (1087) 
Poultry meat industry (347) 
Price aggregate factor input 
Pig farming 
Poultry farming 
Compound feed industry 
Pig meat industry 
Poultry meat industry 
Income 
Dairy farming (5926) 
Pig farming (2198) 
Poultry farming (888) 
Compound feed industry (942) 
Pig meat industry (1169) 
Poultry meat industry (367) 
Income including rents 
Dairy farming (5926) 
Pig farming (2198) 
Poultry farming (888) 
Miscellaneous 
National income (516267) 
Welfare" 
Rent dairy farmingb 
Rent pig farmingb 
Rent poultry farming6 
Base year quantities, in mln 1990 guilders, between parentheses. 
Welfare and rents in mln 1990 guilders. 
Restricting intensive livestock production 37 
Imports of grain substitutes and grain, used in the compound feed industry, fall. Dutch arable 
farming is only slightly affected (small reduction in production and income) because only a 
small part of its production is used in the compound feed industry (except for some grain and 
grain substitutes)8. Moreover, the lower prices for grain and grain substitutes have a larger 
effect on trade than on domestic production. Income in the compound feed and meat 
industries is relatively strongly affected, compared to the livestock industries, because of the 
absence of quota rents. In all cases, the exchange rate appreciates, which indicates that 
especially exporting industries are affected by the livestock reduction. 
In the case of a permitted phosphate loss of 30 kg/ha when only pig production is 
reduced, welfare decreases by 800 mln 1990 guilders, which is only 0.15 per cent of national 
income. Columns 3 and 5 of Table 3.5 show that, from a welfare perspective, to achieve the 
same environmental goal, it is better to have a smaller reduction in two different industries 
than a larger reduction in one industry. It is important to note that these welfare reductions 
would be offset by environmental improvements, which are not included in the welfare 
measure. 
3.6 Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis provides insight into the robustness of the model results for different 
values of the chosen parameters. This section contains a sensitivity analysis with respect to 
the trade substitution and transformation elasticities for agricultural and meat products 
(3.6.1), and factor transformation elasticities (3.6.2). 
3.6.1 Trade substitution and transformation elasticities 
The base simulations use trade substitution and transformation elasticities, for agricultural 
and meat products of 4.5 and 3, respectively. For trade in pigs and eggs, the homogeneity 
assumption is used. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3.6 show the results for lower (3) and higher 
(4) trade substitution and transformation elasticities than in the base simulation (column 2) 
for meat products and agricultural products, except for pigs and eggs (where the homogeneity 
assumption is maintained). 
8 There is no effect on arable farming through manure trade since this market is not present in the national 
accounts and therefore not modelled. 
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Table 3.6 Effects on the Dutch economy of reducing pig and poultry production at 30 kg/ha 
phosphate loss, using different trade elasticities (% change from benchmark) 
Variable" 
Base case Low trade elasticities0 
High trade 
elasticities'1 
Armington 
assumption 
Pigs 
Production 
Pig meat industry (8814) 
Mobile labour 
Pig meat industry (634) 
Capital 
Pig meat industry (453) 
Income 
Pig farming (2198) 
Poultry farming (888) 
Pig meat industry (1169) 
Income including rents 
Pig farming (2198) 
Poultry farming (888) 
Producer prices 
Pigs 
Poultry 
Grain 
Compound feed 
Pig meat 
Poultry meat 
Export 
Pigs (966)" 
Poultry (223) 
Pig meat (4546) 
Poultry meat (1406) 
Import 
Pigs (24)d 
Poultry (82) 
Pig meat (327) 
Poultry meat (315) 
Miscellaneous 
Exchange rate (in 1990 guilders/dollar) 
National income (516267) 
Welfare" 
Rent pig farming1 
Rent poultry farmingb 
-4.7 
-1.9 
-42.9 
-40.8 
-5.4 
-2.6 
-1.0 
2.3 
6.6 
-1.0 
-2.6 
1.3 
3.3 
-100.0 
-37.1 
-7.0 
-19.6 
3.8 
-2.3 
-7.1 
0.48 
-0.09 
-623.9 
885.7 
353.4 
-4.7 
-1.5 
-1.6 
-43.3 
-41.5 
-4.7 
1.8 
7.0 
3.2 
11.1 
-3.4 
-4.3 
2.3 
7.7 
-100.0 
-30.4 
-6.4 
-20.9 
-7.6 
-2.8 
-9.3 
0.55 
-0.08 
-717.6 
991.1 
430.1 
-4.8 
-1.9 
-2.0 
-42.8 
-40.7 
-5.7 
-4.0 
-3.5 
2.0 
5.2 
-0.4 
-2.1 
1.0 
2.1 
-100.0 
-41.1 
-7.2 
-18.3 
12.2 
-2.1 
-6.2 
0.46 
-0.09 
-590.3 
853.1 
330.0 
-15.0 
-6.2 
-6.5 
-42.5 
-40.9 
-17.4 
5.9 
-1.0 
6.1 
6.6 
-1.0 
-2.6 
3.9 
3.3 
-37.7 
-37.1 
-22.4 
-19.6 
1.6 
3.8 
-6.1 
-7.1 
0.48 
-0.14 
-785.1 
1063.4 
353.7 
See "•"Table 3.5. 
In the case of low (high) trade elasticities, the absolute values of the trade elasticities are changed from 
4.5 to 1.5 (low) and 7.5 (high) for agricultural products (G1-G12) and from 3 to 1.15 (low) and 5 (high) 
for meat products (G16-G18). 
In the case of the Armington assumption for trade in pigs, net trade in pigs (966 mln guilders) is 
composed of 990 mln guilders export and 24 mln guilders import. 
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The results show that, in both cases, there is no trade in pigs. Producer price changes 
are lower in the case of higher trade elasticities, because domestic poultry prices and prices 
for pig meat and poultry meat prices are determined, to a larger extent, by world market 
prices, which are assumed to be constant9. Low pig meat prices would result in a lower 
demand for pigs. However, since there is no trade in pigs and pig production is given, high 
trade elasticities also result in lower prices for pigs. These lower pig and poultry prices result 
in a decrease in the income from pig and poultry farming. With low trade elasticities, higher 
prices for pigs and poultry are translated into higher income. This reflects the fact that as 
Dutch commodities become more different from foreign commodities, domestic production 
reduction becomes less harmful for the industries concerned. The results show that with low 
trade substitution and transformation elasticities, it is even possible that by reducing 
production, income will rise. The more the domestic and foreign products are differentiated, 
the higher the rent in agriculture is. The lower welfare shows, however, that low trade 
elasticities are detrimental for the Netherlands as a whole. The less flexible production 
structure resulting from low trade substitution and transformation elasticities hampers an 
efficient allocation of factor inputs and commodities. The previous results are confirmed by 
the results in column 5 in Table 3.6 where, for the trade in pigs, the Armington assumption is 
adopted. In this case, an infinitely high trade elasticity is replaced by a lower value. The 
higher price for pigs results in a higher income from pig farming than in the base simulation. 
The consequences for the pig meat industry are significant. The higher price for pigs results 
in lower production and income. For the economy as a whole, the lower flexibility results in 
lower welfare. 
3.6.2 Factor transformation elasticities 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.7 show the sensitivity of the results to the magnitude of the 
factor transformation elasticities determining the degree of factor mobility. It can be 
concluded that with lower factor mobility than in the base simulation (column 2), fewer 
In the case of multi-country models, the consequences of the choice of trade elasticities are more complicated 
because the monopoly power implicit in national product differentiation is the source of strong terms of trade 
effects (see Shiells and Reinert, 1993). Terms of trade effects do not occur in single country models in which the 
small country assumption applies and thus world market prices (for both imports and exports) are assumed to be 
fixed. In this case, the rest of the world implicitly does not consider the specific country's products as being 
different from other countries. 
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factors will leave pig and poultry farming, which results in lower factor prices and higher 
rents generated. Moreover, due to the fact that more factors stay in the industry, both the 
quantity and price of aggregate intermediate inputs decrease more than in the base simulation. 
Table 3.7 Effects on the Dutch economy of reducing pig and poultry production at 30 kg/ha 
phosphate loss, using different factor market elasticities (% change from benchmark) 
Effects of different simulations (% changes) 
Variable' Low High Low substitution 
Base case factor factor hired/self 
mobility0 mobility0 employed labourd 
Quantity production 
Pig farming (7673) -20.5 -20.5 -20.5 -20.5 
Poultry farming (2558) -20.5 -20.5 -20.5 -20.5 
Price production 
Pig farming 2.3 2.4 1.7 2.3 
Poultry farming 3.9 4.1 2.8 3.9 
Quantity aggregate intermediate input 
Pig farming (1153) -24.1 -24.7 -22.9 -24.2 
Poultry fanning (623) -24.2 -25.2 -22.2 -24.3 
Price aggregate intermediate input 
Pig farming -1.3 -1.8 -0.4 -1.3 
Poultry farming -2.5 -3.1 -1.1 -2.5 
Quantity aggregate factor Input 
Pig farming (2151) -9.1 -6.8 -13.5 -9.0 
Poultry farming (878) -12.1 -9.3 -17.0 -11.9 
Price aggregate factor input 
Pig farming -37.2 -42.4 -25.3 -37.5 
Poultry farming -32.7 -40.3 -16.0 -33.2 
Income 
Pig farming (2198) -42.9 -46.3 -35.4 -43.1 
Poultry farming (888) -40.8 -45.8 -30.3 -41.1 
Pig meat industry (1169) -5.4 -5.5 -5.0 -5.4 
Poultry meat industry (367) -17.1 -17.5 -15.9 -17.1 
Income including rents 
Pig farming (2198) -2.6 -0.1 -9.0 -2.5 
Poultry farming (888) -1.0 2.2 -9.3 -0.9 
Miscellaneous 
Exchange rate (in 1990 guilders/dollar) 0.48 0.50 0.34 0.48 
National income (516267) -0.09 -0.10 -0.04 -0.09 
Welfare" -623.9 -680.0 -345.8 -628.0 
Rent pig farming" 885.7 1015.8 580.0 893.7 
Rent poultry farming" 353.4 426.4 186.2 357.4 
See Table 3.5. 
In the case of low Ough) factor mobility, the transformation elasticity is changed from -0.5 to -0.3 (low) 
and -5 (high) for the distribution of labour and from -0.6 to -0.3 (low) and -6 (high) for the distribution of 
capital. 
In the case of low substitutability between self employed and hired labour in agricultural industries, the 
substitution elasticities are changed from 1.5 to 0.3. 
Restricting intensive livestock production 41 
The net effect is that income (including rents) in both pig farming and poultry farming is 
higher with low factor mobility compared to the base case (in poultry farming income rises). 
When factor mobility is high, rents will be lower resulting in significantly lower income. It 
means that, in the long run, rents will disappear due to an adjusting production structure. 
High factor mobility means more flexibility in the economy, which is beneficial for the 
economy as a whole, represented by a smaller decrease in welfare. However, it is not 
necessarily beneficial for an individual industry. Pig and poultry farming profit less from high 
factor mobility because output prices increase less and feed prices decrease less (in perfectly 
price-elastic output and factor markets, price changes would be zero), leading to a larger 
reduction in income, including rents. At the same time, with high factor mobility, factor 
prices are determined, to a larger degree, outside agriculture. This leads to a larger reduction 
in factor use and a smaller reduction in income excluding rents. 
In column 5, the effects of a low substitution elasticity between immobile (self 
employed) and mobile (hired) labour in the agricultural industries are presented. The results 
are not very sensitive to a change in the substitution elasticity, due to the low share of hired 
labour in pig, poultry and dairy farming. 
3.7 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter quantifies the effects on the Dutch economy of different reductions in livestock 
production necessary to achieve environmentally acceptable phosphate losses using an AGE 
model. The effects of permitted nitrogen losses are not considered, because this was not yet 
part of the policy at the time (1996) the study for this chapter was performed. The simulations 
give a good insight into the effects that stricter mineral policy might cause. The results are, of 
course, conditional on the model characteristics; e.g., functional forms, specification of 
agents and commodities, and the static nature of the model, and should be interpreted with 
care. This is especially the case since AGE models cannot be estimated and tested 
econometrically. 
To permit a better insight into the consequences of mineral policies for the 
environment, the model would have to include some technical relationships. Mineral 
surpluses could be generated by means of emission functions and treated by an abatement 
industry (Nestor and Pasurka, 1995). Moreover, the detrimental effects of a mineral surplus 
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on agricultural production and welfare could be considered. Including minerals in the model 
would also be useful in showing the inefficiency of reducing livestock production instead of 
using market-based instruments to reduce the mineral surplus 1 0. 
A decrease in livestock production to achieve a phosphate loss of 30 kg/ha will 
decrease income (including rents) from pig and poultry farming by 2.6 and 1.0 per cent, 
respectively. If pig production alone is reduced, the income from pig farming will decrease 
by 4.8 per cent. This is under the assumption that livestock farmers do not incur manure 
transportation costs [74 mln guilders in 1992/93; LEI (1994)], pay no levies [36 mln guilders 
in 1992/93; LEI (1994)] and technological progress is free. However, as this is unrealistic, the 
effects on income are underestimated. Nevertheless, the fact that the perfect homogeneity 
assumption in pig trade is used, tends to overestimate the negative effects on income. The 
lower production in pig and poultry farming affects the production and income of the 
compound feed, pig and poultry meat industries more seriously than the livestock industries 
because of the absence of quota rents. The effects on trade are that net exports of livestock 
and net imports of feedstuff's decrease. Moreover, in all cases, the exchange rate appreciates, 
which indicates that the trade position of the Netherlands would deteriorate because of the 
livestock reduction. 
Total welfare reductions would be offset by a welfare increase caused by improved 
environmental quality. However, there are no estimates available of such a welfare 
improvement. 
The results of the model simulations place Dutch manure and phosphate surplus 
reduction policies in a broader perspective. They also show the important linkages that are 
present with the rest of the economy. This forms the background to discussions on the 
advantages and disadvantages of reducing livestock production in Dutch agriculture and on 
the design of policies in other countries that deal with the same environmental problems. 
Of course this would be useful only if emissions are not fully proportional to output in which case the results 
will be exactly the same. Emissions are related to both inputs and output in Chapters 5 and 6, which deal 
with restricting eutrophication and nitrogen emissions, respectively. 
CHAPTER 4 
ENERGY TAXES IN THE NETHERLANDS: WHAT ARE THE DIVIDENDS? 1 
Abstract 
In this chapter, the environmental and economic effects of the introduction of a unilateral 
energy tax in the Netherlands are analysed using an applied general equilibrium (AGE) 
model. The effects of a small-user energy tax and a general energy tax are compared, while 
taking into account different tax recycling mechanisms. The AGE model contains a high level 
of detail with respect to emissions and environmental indicators (indicators measuring the 
greenhouse effect, acidification, eutrophication and waste accumulation), which is helpful for 
assessing environmental quality. The results show that the introduction of a small 
environmental tax reform not only improves the environment but also raises non-
environmental welfare, which is due to an improvement in the efficiency of the tax structure. 
4.1 Introduction 
Like the other signatory countries of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), 
the Netherlands has recognised the importance of its national contribution to the greenhouse 
effect. To reduce CO2 emissions (the main greenhouse gas), the Dutch government decided to 
introduce a unilateral energy tax. A fundamental problem for a small open country is that 
foreign countries may choose not to use taxes and often pursue a less ambitious environ-
mental policy. Industries which are particularly energy-intensive and which face international 
competition have to bear a high burden which could also harm the country as a whole 
(Bovenberg, 1993). Moreover, there is the question whether global emissions of CO2 will fall 
because of the energy tax since production of energy intensive commodities may relocate to 
other countries (emission leakage effect). International reallocation of production is less of a 
threat if only households and small users are taxed (see Bovenberg, 1993; Hoel, 1996; 
Böhringer and Rutherford, 1997). The Dutch government implemented their policy by taxing 
1 This chapter is based on Komen and Peerlings (1999). 
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fossil fuels (except fuels for vehicles) and electricity use by households and 'small' energy 
users. Moreover, the revenues of the energy tax are used to reduce taxes on labour. In doing 
so, detrimental effects of the energy tax on energy users are (partly) offset while pre-existing 
tax distortions in the labour market decrease. 
In this chapter, the environmental and economic effects of the introduction of a 
unilateral energy tax in the Netherlands are analysed using an applied general equilibrium 
(AGE) model 2. The effects of a small-user energy tax and a general energy tax are compared, 
taking into account different tax recycling mechanisms. Although a carbon tax is expected to 
be more efficient than an energy tax from a welfare perspective, it is not considered in this 
chapter to keep the analysis of the real tax policy transparent. Special attention is paid to 
horticulture that is one of the industries that are partly exempted. The chapter contributes to 
the existing literature on environmental tax reforms in two respects. 
Firstly, in the AGE model presented, several emissions related to inputs, production and 
consumption are explicitly taken into account at a very detailed level. Although in several 
AGE models emissions are included (BQhringer and Rutherford, 1997, for CO2 emissions; 
Larsen, 1997, for NO„ emissions), previous work dealing with multiple emissions at such a 
detailed level is still scarce. Moreover, emissions are converted into four environmental 
indicators that measure the greenhouse effect, acidification, eutrophication and waste 
accumulation. For a good assessment of the environmental effects of an 'environmental tax 
reform', such environmental detail is necessary because emission factors differ to a large 
extent among the different agents and emission sources within an economy. 
Secondly, this chapter contributes to the notion of the double dividend. According to 
the 'standard double dividend literature' a revenue-neutral tax reform might: not only (1) 
improve the environment, but also (2a) reduce the distortionary costs of the tax system, 
and/or (2b) reduce unemployment (for a clear discussion see Goulder, 1995a; de Mooij, 
1999). It is also argued that a second dividend (2a) may not occur when the gains from using 
pollution tax revenues to substitute for other distortionary tax revenues are offset by the 
distortionary effects that result from the introduction of the pollution tax itself (see 
Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994; Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg, 1994). The results in this 
chapter show that if only consumers and small energy users are taxed, a double dividend 
2 A number of papers have also dealt with the effects of an energy tax using an AGE model, among which: 
Conrad and Schrader (1991), BShringer and Rutherford (1997) and Goulder (1995b). Papers dealing with an 
energy tax in the Netherlands are the Centraal Planbureau (1992 and 1993) and Dellink and Jansen (1995). 
These papers, however, are not based on the green tax reform of 1996 (e.g., different tax rates and 
exemptions) while the effects for the environment are not analysed. 
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occurs. In an exceptional case, a double dividend may even exist when the tax revenues are 
returned in a lump sum fashion. Both cases are due to inefficiencies in the tax system in the 
benchmark. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 sketches the 
contribution of the different economic agents to the environmental problems in the 
Netherlands. Section 4.3 deals with specific characteristics of the model used for the analysis 
in this chapter. Policy simulations are presented in Section 4.4 and some of the results are 
elucidated in Section 4.5. The responsiveness of the results to some critical assumptions is 
determined using sensitivity analyses in Section 4.6. Finally, a summary and general 
conclusions are provided in Section 4.7. 
4.2 Emissions and environmental indicators 
In this chapter, so-called 'environmental themes' are adopted from the Netherlands' National 
Environmental Policy Plan (MVROM, 1989). These environmental themes are used as an 
inventory framework of current environmental issues in the Netherlands. The following 
environmental themes are considered: greenhouse effect, acidification, eutrophication, and 
accumulation of waste. To quantify each theme, nine specific emissions are distinguished 
and, using theme equivalents, converted into four environmental indicators3. 
Table 4.1 Contribution to greenhouse effect by industries and consumers in the Netherlands (1990) 
Greenhouse gas excluding CFK's (mln kg C 0 2 equivalents8) 
co 2 N 2 0 CBL, Total Total % 
Agricultureb 8671 7312 5628 21611 12.1 
Agribusinessb 4759 0 0 4759 2.7 
Other industries'1 42840 2979 914 46733 26.2 
Public utilities" 38450 0 793 39243 22.0 
Services'" 24000 1083 88 25171 14.1 
Consumption 34570 1896 154 36620 20.5 
Waste dumping" 0 0 4152 4152 2.3 
TOTAL 153290 13270 11730 178290 100.0 
" 1 kg N 2 0 is 270 kg C 0 2 equivalent; 1 kg CH4 is 11 kg C 0 2 equivalent. 
To save space, the 37 industries present in the model are aggregated into 5 groups. 
0 Emissions by waste dumping are related to accumulated waste at rubbish dumps. 
Source: CBS-6 (1996) and own calculations. 
Hence, environmental indicators are a quantification of environmental themes. In the remainder of this 
thesis, the term 'environmental indicator' will be used as a synonym for 'environmental theme'. 
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The contribution of the different economic agents in the Netherlands to emissions and 
environmental indicators in 1990 is summarised in Tables 4.1 to 4.3. The figures presented 
are aggregated from a larger data set used in the model, which is not shown here to save 
space. In Table 4.1, the contribution to the greenhouse effect by different sources is shown. 
Emissions that contribute to the greenhouse effect are carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide 
(N2O) and methane (CH4). The emissions are aggregated using kg CO2 emission equivalents. 
CO2 is the most important pollutant in all industries. In agriculture, however, N2O and CIL. 
are also important greenhouse gases. 
Table 4.2 Contribution to acidification by industries and consumers in the Netherlands (1990) 
Acidification (mln acid equivalents") 
NO x so 2 NH3 Total Total % 
Agriculture 395 63 13857 14316 42.5 
Agribusiness 307 63 0 370 1.1 
Other industries 2876 3784 178 6838 20.3 
Public utilities 1668 1482 0 3150 9.4 
Services 3468 820 0 4288 12.7 
Consumption 3885 158 654 4697 14.0 
TOTAL 12600 6370 14690 33660 100.0 
" Quantities of acidifying compounds are expressed in molarity: 1 acid equivalent is equal to 1 mole H*. 
1 kg NO„ is 0.22 acid equivalent 1kg S 0 2 is 0.31 acid equivalent; 1 kg NH 3 is 0.59 acid equivalent 
Source: CBS-6 (1996) and own calculations. 
Table 4.2 shows the acidification sources. Emissions that contribute to acidification are 
nitrogen oxides (NO x), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and ammonia (NH3). The different emissions 
are aggregated using acid equivalents. NH3, mainly emitted in agriculture, is the most 
important pollutant. 
Table 4.3 Contribution to eutrophication and waste by industries and consumers in the Nether-
lands (1990) 
Eutrophication (mln kg N equivalents") Waste (mln kg) 
N P Total Total % Waste Total % 
Agriculture 1197 1324 2521 73.6 731 3.1 
Agribusiness 29 90 119 3.5 1647 7.0 
Other industries 51 80 131 3.8 10262 43.6 
Public utilities 23 0 23 0.7 610 2.6 
Services 105 261 366 10.7 3850 16.4 
Consumption 126 140 266 7.8 6440 27.4 
TOTAL 1531 1896 3427 100.0 23540 100.0 
" 1 kg P is 10 kg N equivalents. 
Source: CBS-6 (1996) and own calculations. 
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Table 4.3 shows the contribution of different sources to eutrophication and waste 
accumulation. Nitrogen (N) and phosphate (P) are aggregated using kg nitrogen equivalents. 
Clearly, agriculture with its high livestock production is the most important contributor to 
eutrophication in the Netherlands. 
An advantage of environmental indicators is that they summarise different types of 
emissions. There are, however, also at least three drawbacks when environmental indicators 
are used in the way described. First, not all harmful emissions are considered (e.g., pesticides, 
dioxin, heavy metals, etc.). Second, the environmental indicators do not reflect the current 
quality of the environment. Environmental indicators are considered as being flows while 
some emissions are only harmful after reaching a certain stock (e.g., the accumulation of 
phosphate into the soil). Moreover, there exist also international flows of emissions that are 
not considered in this chapter. Third, although different emissions can be aggregated into 
single environmental indicators, the same is not true for the indicators themselves. From a 
policy perspective, it still seems a matter of subjective choice, which weight to attach to each 
environmental indicator. 
Although the overall environmental quality may be determined in a higher spatial and 
time dimension, environmental indicators are useful to evaluate the environmental effects of 
environmental policies. 
4 3 Model characteristics 
The model applied in this chapter is calibrated on the 1990 data set. This section deals with 
the specific adjustments of the model described in Chapter 2 that are used for the simulations 
in this chapter. Moreover, some features of the model that are especially relevant in light of 
the analysis in this chapter are discussed. 
4.3.1 Energy taxes and tax revenue recycling 
In this chapter, a reduction in domestic energy use is achieved by means of an energy tax. 
The energy tax is levied on certain commodities for domestic industries and consumers (see 
Section 4.4 for a description of the model simulations). Hence, the relevant price equations in 
the model for intermediate energy inputs (1.36) and private household demand (1.37) need to 
be replaced by (4.1) and (4.2), respectively, to take the energy tax rate,* 6", into account: 
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WINt,g = d + tZ).WDUg VbeB,VgeSm (4.1) 
WDU?= (l + m™+t?).WDUg V g e S O T (4.2) 
Energy tax revenues TXm is given by equation (4.3): 
E S T - = JfiWDU,*? +1 Z C - r a c / A (4-3> 
In this chapter, the revenues of the energy tax are used to reduce taxes on labour. Hence, the 
tax rate in the price equation of labour (1.45) is adjusted for an endogenous tax recycling rate, 
^labial . 
WTPRX = WTPR^'.il + t^10' -r1"""") (4.3) 
Simulations are based on a revenue-neutral tax reform in the sense that welfare derived by 
government consumption is held fixed in order to derive a transparent welfare analysis. Since 
the tax reform might also induce changes in revenues of other taxes or changes in prices of 
government consumption, an endogenous tax transfer fX*™" is added to the government 
budget equation (1.61) to achieve such a zero change in government welfare: 
pov = TX + DEF + TRgm .ER-TX*™ (4.4) 
The energy tax revenues corrected for the tax transfer equal the total reduction in taxes on 
labour, which is represented by equation (4.5): 
T x e n +Txtrans = ^ablo! ^rjpR^' JpRj (4.5) 
If, for example, the tax reform induces lower prices for commodities consumed by the 
government, TX'ram will be positive. At lower prices, the government budget can be reduced 
to achieve an equal welfare and more taxes can be used to reduce taxes on labour. 
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4.3.2 Caveats 
The model as applied for the purpose in this chapter, has some caveats that are elucidated 
before the analysis takes place. First, since capital supply is assumed fixed, a tax on capital 
will not entail an excess burden. Redistribution of the tax burden from labour towards capital 
is therefore always welfare improving. The introduction of an energy tax described above 
could generate such a redistribution since energy tax revenues are used to reduce taxes on 
labour. Given the assumption of a fixed capital supply, however, it should be kept in mind 
that the results in this chapter are only valid in the short term. Second, it should be recognised 
that the small open economy model fails to account for trade-related impacts on global 
emissions (e.g., carbon leakage effect). Third, because there is only one representative 
household in the model, equity issues cannot be dealt with, which is relevant when changes in 
the tax system are considered. Fourth, all markets are assumed perfect. An increase in 
employment due to changes in the tax scheme, however, might lead to a stronger bargaining 
power with a consequent stronger rise in real wages. Introducing such a bargaining model 
will certainly influence the effects of an environmental tax reform (Welsch, 1996). Moreover, 
although energy suppliers in the Netherlands are privatised they are still under strong 
government regulation and some evidence suggests that they behave under imperfect 
competition. If this were the case, it would influence the calculated environmental and 
economic effects of an energy tax 4. Finally, environmental quality (e.g., expressed by 
environmental indicators) is not an argument in the utility function of the representative 
household. This makes it impossible to determine 'true' welfare effects (including 
environmental quality). Environmental quality is not included in the utility function because 
the implicit weights necessary for incorporation of indicators are lacking due to insufficient 
empirical information. 
4.4 Policy simulations 
The small-user energy tax in the Netherlands, introduced in 1996, is summarised in Table 4.4. 
It shows that the first 800 m 3 gas and 800 kWh electricity foT each user are exempted from 
A unit tax on output entails a lower reduction of output in case of a monopoly than under perfect competition 
since the relevant response function of a monopoly (marginal revenue function) is steeper than the relevant 
function under perfect competition (demand function). In case of oligopolistic behaviour, matters become 
more complicated since then strategic behaviour (e.g., price setting) might be involved. See also Baumol and 
Oates (1988) for a discussion on Pigouvian taxes under imperfect competition. 
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taxation. Moreover, usage above 170,000 m 3 gas and 50,000 kWh electricity is also excluded. 
Table 4.4 The Dutch small-user energy tax 
Energy user Gas Electricity 
Households > 800 m 3 > 800 kWh 
Firms (small users) 800-170 000 m3 800-50 000 kWh 
Firms (large users) 800-170 000 m 3 no tax 
Horticulture no tax 800-50 000 kWh 
Source: Energie Beheer Nederland, 1995. 
The different thresholds imply that the relevant price of electricity and gas for a small 
and large user includes respectively excludes the tax. Although in horticulture small users are 
dominant, firms are exempted from the energy tax on gas. The government considers taxing 
this energy intensive industry as a too large threat for its international competitiveness. In 
addition to gas, also other fuels for heating (excluding coal) are taxed. Fuels for vehicles are 
not included. 
In this chapter, two simulations are dealt with. The first simulation considers the small-
user energy tax, which is implemented in the Netherlands in 1996. In this simulation the use 
of distributed gas, other fuels for heating and electricity is taxed for small users 5. In the 
second simulation (general taxation), the tax base is broadened to all industries and 
exemptions are not considered. In this case, also coal and natural gas (only used by large 
users) are taxed. Public utilities are still exempted from taxation in order to avoid double 
taxing. To be able to compare the two simulations, tax rates will be adjusted in the general 
tax simulation such that the same CO2 reduction will be achieved as in the small-user tax 
case. 
In reality, the introduction of the small-user energy tax will take place in three steps. In 
the simulations in this chapter ad valorem tax rates are applied which are approximately the 
final tax rates that will be used in 1998: 25 per cent for gas, 15 per cent for electricity, 25 per 
The different thresholds imply that the relevant price of energy for small and large users includes 
respectively excludes the energy tax. Consumers and industries where small users are dominant have to pay 
the tax. Consumers and small users do not have to pay the tax over the first 800 m 3 gas and 800 kWh 
electricity use. This is modelled by taxing total use and a partial lump sum tax return. For those industries 
where large users are dominant (mainly food processing, chemical and metal industries) it is assumed that 
the relevant prices exclude the tax. However, these industries have to pay the energy tax over the range of 
800-170,000 m 3 taxable gas use. This is modelled by means of a lump sum transfer from the industries to the 
government. Notice that this policy measure gives no incentive for large users to reduce gas use. 
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cent for coal and 20 per cent for other fuels for heating. In the simulation of the general tax, 
tax rates were adjusted to 46.6 per cent of the small-user energy tax rates. 
In both simulations, energy tax revenues are used to reduce the adverse effects of the 
tax by reducing pre-existing distortionary taxes on labour6. Alternative recycling mechanisms 
will be considered in the sensitivity analysis. 
4.5 Results 
Effects on industries and consumers 
The 'economic' effects of the different simulations on some selected industries and consumers 
are summarised in Table 4.5. The table shows that the small-user energy tax results in higher 
prices of distributed gas (20.3 per cent), other fuels (16.6 per cent) and electricity (10.0 per 
cent) for small users and lower prices for large users (-3.8, -2.8 and -4.4 per cent, respective-
ly). These lower prices result from the fact that with perfect competition energy supply is 
price elastic and hence prices excluding taxes are lower at a smaller supply. Consumers use 
less distributed gas (5.2 per cent), other fuels for heating (4.0 per cent) and electricity (2.6 per 
cent). Being exempted from an energy tax on gas, large users profit from the lower price of 
energy. The fertiliser industry, for example, uses 1.7 per cent more natural gas, increasing 
production and income by 1.2 and 1.9 per cent, respectively. Horticulture under glass also 
profits, being exempted from the tax on distributed gas. The use of distributed gas increases 
by 1.1 per cent, electricity use decreases by 0.9 per cent (horticulture under glass is not 
exempted from the tax on electricity), production increases by 0.2 per cent and income also 
increases by 0.2 per cent. Horticulture under glass also profits from the lower price of labour 
(tax revenues are used to lower taxes on labour) which causes an increase in labour demand 
(0.2 per cent). 
The effects on the other agricultural industries are negative. Income and production in 
dairy farming, pig farming, poultry farming, arable farming and other horticulture fall (see 
Table 4.6). The higher costs for distributed gas, other fuels for heating and electricity and the 
decrease in the exchange rate (appreciation of the guilder) have a negative effect on both 
production and income. Because these agricultural industries do not use much labour (other 
than self employed labour), they hardly profit from lower taxes on labour. 
6 In the model (see Chapter 2), labour taxes paid by employers (different in each industry) are distinguished 
from labour taxes paid by employees (single tax rate). To realise an equal distribution of the taxes over all 
industries, revenues are recycled by reducing the labour tax rate for employees. 
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Table 4.5 Effects on income, production, employment, energy use and prices for selected industries 
and consumers of energy taxes (% change from benchmark) 
Variable" Small-user energy tax General energy tax 
Coal 
Use by electricity supply (890) -4.8 -3.2 
Price including tax - 11.9 
Price excluding tax -0.1 0.2 
Natural gas 
Use by electricity supply (1539) -4.5 -2.9 
Use by fertiliser industry (606) 1.7 -15.2 
Use by gas distribution (5933) -6.2 -3.7 
Price including tax - 20.6 Price excluding tax -2.2 -2.1 
Distributed gas 
Consumption (4577) -5.2 -2.2 
Horticulture under glass (766) 1.1 -3.6 
Price including tax 20.3 8.3 
Price excluding tax -3.8 -3.0 
Other fuels for heating 
-1.9 Consumption (38) -4.0 
Price including tax 16.6 7.7 
Price excluding tax -2.8 -1.5 
Electricity 
-0.9 Consumption (2747) -2.6 
Horticulture under glass( 101) -0.9 -3.0 
Price including tax 10.0 3.7 
Price excluding tax -4.4 -3.1 
Fertiliser 
Use by dairy farming (337) -0.1 -0.3 
Use by arable farming (188) -0.1 -0.4 
Price domestic use -0.8 6.6 
Production 
Electricity supply (11283) -4.3 -2.8 
Gas distribution (8490) -6.0 -3.6 
Petroleum industry (21047) -2.1 -1.5 
Fertiliser industry (2344) 1.2 -11.0 
Horticulture under glass (7378) 0.2 -0.7 
Labour demand 
Electricity supply (1808) -3.7 -2.4 
Gas distribution (687) -5.0 -3.0 
Petroleum industry (814) -0.7 -0.3 
Fertiliser industry (343) 0.7 -6.6 
Horticulture under glassb (1168) 0.2 -0.3 
Income 
Electricity supply (5309) -10.4 -7.1 
Gas distribution (1820) -13.8 -8.8 
Petroleum industry (3067) -2.3 -1.3 
Fertiliser industry (676) 1.9 -18.3 
Horticulture under glass (4685) 0.2 -1.3 
Base year quantities, in mln 1990 guilders, between parentheses. 
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Table 4.6 Effects on production and income in agricultural industries of energy taxes (% change 
from benchmark) 
Variable" Small-user energy tax General energy tax 
Production 
Dairy farming (12734) -0.1 -0.2 
Pig farming (7669) -0.3 -0.0 
Poultry farming (2557) -0.2 0.1 
Arable farming (3556) -0.1 -0.2 
Horticulture under glass (7378) 0.2 -0.7 
Other horticulture (4634) -0.3 0.1 
Income 
Dairy farming (5554) -0.3 -0.2 
Pig farming (2155) -0.9 0.0 
Poultry farming (878) -0.5 0.2 
Arable farming (1522) -0.3 -0.3 
Horticulture under glass (4685) 0.2 -1.3 
Other horticulture (2965) -0.7 0.4 
See Table 4.5. 
Table 4.7 shows the effects at the national level. Total domestic use of natural gas, 
other fuels and electricity decrease by 4.1, 7.5 and 4.6 per cent, respectively. The reduction 
of labour costs, by means of recycling 2432 million guilders (1990) 7, results in 0.10 per cent 
more employment and a redistribution of welfare from leisure towards private consumption 
and savings. The changing tax base decreases the excess burden due to existing tax distor-
tions (second best welfare improvements) which results in a higher total national welfare of 
0.06 per cent (see also Section 4.6). When the tax base is broadened to all industries, while 
the same CO2 reduction is achieved, total domestic use of natural gas decreases more (5.4 per 
cent) than in the small-user tax case. The reduction of all other energy sources is less than in 
the small-user tax case. Apparently, large energy users use relatively more natural gas than 
small energy users. For example, the fertiliser industry, not being exempted, now uses 15.2 
per cent less natural gas and produces 11.0 per cent less. Due to the very energy intensive 
production, income of the fertiliser industry decreases by 18.3 per cent. Production and 
income in horticulture under glass decrease by 0.7 and 1.3 per cent, respectively, while 
electricity and gas use decrease by 3.0 and 3.6 per cent, respectively. These input price 
increases are not compensated by the lower labour costs. Employment in horticulture under 
glass decreases by 0.3 per cent. Although total employment increases by 0.15 per cent and 
more pre-existing tax distortions on labour are removed by recycling 3014 million guilders 
7 The amount of tax that is recycled is not exactly equal to the energy tax revenues, because the simulations 
are based on a government welfare-neutral tax reform, which is achieved by a lump sum transfer between 
energy tax revenues and non-environmental tax revenues. 
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(1990), welfare decreases by 0.02 per cent. The exchange rate increases by 0.25 per cent, 
indicating that in the case of the general tax, international competitiveness of the large 
energy-using industries has deteriorated. The negative effects on the other agricultural 
industries due to the energy tax are smaller than in the case of a small energy tax, because the 
same reduction in greenhouse gases is now achieved by more industries (lower energy tax). 
Moreover, the increase in the exchange rate in the case of a general energy tax, (depreciation 
of the guilder) has a positive effect on income. Opposite to this is the negative effect of a 
higher price for the input of fertiliser (dairy farming and arable farming). 
Table 4.7 Effects on domestic energy intensive commodities, welfare and employment at the 
national level of energy taxes (% change from benchmark) 
Variable" Small-user energy tax General energy tax 
Total domestic use 
Coal (1531) -3.0 -2.3 
Natural gas (10031) -4.1 -5.4 
Distributed gas (7905) -6.0 -3.6 
Other fuels for heating (975) -7.5 -5.1 
Electricity (10004) ^t.6 -3.0 
Fertiliser (750) 0.2 -2.3 
Welfare" 
Welfare private consumption (280134) 0.05 0.06 
Welfare public government (74795) 0 0 
Welfare leisure (40035) -0.39 -0.59 
Welfare savings (105640) 0.33 -0.06 
Total welfare (500604) 0.06 -0.02 
Miscellaneous 
Exchange ratec -0.13 0.25 
Total employment (239939) 0.10 0.15 
General wage rate (excl. tax) 1.0 1.0 
Energy tax paid by industries'1 1065 1382 
Energy tax paid on consumption19 829 694 
Tax recycling1* 2432 3014 
See Table 4.5. 
Welfare expressed in million guilders (1990). 
Exchange rate expressed as guilder per dollar (1990). 
Tax revenues in million guilders (1990). 
Environmental effects 
In Table 4.8, the effects of the small-user energy tax and the general energy tax on C 0 2 
emissions are summarised. In the case of a small-user energy tax, total C 0 2 emissions 
decrease by 3.5 per cent. A domestic carbon leakage effect occurs in agriculture (0.2 per cent) 
and agribusiness (1.5 per cent), where the increase of CO2 emissions by large users dominate 
the decrease of CO2 emissions by small users. 
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Table 4.8 Effects on CO2 emission of energy taxes (% change from benchmark) 
CO2 emission" Small-user energy tax General energy tax 
Agriculture (8671) 0.2 -3.0 
Agribusiness (4759) 1.5 -5.4 
Other industries (42840) -2.7 -6.0 
Public utilities (38450) -4.7 -3.1 
Services (24000) -6.3 -2.8 
Consumption (34570) -2.9 -1.3 
TOTAL (153290) -3.5 -3.5 
" Base year CO2 emissions, in mln kg, between parentheses. 
When the tax base is broadened to all industries, C 0 2 emissions in agriculture, 
agribusiness and other industries are lower than in the small-user tax case, since large users 
are not exempted (e.g., fertiliser industry, horticulture under glass). Emissions by public 
utilities, services and consumers are higher in the general tax case since tax rates are lower in 
order to achieve the same C 0 2 reduction as in the small-user tax case. 
Table 4.9 Effects on environmental indicators by different industries and consumers of energy 
taxes (% change from benchmark) 
Environmental indicator Greenhouse effect Acidification Eutrophication Waste accumulation 
Small General Small General Small General Small General 
Agriculture 0.0 -1.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Agribusiness 1.5 -5.4 0.6 -4.3 0.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.1 
Other industries -2.5 -5.6 -4.4 -4.7 -0.3 -4.0 0.2 -0.5 
Public utilities -4.7 -3.1 •4.1 -3.1 -4.7 -3.1 -4.3 -2.8 
Services -6.0 -2.7 -1.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Consumption -2.7 -1.2 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 
Waste dumping 0.0 0.0 - - - - - -
TOTAL -3.1 -3.1 -1.6 -1.5 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 
In Table 4.9, the effects of the small-user energy tax and the general energy tax on 
environmental indicators are summarised (see Appendix X for quantification at emission 
level and Appendix XI for the effects on emissions in agriculture). In the case of the small-
user energy tax, the greenhouse effect from emissions in the Netherlands decreases by 3.1 per 
cent. The effects of an energy tax on the other environmental indicators are much smaller, 
which is due to a less distinct relation to energy use. For example, although the emissions of 
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N 0 X and SO2 decrease, the relative small decrease of NH3 in agriculture causes a reduction in 
acidification in the small-user tax case of only 1.6 per cent. In the general tax case, 
acidification reduction is even smaller (1.5 per cent) because the assumed CO2 reduction is 
now achieved by relatively reducing more natural gas use. The SO2/CO2 emission-ratio of 
natural gas is lower than the other energy sources. 
4.6 Sensitivity analysis 
This section contains a sensitivity analysis with respect to assumptions in the model that are 
relevant for this chapter: the tax recycling scheme and labour market parameters. 
4.6.1 Tax recycling scheme 
The previous results in this chapter show that in the case of a small-user energy tax, both 
economic welfare and the environment improve. Hence, a double dividend is achieved. Some 
"...literature on the double dividend suggests, however, that environmental taxes typically 
exacerbate, rather than alleviate, pre-existing tax distortions" (de Mooij and Bovenberg, 
1995, p.1). In this literature, two effects are distinguished. A tax interaction effect occurs due 
to the interaction of the new environmental tax and pre-existing tax distortions. When there is 
only one factor of production (e.g., labour), this tax interaction effect is typically welfare 
deteriorating because it exacerbates existing tax distortions. A positive tax recycling effect 
occurs because environmental tax revenues can be used to reduce pre-existing tax distortions. 
The 'general conclusion' is that the tax interaction effect is greater than the tax recycling 
effect and hence a double dividend is not achieved. More recent literature shows, however, 
that an increase in welfare is much more likely when more than one factor of production is 
assumed (see de Mooij and Bovenberg, 1995). In this case, the initial situation allows for an 
inefficient distribution of the tax burden over factors. An environmental tax can alleviate 
(exacerbate) this inefficiency if the tax burden is redistributed from overtaxed (undertaxed) 
factors towards undertaxed (overtaxed) factors. Depending on the inefficiency of the initial 
tax system, it is possible that the sum of the tax interaction effect and tax recycling effect is 
positive and hence an environmental tax reform entails a welfare increase. Since there are 
two factors of production in this chapter, fixed capital (hence undertaxed) and elastically 
supplied labour (hence overtaxed), the latter case applies. Given these assumptions, the 
effects of different tax recycling mechanisms and different tax rates are analysed. 
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Tax recycling mechanisms 
Table 4.10 contains results of a sensitivity analysis with respect to different tax recycling 
mechanisms. In the table, the total effect of the environmental tax reform is separated in a tax 
interaction effect and a tax recycling effect. To determine the tax interaction effect of the 
environmental tax reform, tax revenues are lump sum recycled to private income. The tax 
interaction effect is positive (132.7 mln guilders (1990)) in the case of a small-user energy tax 
which implies that lump sum recycling of tax revenues redistributes the tax burden such that 
total distortions decrease. For the small-user tax case, four alternative recycling mechanisms 
are considered: reducing labour tax, capital tax, income tax and consumption tax. Since 
labour is the only elastically supplied factor, recycling tax revenues by reducing taxes on 
labour generates the largest positive welfare effect (189.9 mln guilders (1990)). Recycling 
revenues by reducing taxes on capital generates the same result as lump sum recycling since 
capital supply is assumed fixed. Recycling revenues by reducing income or consumption 
taxes generates intermediate results. 
When the tax base is broadened to all energy users, it turns out that the tax interaction 
effect is negative (-352.7 mln guilders (1990)), which is partly due to a deterioration of 
international competitiveness of the large energy-using industries. Clearly, this negative 
effect is not offset by the positive tax recycling effect (234.4 mln), when revenues are 
recycled towards labour. 
Table 4.10 Effects on welfare of energy taxes, using different tax revenues recycling schemes (in mln 
1990 guilders) 
Small-user energy tax General energy tax 
Recycling to: Labour Capital Income Consumption Labour 
Tax interaction effect 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 -352.7 
Tax recycling effect 189.9 0.0 72.6 93.3 234.4 
Total effect 322.6 132.7 205.3 226.0 -118.3 
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A: all small users 
% energy tax 
B: consumers 
400 7 
-400 J 
% energy tax 
C: small user industries 
400 1 
-1000 J — ' 
% energy tax 
Figure 4.1 Welfare effects of a small-user energy tax 
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Tax rates 
In the previous analysis, it was concluded that in the case of a small-user energy tax, the 
welfare effect of lump sum tax recycling (tax interaction effect) is positive. Further analysis 
for the small-user tax shows that this is only valid at low tax rates (see Figure 4.1 A). As soon 
as tax rates are as high as 67 per cent, lump sum recycling generates a negative welfare 
effect. When tax revenues are recycled towards labour, the welfare effect becomes negative 
at a rate higher than 140 per cent. 
If only consumers are considered (Figure 4. IB), lump sum tax recycling always 
generates a negative welfare effect8. When the energy tax revenues are recycled towards 
labour, however, the redistribution of the tax burden from the overtaxed factor (labour) 
towards the undertaxed factor (capital) is large enough to entail a positive welfare effect. 
If only small energy-using industries are considered (Figure 4.1C), an energy tax entails 
a positive welfare effect even when the tax revenues are recycled lump sum. This implies that 
the introduction of the energy tax itself already generates a redistribution of the tax burden 
large enough to offset distortionary effects of the energy tax itself9. When tax revenues are 
recycled towards labour, the positive welfare effect is even greater since existing labour tax 
distortions are reduced. 
Figure 4.2 shows the welfare loss at different rates of CO2 reduction for the small-user 
energy tax and the general energy tax, when tax revenues are recycled towards labour. The 
figure repeats the results achieved above that the small-user energy tax entails a welfare gain 
at low CO2 reduction levels, which is due to households as well as small industries. At higher 
C 0 2 reduction rates, small industries cause a welfare loss. Ultimately, the welfare loss caused 
by small industries offsets the welfare gain by households. An even larger CO2 reduction, in 
combination with a small tax base, causes the welfare loss to increase rapidly. 
Since large energy users already entail a welfare loss at low tax rates, a general user tax 
will perform worse than a small-user tax at low CO2 reductions. However, it turns out that at 
higher tax rates, necessary to entail high CO2 reductions, the welfare loss of a general energy 
tax is lower than in the case of a small energy tax, which is due to the broader tax base of the 
former. 
Taxes on consumption reduce the real wage rate and hence directly affect the labour-leisure choice. 
9 It should be noted that this is not a general result Detailed analysis showed that the welfare effect of lump 
sum tax recycling is negative for most industries (the results are available upon request). The positive 
welfare effect of lump sum tax recycling at low tax rates is caused by a few industries (B34-B37). Taxing 
these industries is more efficient since the commodities produced by these industries are mainly non-
tradeables of which domestic demand is inelastic. 
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Cost curves C 0 2 reduction 
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Figure 4.2 Welfare effects of small-user energy tax and general energy tax (revenues recycled 
towards labour) 
Figure 4.2 also shows that a 25 per cent reduction of CO2 in both scenarios leads to a 
welfare loss of only 0.7 per cent (approximately 3300 mln guilders (1990)). In other studies, 
also relative low welfare losses are reported at such large CO2 reductions. Zhang and Folmer 
(1998), for example, report a welfare loss of 1.1 per cent when CO2 emission is reduced by 
20 per cent. In addition, Whalley and Wigle (1991) report a welfare reduction of 2 per cent 
when CO2 emissions are reduced by 50 per cent. In these papers, however, tax revenues were 
not used to reduce other pre-existing tax distortions. 
4.6.2 Labour market parameters 
Most simulations in this chapter are related to reducing tax distortions in the labour market. 
Therefore, it is important to determine the responsiveness of the model results to some of the 
parameters describing the labour market. This section considers different uncompensated 
labour supply elasticities, labour mobility and initial unemployment rates. 
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Uncompensated labour supply elasticity 
The base simulations are based on an uncompensated labour supply elasticity of 0.12 1 0. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.11 show the results for a lower (0.04) and higher (0.20) 
uncompensated labour supply elasticity. The results show that the model is robust with 
respect to the magnitude of the uncompensated labour supply elasticity. Although total 
employment, the wage rate and the welfare distribution change slightly, the other results are 
almost identical to the base case situation. 
Table 4.11 Effects on Dutch economy of a small-user tax, using different uncompensated labour 
supply elasticities (% change from benchmark) 
Variable- Base case Low supply elasticityb High supply elasticityb 
Employment 
Total employment (239939) 
General wage rate (excl. tax) 
0.10 
1.02 
0.06 
1.02 
0.13 
1.00 
Welfare 
Welfare private consumption (280134) 
Welfare public consumption (74795) 
Welfare leisure (40035) 
Welfare savings (105640) 
Total welfare (500604) 
0.05 
0 
-0.39 
0.33 
0.06 
0.02 
0 
-0.26 
0.31 
0.06 
0.07 
0 
-0.53 
0.36 
0.07 
Taxes 
Energy tax paid by industries 
Energy tax paid on consumption 
Tax recycling 
1065 
829 
2432 
1065 
828 
2375 
1065 
829 
2490 
Environment 
Greenhouse effect 
Acidification 
Eutrophication 
Waste accumulation 
-3.1 
-1.6 
-0.2 
0.0 
-3.1 
-1.7 
-0.2 
0.0 
-3.1 
-1.6 
-0.2 
0.0 
See Table 4.7 for units. 
In the case of low (high) uncompensated labour supply elasticity, the elasticity is changed from 0.12 to 
0.04 (low) and 0.20 (high). 
1 0 The value of 0.12 is chosen rather arbitrary from van Soest (1995) who finds a 80 per cent confidence 
interval for the average male's and female's own wage elasticities of expected hours worked, of [-0.005, 
0.048] and [0.269,0.362], respectively. 
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Labour mobility 
In the base simulations, a labour transformation elasticity of -0.5 is used to determine the 
degree of labour mobility between industries. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.12 show the results 
for a (in absolute terms) lower (-0.25) and higher (-0.75) transformation elasticity. Clearly 
with a higher (lower) elasticity, labour is able to move easier (more difficult) between 
industries and hence absolute changes in employment in industries are greater (smaller). 
Again the other results (not shown in the table) hardly change. 
Table 4.12 Effects on Dutch economy of small-user energy tax, using different labour 
transformation elasticities (% change from benchmark) 
Variable" Base case Low labour mobilityb High labour mobility0 
Employment 
Labour electricity supply (1808) -3.7 -2.8 -4.2 
Labour gas distribution (687) -5.0 -4.0 -5.5 
Labour fertiliser industry (343) 0.7 0.5 0.9 
Total employment (239939) 0.10 0.09 0.10 
General wage rate (excl. tax) 1.02 0.97 1.04 
Welfare 
Welfare private consumption (280134) 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Welfare public consumption (74795) 0 0 0 
Welfare leisure (40035) -0.39 -0.36 -0.41 
Welfare savings (105640) 0.33 0.32 0.34 
Total welfare (500604) 0.06 0.06 0.07 
See Table 4.7 for units. 
In the case of low (high) labour mobility, the transformation elasticity is changed from -0.5 to -0.25 (low) 
and -0.75 (high). 
Unemployment rate 
In the base simulations, an initial unemployment rate of 20 per cent (including voluntary 
unemployment) is used to calibrate leisure and mobile labour. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.13 
show the results for a lower (10 per cent) and higher (30 per cent) initial unemployment rate. 
Again, the results are rather robust. At a lower initial unemployment rate, the positive welfare 
effects of reducing labour taxes are lower than in the case of a high initial unemployment 
rate. Clearly, with low unemployment, the existing disturbance in the labour market is lower 
and hence reducing labour taxes will generate a smaller welfare improvement. Other results 
of the model hardly change. 
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Table 4.13 Effects on Dutch economy of a small-user energy tax, using different unemployment rates 
in the benchmark (% change from benchmark) 
Variable" Base case Low unemployment'' High unemployment11 
Employment 
Labour electricity supply (1808) -3.7 -3.7 -3.7 
Labour gas distribution (687) -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 
Labour fertiliser industry (343) 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Total employment (239939) 0.10 0.07 0.13 
General wage rate (excl. tax) 1.02 1.02 1.01 
Welfare 
Welfare private consumption (280134) 0.05 0.03 0.06 
Welfare public consumption (74795) 0 0 0 
Welfare leisure (40035) -0.39 -0.65 -0.30 
Welfare savings (105640) 0.33 0.30 0.37 
Total welfare (500604) 0.06 0.06 0.07 
See Table 4.7 for units. 
In the case of low (high) unemployment, the unemployment rate is changed from 20% to 10% (low) and 
30% (high). 
4.7 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, the environmental and economic effects of the introduction of a unilateral 
energy tax are analysed. The simulations in this chapter show that the small-user energy tax 
causes a C 0 2 reduction of 3.5 per cent while total emissions of greenhouse gases are reduced 
by 3.1 per cent. This result is less than the target of 3-5 per cent reduction in 1989-1990 C 0 2 
levels by 2000, established by the Dutch government, because economic growth is not 
considered in the model. The results are hardly comparable with other studies focusing on the 
effects of an energy tax on the Dutch economy, which is due to different modelling 
assumptions and policy simulations 1 1. 
By recycling revenues of the small-user energy tax, employment increases by 0.10 per 
cent and existing tax distortions decrease (second best welfare improvements), resulting in a 
higher national welfare of 0.06 per cent. When the tax base is broadened to all energy users 
and exemptions are ignored, welfare decreases by 0.02 per cent and the exchange rate 
increases by 0.25 per cent. This illustrates that in the case of the general energy tax, internati-
onal competitiveness of the large energy-using industries deteriorates. 
1 1 A comparison with other studies for the Netherlands is difficult for reasons mentioned in footnote 2. 
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The effects of a small-user and general energy tax on acidification, eutrophication and 
waste is smaller than for greenhouse gas emissions, which is due to the less distinct relation 
of these indicators with energy sources. The distribution of the environmental effects among 
the different industries and consumption, however, is rather different between both tax 
regimes. 
Sensitivity analyses of the results show that the positive welfare effects of a small-user 
energy tax only apply at low tax rates. At higher tax rates, the negative distortionary effects 
of the introduction of a small-user energy tax dominate the positive effect of redistributing 
existing distortions from labour to capital. At a certain CO2 reduction, welfare costs of a 
small-user energy tax even become higher than welfare costs of a general energy tax, which 
is due to a broader tax base of the general tax. 
It thus seems that, under the restrictions of the model used, a second dividend can be 
achieved by the introduction of a small-user energy tax. At low tax rates, a welfare improve-
ment is even possible when the revenues of a small-user energy tax are recycled in a lump 
sum fashion. These typical second-best results occur due to an inefficient initial distribution 
of the tax burden. From a policy perspective the question remains, however, whether 
introducing an energy tax is the appropriate tool to reduce distortions caused by other taxes. 
CHAPTER 5 
MULTIPLE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GOALS: 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND INTERACTION OF POLICD3S 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses the environmental and economic effects of restricting the 
environmental indicators that measure the greenhouse effect, acidification, eutrophication 
and waste accumulation, using a system of emission permits in an applied general 
equilibrium model for the Netherlands. Attention is paid to the different effects of restricting 
single environmental indicators, the interaction effects of restricting different environmental 
indicators simultaneously and the extent of tradeability of emission permits. In doing so, the 
main causal relationships linking the economy and the environment are quantified and 
shadow prices of restrictions on different environmental indicators can be determined. 
5.1 Introduction 
Like in most industrialised countries, the concern for improving environmental quality has 
taken a firm place on the policy agenda in the Netherlands. The Dutch government has 
developed policy targets, specified in terms of environmental indicators that measure 
phenomena like the greenhouse effect, acidification, eutrophication, and waste accumulation. 
Typically, each policy target entails a reduction in emissions that cause the environmental 
problem measured by the indicator. For the government, in aiming at these targets, it is 
important to understand the nature of the different environmental problems and the economic 
consequences of government intervention. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the 
environmental and economic effects of restricting environmental indicators, using a system of 
emission permits in an applied general equilibrium (AGE) model for the Netherlands. 
Moreover, special attention is paid to the differences between environmental indicators, the 
interaction of different environmental policies and the extent of tradeability of emission 
permits. Since economy-wide effects can be expected from environmental restrictions, using 
an AGE model is appropriate (Bergman, 1991). In addition, the AGE framework is well 
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suited to quantify the causal relationship linking the economy and environment, since both 
direct and indirect effects are taken into account while the consumption and production 
structure in the model allows for proper substitution. 
The policy simulations in this chapter determine the economic effects of restricting 
environmental indicators, taking into account all relevant contributing emissions. Shadow 
prices of restrictions on environmental indicators are calculated. It is shown that the 
economic effects of quantitative restrictions depend on emission coefficients, substitution 
possibilities and relative economic magnitude of the variables to which emissions are 
attached. For this purpose, the AGE model contains a great level of detail with respect to 
emissions to take into account the large differences that exist between different industries and 
consumption. Dellink et al. (1999) also apply the concept of environmental indicators to 
determine possible sustainable economic structures for the Netherlands, using an input-output 
type of optimisation model. Other AGE studies on the consequences of environmental 
policies are less detailed (see Wajsman, 1995, for an overview) and have not focused on 
environmental indicators but mainly on the restriction of just one or a few emissions (see for 
example Larsen (1997) on NO x ; Boyd et al. (1995), BShringer and Rutherford (1997) and 
Conrad and Schroder (1991) on C 0 2 ; and Boyd and Krutilla (1992) on SO2 and NO x). This 
chapter also shows the interaction effects when policy targets for different environmental 
indicators are achieved simultaneously. Shadow prices of restrictions on environmental 
indicators turn out to be mutually dependent when different indicators are related to the same 
economic variables. Dessus and Bussolo (1998) also look at a wide range of emissions but 
their simulations only consider a reduction of single emissions. Although Bergman (1991) 
determines the effects of a simultaneous reduction of C 0 2 , N O x and SO x emissions, shadow 
prices of all emissions and the interaction of environmental policies are not considered. 
Finally, this chapter deals with the potential benefits of a system of tradeable emission 
permits over a system of non-tradeable permits at a national level. The results show that the 
magnitude of these benefits differ between emissions. Although there is a vast amount of 
literature on this topic (see e.g., Baumol and Oates, 1988) most studies fail to quantify the 
potential benefits (for an exception see Rendleman et al., 1995). 
In Section 5.2 the distribution of emissions and environmental indicators over the 
Dutch economy is elaborated. Section 5.3 explains the modelling of emission permits within 
the AGE model. Section 5.4 translates environmental targets into quantitative restrictions and 
presents the policy simulations. The results of the different simulations will be elucidated in 
Section 5.5. Finally, Section 5.6 provides a summary and general conclusions. 
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5.2 Distribution of emissions and environmental indicators over the economy 
In this chapter, the environmental indicators adopted in Chapter 4 are applied as an inventory 
framework of current environmental problems in the Netherlands. Environmental indicators 
for the following phenomena are considered: greenhouse effect, acidification, eutrophication, 
and accumulation of waste. To quantify each indicator, nine specific emissions are 
aggregated using indicator equivalents. The direct contribution of the different economic 
agents in the Netherlands to emissions and environmental indicators in 1993 is shown in 
Table 5.1, which gives an idea of the distribution of the different environmental indicators 
over economic activities. However, this picture is incomplete since only direct emissions are 
taken into account. If, for example, an industry hardly generates pollution itself, it might use 
intermediate inputs, the production of which is polluting. It is therefore not accurate to 
compare the direct contribution to environmental damage by individual industries with 
economic variables like the contribution to national income, trade surplus or employment 
(see e.g., de Haan and Keuning, 1995 and 1996). In order to identify the links between 
economic activity and environment, indirect effects should also be taken into account. 
A different point of view on the links between economic activity and environment is 
provided by Table 5.2 that shows to what extent emissions are related to individual inputs and 
aggregate output by industries, and to consumer goods and aggregate consumption by 
consumers. Emissions contributing to the greenhouse effect are mainly related to inputs by 
industries and consumer goods (fuels). Acidification is related to inputs by industries and 
consumer goods as well as aggregate output of industries. Eutrophication and to a greater 
extent waste accumulation are mainly related to aggregate output of industries and aggregate 
consumption. Hence, the table shows large differences in the links between emissions and 
economic variables. For individual industries, these differences (not shown here) are even 
larger. Inputs and individual consumer goods are easier to substitute than output and 
aggregate consumption. Moreover, substitution possibilities also differ between different 
industries. Hence, if the aim is to reduce emissions, different effects can be expected due to 
different substitution possibilities of the economic variables to which emissions are linked. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show that the distribution of emissions over the economy is diverse, 
both with respect to economic agents and with respect to the economic variables to which 
emissions are linked. In order to take into account this diversity at a sufficient detailed level 
and to allow for feed back effects and substitutability, an AGE model is the appropriate tool 
to identify the links between economic activity and the environment. 
Table 5.1 Distribution of emissions and environmental indicators, summarisedfor industries and consumers in the Netherlands 
(1993; % between parentheses/ 
Emission Agriculture Agribusiness Other industries Public utilities Services Consumption Total 
Indicator 
C0 2 10179 5292 44412 39141 26012 36205 161241 (88.7) 
N 2 0 6959 62 3429 84 925 1998 13458 (7.4) 
Cft, 4942 6 972 878 138 143 7079 (3.9) 
GHG 22080 (12.1) 5361 (2.9) 48814 (26.9) 40102 (22.1) 27074 (14.9) 38346 (21.1) 181777 (100.0) 
NO x 437 356 2734 1372 3423 3746 12068 (39.8) 
S 0 2 34 56 3593 831 824 145 5483 (18.1) 
NH 3 11765 55 284 0 1 655 12760 (42.1) 
ACID 12236 (40.4) 467 (1.5) 6611 (21.8) 2203 (73) 4247 (14.0) 4546 (15.0) 30311 (100.0) 
N 628 29 52 19 114 133 976 (45.5) 
P 710 61 73 1 193 133 1169 (543) 
EUT 1338 (62.4) 90 (4.2) 125 (5.8) 20 (0.9) 307 (143) 266 (12.4) 2145 (100.0) 
WST 707 (3.3) 1741 (8.2) 8362 (39.3) 262 (1.1) 4428 (20.7) 5845 (27.4) 21345 (100.0) 
" Greenhouse gases (GHG) in mln kg C 0 2 equivalents, acidification (ACID) in mln acid equivalents, eutrophication (EUT) in mln kg N equivalents, 
and waste accumulation (WST) in mln kg. 
Source: CBS-6 (1996) and own calculations. 
Table 5.2 Emissions and environmental indicators linked to inputs, output, consumer goods and aggregate consumption in the Netherlands 
(1993; % between parentheses)" 
Industries Consumption Total 
Emission Inputs Aggregat e output Consumer goods Aggregate consumption 
Indicator 
C0 2 115704 9331 34605 1600 161241 (88.7) 
N 2 0 1195 10265 1998 0 13458 (7.4) 
Cft, 134 6802 143 0 7079 (3.9) 
GHG 117033 (64.4) 26398 (143) 36746 (20.2) 1600 (0.9) 181777 (100.0) 
NO x 7939 383 3702 44 12068 (39.8) 
so2 4358. 980 145 0 5483 (18.1) 
NH3 574 11531 655 0 12760 (42.1) 
ACID 12871 (423) 12894 (423) 4502 (14.9) 44 (0.1) 30311 (100.0) 
N 272 571 60 73 976 (45.5) 
P 387 650 133 0 1169 (54.5) 
EOT 659 (30.7) 1221 (56.9) 193 (9.0) 73 (3.4) 2145 (100.0) 
WST 0 (0.0) 15500 (72.6) 0 (0.0) 5845 (27.4) 21345 (100.0) 
See Table 5.1. 
Source: CBS-6 (1996) and own calculations. 
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S3 Model characteristics 
In this chapter the model described in Chapter 2 is used, calibrated on the 1993 data set. This 
section develops the modelling of emission permits in the AGE model 1. First, a restriction on 
one environmental indicator related to aggregate output in an industry is developed. This is 
extended to the case where an environmental indicator is also related to inputs. Next, the case 
of tradeable emission permits is taken into account. Finally, a restriction on multiple 
environmental indicators is considered. 
5.3.1 Modelling restrictions on environmental indicators 
Environmental indicators ENe from a set E = {1,2,3,4} are expressed in indicator equivalents: 
^ = Z Z ^ ^ + E< 4 ^ + E < " ^ r + ^ r - C O i V VeeE (5.1) 
beBgeO beB geG 
where y/ are emission coefficients expressed in indicator equivalents for intermediate inputs 
(INg,b), aggregate output (Yb), consumer goods (Xfn) and aggregate consumption (CON). The 
policy simulations in this chapter adopt a system of emission permits expressed in indicator 
equivalents for each environmental indicator. As equation (5.1) shows, this implies a 
restriction on demand of inputs and supply of aggregate output by industries and a restriction 
on demand for consumer goods and aggregate consumption by consumers, since emissions 
are linked to these economic variables proportionally. 
First, consider for each industry a restriction on one environmental indicator that is 
related to aggregate output only. Emission permits related to aggregate output by industries 
are modelled as a restriction on aggregate output inducing a level of emissions equal to the 
number of permits (expressed in indicator equivalents). Since aggregate output is restricted, a 
'rent' (RENTJb) occurs, which is equal to the difference between the market value and 
shadow value of aggregate output (see Hertel and Tsigas, 1991). The rent enters the AGE 
model, ensuring the zero profit condition holds. Hence, the zero profit condition of the basic 
1 In this chapter the reduction of environmental indicators is considered. Hence, use of the term 
'environmental indicator permit' might be more appropriate. Since environmental indicators are a weighted 
sum of individual emissions, the more commonly used term 'emission permit' is preferred here. 
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model (equation 1.22 in Appendix I) is adjusted accordingly2. 
WYb.Yb = WALNb.AINb + WAENb.AENb + WAPRb.APRb + RENTjJ> ezE; V 2 > e 5 (5.2) 
where W.. are prices, AINb is aggregate intermediate materials input, AENb is aggregate 
intermediate energy input, and APRb is aggregate factor input. In the case of a restriction on 
one indicator, the rent represents the shadow value of the permitted indicator equivalents 
related to aggregate output. The shadow price per emission permit (WEN) in each industry 
can therefore be calculated as: 
^ , = S S Ä e s * ; V i e B (5.3) 
ENlj, Vl,b-Yh 
This shadow price is equal to the value of the last indicator equivalent that has been reduced 
(marginal cost of reducing the environmental indicator). 
5.3.2 Shadow price equalisation 
In this chapter, restrictions are set on environmental indicators which, in industries, are not 
only related to aggregate output but also to inputs. For example, take the following restricted 
environmental indicator .EW: 
EK.b =Z((C A J+ vl>% ezE;VbeB (5.4) 
geG 
A reduction of one environmental indicator for each industry can be achieved by 
reducing emissions related to aggregate output as well as inputs. A restriction on emissions 
related to inputs is modelled similarly as a restriction on aggregate output. Again a rent 
occurs, being the difference between the market value and shadow value of an input. Since 
substitution is possible, the magnitude of the reductions will not be equal in each direction. A 
2 Basically, an emission permit related to output is modelled exactly the same as the supply quota modelled in 
Chapter 3. The quota rent, in case of a supply quota, is related to output while in case of an emission permit, 
the quota rent is related to emissions. 
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reduction of emissions related to inputs through substitution by other inputs, for example, 
might be less costly than reducing emissions related to aggregate output. A least cost solution 
implies a reduction of emissions related to inputs and aggregate output by each industry such 
that shadow prices of permits related to inputs and aggregate output (marginal costs) will be 
equalised. Therefore, when a reduction target for one environmental indicator is set in each 
industry, the following shadow price equalisation rule within agents applies: 
WENl = WEN™GJ> = WENZJ, eeE;g*h;VbeB;Vg,heG (5.5) 
In addition to (5.3) we have (5.6): 
RENT"! 
WEK^ m Z* eeE;VbeB;VgeG (5.6) 
and the zero profit conditions for intermediate material and energy demand that replace 1.23 
and 1.24 in the basic model: 
WAENb.AENb = J^WIN^JN,, + ^RENT^j, eeE;VbeB (5.7) 
WAINb.AINb = Y^I^M* + T,XENT£* eeE;VbeB (5.8) 
5.3.3 Tradeable emission permits 
A restriction on emissions related to consumer goods and aggregate consumption is modelled 
similarly as a restriction on inputs and aggregate output in industries. The shadow price 
equalisation rule within agents also applies to consumption, implying that the shadow price of 
emission permits related to consumer goods and aggregate consumption should be equal. 
Since industries and consumers within the Dutch economy contribute to environmental 
problems to a different extent, shadow prices are likely to differ when each industry and 
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consumer has to reduce emissions to the same extent3. This scenario could also be called a 
'command-and-contror regulatory approach (see Rendleman et al., 1995) where emission 
permits are non-tradeable. 
It is also possible that quantitative restrictions take the form of a system of tradeable 
emission permits. For example, assume all industries together face the following restriction: 
^ = E £ f c ^ J + £ ^ esE (5.9) 
bsBgsG beB 
This restriction on one environmental indicator for all industries together can be achieved by 
reducing emissions related to inputs and aggregate output in different industries. Industries 
with low shadow prices are likely to sell their emission permits to industries with high 
shadow prices. Hence, by trading emission permits, under such a 'market-based' system, 
emission permit prices will be equalised between agents: 
WENYeJ> = WEN™j, = WEN^ = WENre_c eeE;b*c;VgeG; Vb,c e B (5.10) 
This equalisation rule between agents can be extended to consumption when emission 
permits related to consumer goods and aggregate consumption are taken into account. 
In Appendix XTI it is shown that given a certain emission reduction related to an input 
in one industry, the shadow price of an emission permit related to this input is lower, the 
higher emission coefficients and substitution elasticities are, and the smaller the cost share of 
an input is. Generalised to the whole economy this implies that shadow prices of restrictions 
on emissions related to certain economic variables are lower, the higher the emission 
coefficients and substitution possibilities are, and the smaller cost shares of the variables are. 
5.3.4 Restrictions on multiple environmental indicators 
In addition to a restriction on single environmental indicators, environmental indicators can 
be restricted simultaneously. When more environmental indicators are restricted 
simultaneously, equation (5.9) and (5.10) hold for each restricted environmental indicator. 
3 In the AGE model, consumers and each industry are represented by one agent However, in reality there is 
also heterogeneity between different consumers and firms within industries. Therefore, the efficiency gain of 
a system of tradeable emission permits is under-estimated in the chapter. 
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Moreover, since the rent that occurs now is divided over different restricted environmental 
indicators, zero profit conditions need to be adjusted accordingly: 
WYb.Yb = WAINb.AINh + WAPRb.APR„ + Y,RENT*b VZ> e B (5.11) 
eeE 
WAENb.AEN„ = YwiNgibJNg>i + £ Y,RENTZ.» V* E B <5-12) 
WAINb.AINb = YF11*,*^ + X YRENTZJ, VbeB (5.13) 
geSma eeEgeS^ 
When different environmental indicators are related to the same economic variables, 
the restriction on an additional indicator will be less restrictive than the restriction on a single 
indicator. The rent is subdivided over different indicators, which implies that shadow prices 
of different emission permits are mutually dependent. For each indicator, the shadow price 
equalisation rules hold. 
5.3.5 Caveats 
The model presented has some caveats, which are elucidated before the simulations are 
presented. First, although emissions are taken into account at a very detailed level, there are 
still improvements possible. Due to insufficient information, it is assumed that waste 
emissions by industries are related to aggregate output, while it seems clear that part of it is 
related to certain inputs. Moreover, not all harmful emissions are taken into account (e.g., 
pesticides, dioxin, heavy metals, etc.). Second, abatement functions are not present in the 
model. A reduction of emissions can therefore only take place by reducing inputs and 
aggregate output by industries and consumer goods and aggregate consumption by 
consumers. In some other studies abatement functions are taken into account, based on ad hoc 
assumptions (Bergman, 1991) or embedded in the SAM (Nestor and Pasurka, 1995). At the 
level of detail applied in this chapter, however, data is lacking to derive a consistent set of 
abatement functions for all emissions by all activities that are considered. An alternative way 
of emission reduction would be to represent an industry by specifying multiple technologies 
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(see Chapter 6 and Böhringer, 1998). Third, we recognise that in our small open economy 
model we fail to account for trade-related impacts on global emissions. Finally, 
environmental quality is not an argument in the utility function of the representative 
household. This makes it impossible to determine 'true' welfare effects (including 
environmental quality). We choose not to include environmental quality in the utility function 
because the implicit weights necessary for incorporation are lacking. 
5.4 Policy simulations 
When it comes to formulation of environmental policy, authorities often refer to a reduction 
in flows of emissions. The Dutch government has developed quantitative environmental 
policy targets while dividing its environmental policy into different indicators (see MVROM, 
1996 and 1997). This chapter considers a reduction of the greenhouse effect, acidification, 
eutrophication and waste accumulation. Quantitative targets are modelled by introducing 
emission permits expressed in indicator equivalents. Emissions permits are chosen as policy 
variable to ensure a 'first-best' solution. Alternatively, an endogenously determined emission 
tax could be introduced which, theoretically, generates equivalent results 4. 
The aim of the simulations in this chapter is to quantify the main causal relationships 
linking the Dutch economy and the environment and to compare the potential economic 
consequences of restricting different environmental indicators. In reality, for each indicator 
policy goals are set, referring to different reduction rates, base years and time horizons (see 
e.g., Centraal Planbureau, 1997). In this chapter, economic and environmental data of 1993 
are used. To facilitate comparison, in the different simulations an equal reduction of 
environmental indicators relative to 1993 is set as imaginary policy goal. The first set of 
simulations determines the effects of a 10 per cent reduction of each single environmental 
indicator. Moreover, for each environmental indicator the effects of a system of tradeable and 
non-tradeable emission permits are compared5. Finally, it will be investigated what the effects 
are when policy goals are set for two environmental indicators simultaneously. The 
4 Emission taxes and emission permits are theoretically equivalent in the short run when tax revenues are 
given the same destination as the value of the emission permits. From a policy point of view, however, there 
are many differences (see Baumol and Oates, 1988, p. 178-181). 
5 Under the non-tradeable 'command-and-control' approach, the sum of emissions by consumption and each 
industry is equal to the target level that is set for consumption and each industry. Hence shadow prices of 
emission permits are different. Under the tradeable 'market-based' approach, the sum of emissions over all 
industries and consumption is equal to the national emission target while shadow prices are equalised 
between industries and consumption. The value of the emission permits or 'rents' are transferred lump-sum 
to consumers and industries. 
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interaction of a greenhouse gas restriction and an acidification restriction will be evaluated 
under the assumption of tradeable emission permits. 
5.5 Results 
Shadow prices and emission reduction levels 
The effects of a 10 per cent reduction of each single environmental indicator on shadow 
prices and reduction levels for individual industries and consumption are presented in Tables 
5.3 and 5.4. 
Table 5.3 Shadow prices of environmental indicators for selected industries and consumption at 
10% environmental indicator reduction (in 1993 guilder per indicator equivalent) 
Simulation: 10% reduction GHG 10% reduction ACID 10% reduction EUT 10% reduction WST 
Shadow price for 
not not not 
tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable 
not 
tradeable tradeable 
Dairy farming 0.21 0.04 0.23 0.18 1.42 1.52 4.05 3.37 
Pig farming 0.16 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.83 1.52 4.62 3.37 
Horticulture under glass 0.09 0.04 1.44 0.18 69.03 1.52 11.95 3.37 
Petroleum industry 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.18 11.08 1.52 7.24 3.37 
Fertiliser industry 0.02 0.04 0.19 0.18 1.80 1.52 0.48 3.37 
Basic metal industry 0.10 0.04 0.70 0.18 52.50 1.52 2.16 3.37 
Electricity supply -0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.18 36.73 1.52 3.35 3.37 
Consumption 0.24 0.04 1.43 0.18 4X03 1.52 12.93 3.37 
Mean shadow price 0.13 0.04 1.03 0.18 21.43 1.52 9.41 3.37 
Indicator equivalents are defined as: Greenhouse gases (GHG) in kg C 0 2 equivalent, acidification 
(ACID) in mole H*, eutrophication (EUT) in kg N equivalent, waste accumulation (WST) in kg waste. 
The tables show that under a system of tradeable permits, shadow prices are equal 
between agents, while under a system of non-tradeable permits, reduction levels are equal. 
The permit prices for 1 kg CO2 equivalent (greenhouse effects), 1 mole H* (acidification), 1 
kg N equivalent (eutrophication) and 1 kg waste (waste accumulation) at 10 per cent 
reduction of the concerning indicators are 0.04, 0.18, 1.52 and 3.37 guilders (1993) 
respectively, when permits are tradeable. Agents with the highest shadow prices under a 
system of non-tradeable permits will have the lowest reductions when permits are tradeable. 
Consumers, for example, face a shadow price of 0.24 guilders (1993) per kg CO2 equivalent 
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when permits are non-tradeable, which is almost twice the mean shadow price 6. Clearly, 
consumers are willing to buy tradeable permits and thus reduce less greenhouse gases (only 
3.7 per cent) than in case permits are non-tradeable (10 per cent). The fertiliser industry and 
petroleum industry, however, are likely to sell permits since it is cheap for these industries to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions relative to other energy users. 
Table 5.4 Effects on environmental indicators for selected industries and consumption of 10% 
environmental indicator reduction (in % change from benchmark) 
Simulation: 10% reduction GHG 10% reduction ACID 10% reduction EUT 10% reduction WST 
Environmental 
indicator 
not 
tradeable tradeable 
not 
tradeable tradeable 
not 
tradeable tradeable 
not 
tradeable tradeable 
Dairy farming -10.0 -2.2 -10.0 -8.0 -10.0 -6.3 -10.0 -10.5 
Pig farming -10.0 -3.4 -10.0 -22.2 -10.0 -25.6 -10.0 -26.6 
Horticulture under glas s -10.0 -11.7 -10.0 -0.5 -10.0 0.3 -10.0 -0.3 
Petroleum industry -10.0 -39.9 -10.0 -38.7 -10.0 -0.9 -10.0 -2.0 
Fertiliser industry -10.0 -24.0 -10.0 -11.5 -10.0 -10.1 -10.0 -35.9 
Basic metal industry -10.0 -4.9 -10.0 -1.6 -10.0 0.4 -10.0 -8.7 
Electricity supply -10.0 -14.9 -10.0 -4.6 -10.0 -0.7 -10.0 -7.0 
Consumption -10.0 -3.7 -10.0 -3.1 -10.0 -0.7 -10.0 -4.7 
Total emissions -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 
The results also show that in the case of non-tradeable permits, negative shadow prices 
are feasible. For example in the case of acidification reduction, a shadow price of -0.04 
guilders per mole I T for the electricity supply industry implies that a 10 per cent reduction of 
acidification is not a maximum restriction but a minimum restriction. Without a restriction for 
electricity supply, acidification would be reduced by more than 10 per cent. This is due to 
indirect effects, because consumption and other industries demand less energy inputs as result 
of their own acidification restriction7. 
In general, the results in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show that not necessarily only agents with 
large emissions are affected (e.g., basic metal industry). However, to a larger extent agents 
with high emission coefficients are affected (e.g., fertiliser and petroleum industry with 
The mean shadow price is calculated as the total shadow value of all restrictions (sum of rents) divided by 
the total restricted level of emissions. Hence, it is a perfect weighted mean shadow price, using emissions as 
weights. 
This peculiar result is due to the fact that emission restrictions are modelled as a strict equality. Negative 
shadow values could be avoided by introducing a 'smaller-than-or-equal' equality. In AGE models this is 
feasible by means of defining a mixed complementarity problem (see e.g., Lôfgren and Robinson, 1999a). 
However, to ensure a 10 per cent indicator reduction at a national level, consistent with the other 
simulations, it is not applied in this chapter. 
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respect to greenhouse gases and dairy farming and pig farming with respect to 
eutrophication). This corifirms the analytical results obtained in Appendix XII. Figure 5.1 
shows that the shadow price of a restriction on greenhouse gas emissions increases when the 
reduction level is increased. Clearly, when permits are tradeable, shadow prices are much 
lower which implies that tradeability lowers the costs of reducing emissions. Moreover, the 
difference is greater when the reduction level increases. 
0.25 i 1 
% reduction GHG 
Figure 5.1: Shadow price of GHG emission permit with and without tradeable permits 
Production 
Table 5.5 shows the effects on production in some selected industries. When permits are not 
tradeable, the consequences for production depend on the possibility of substitution within 
industries. Horticulture under glass, for example, only reduces production by 2.1 per cent 
while greenhouse gas emissions have to be reduced by 10 per cent. Apparently, there is 
enough substitution between inputs to avoid a large production reduction. If, however, 
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emissions are mainly related to aggregate output, like acidification and eutrophication in 
agriculture and waste accumulation in all industries, substitution possibilities are hardly 
available and a reduction of production is inevitable. 
When permits are tradeable, differences between industries are larger. Industries with 
high emission coefficients are affected most by a 10 per cent reduction of greenhouse gases 
when permits are tradeable. In the fertiliser industry and petroleum industry, production 
decreases by 22.5 per cent and 9.5 per cent respectively. In the case of acidification and 
eutrophication reduction, agricultural industries reduce production most. Some industries are 
also affected indirectly, when the demand for commodities produced by these industries 
decreases. In the case of acidification and eutrophication, for example, agricultural industries 
will demand less input, which clearly affects the compound feed industry. The same applies 
for electricity supply in the case of a reduction of greenhouse gases. 
Table 5.5 Effects on production by selected industries of 10% environmental indicator reduction 
(% change from benchmark) 
Simulation: 10% reduction GHG 10% reduction ACID 10% reduction EUT 10% reduction WST 
Production by 
not 
tradeable tradeable 
not 
tradeable tradeable 
not 
tradeable tradeable 
not 
tradeable tradeable 
Dairy farming -9.9 -2.1 -9.7 -7.7 -9.0 -5.6 -10.0 -10.5 
Pig farming -9.7 -2.7 -10.0 -22.2 -10.0 -25.6 -10.0 -26.6 
Horticulture under glass -2.1 -2.5 -2.1 0.2 -4.1 0.3 -10.0 -0.3 
Compound feed industry -11.0 -2.5 -11.2 -15.0 -9.9 -18.0 -10,0 -25.3 
Petroleum industry -4.3 -9.5 -5.1 -10.2 -3.4 0.1 -10.0 -2.0 
Fertiliser industry -9.4 -22.5 -9.8 -11.2 -8.5 -8.9 -10.0 -35.9 
Basic metal industry -6.8 -3.7 -8.3 -1.2 -8.8 0.4 -10.0 -8.7 
Electricity supply -11.9 -10.8 -9.1 -3.1 -7.6 -0.5 -10.0 -7.0 
Gas distribution -10.0 -6.0 -9.6 -1.3 -4.7 -0.5 -10.0 -3.9 
Domestic use and trade of commodities 
Table 5.6 shows the effects on domestic use (total use within the Netherlands) of some 
selected commodities. The results show that in the case of greenhouse gas reduction as well 
as in the case of acidification reduction, domestic use of the polluting commodities 'other 
fuels for heating' (mainly petroleum and fuel oil) and 'coal' are reduced most. 'Distributed gas' 
and 'fuels for vehicles' are reduced to a much lesser extent. In the case of eutrophication 
reduction, clearly domestic use of'fertiliser' and 'compound feed' are reduced. 
The effects on trade are presented in Table 5.7. On the one hand, it can be concluded 
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that exports (imports) of commodities that are polluting when used domestically increase 
(decrease) as is the case for natural gas and coal, in the case of greenhouse gases or 
acidification reduction. On the other hand, exports (imports) of commodities whose domestic 
production is polluting, decrease (increase), as is the case for fertiliser, compound feed and 
pigs 8. For commodities like fuels for vehicles and other fuels for heating, both effects occur. 
These trade effects occur since restrictions are set on domestic use. If similar environmental 
restrictions were in force in the EU or the rest of the world, these effects would be less 
pronounced. 
Table 5.6 Effects on domestic use of selected commodities of 10% environmental indicator 
reduction (% change from benchmark) 
Simulation: 10% reduction GHG 10% reduction ACID 10% reduction EUT 10% reduction WST 
Domestic use of 
not 
tradeable tradeable 
not 
tradeable tradeable 
not 
tradeable tradeable 
not 
tradeable tradeable 
Fuels for vehicles -8.1 -3.5 -10.7 -3.9 -8.7 -0.8 -13.5 -7.0 
Coal -11.3 -14.6 -11.0 -6.9 -10.8 -0.5 -11.6 -9.0 
Natural gas -10.8 -9.2 -10.3 -3.0 -7.1 -0.8 -12.0 -7.8 
Distributed gas -10.0 -6.0 -9.6 -1.3 -4.7 -0.5 -10.7 -3.9 
Other fuels for heating -16.7 -18.0 -12.6 -15.5 -9.7 -0.7 -11.4 -13.1 
Electricity -13.4 -10.2 -9.8 -3.0 -7.7 -0.6 -10.6 -7.5 
Compound feed -11.4 -2.6 -11.8 -15.7 -11.3 -18.8 -11.9 -24.5 
Fertiliser -11.3 -8.3 -10.6 -7.8 -10.6 -6.5 -14.4 -19.8 
Welfare 
Table 5.8 shows the welfare improvement of a system of tradeable emission permits over a 
system of non-tradeable permits when emissions are reduced by 10 per cent. For example, a 
reduction of greenhouse gases by 10 per cent will decrease welfare by 2944 million guilders 
(1993) without tradeable permits while in the case of tradeability the welfare loss will be 
1850 million guilders (1993). 
For pigs the homogeneity assumption is valid which implies that pigs are either imported or exported. 
Initially pigs are exported and the domestic price is equal to the export price. Acidification and 
eutrophication reduction leads to a fall in domestic production of pigs and hence a decrease of pig export. At 
an acidification and eutrophication reduction of 6.5 per cent and 5.6 per cent respectively, pig export is 
reduced to zero. In the model there is a positive difference between the import (c.i.f.) and export (f.o.b.) 
price because of market margins. When acidification and eutrophication is reduced by 10 per cent, the 
domestic price happens to lie between the import and export price and hence trade is absent. Additional 
calculations show that the domestic price is equal to the import price when acidification and eutrophication 
are reduced by 18.1 per cent and 16.5 per cent respectively. At this point the Netherlands becomes a pig 
importer. 
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Table 5.7 Effects on trade in selected commodities of 10% environmental indicator reduction (% 
change from benchmark) 
Simulation: 10% reduction GHG 10% reduction ACID 10% reduction EUT 10% reduction WST 
not not not not 
Trade tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable 
Net export 
Fuels for vehicles -2.5 -12.5 -2.3 -13.4 -0.8 0.6 -8.3 0.4 
Natural gas 13.8 11.1 14.9 5.9 14.2 3.2 -6.4 27.9 
Other fuels for heatin g 2.0 -5.0 -1.1 -7.3 -0.1 0.5 -9.3 3.5 
Fertiliser -7.5 -31.3 -8.8 -12.8 -6.7 -10.1 -6.9 -45.5 
Pigs -56.3 -15.2 -46.4 -100° -6.2 -100" -3.8 -12.6 
Net import 
Coal -11.3 -14.6 -11.0 -6.9 -10.8 -0.5 -11.6 -9.0 
Electricity -57.6 2.5 -33.5 -2.9 -12.8 -3.1 -26.6 -20.6 
In these cases the Netherlands neither exports nor imports pigs (see also footnote 8). 
The difference in welfare loss is the largest for eutrophication (5476 vs. 1060 million 
guilders). The large difference in eutrophication emission coefficients between agents, and 
consequently differences in shadow prices, offers scope for efficiency gains when a tradeable 
emission permits system is introduced. It should be noted that the potential benefit of a 
tradeable permit system is lower when transaction costs are considered (see Stavins, 1995). 
Table 5.8 Effects on welfare and exchange rate of 10% environmental indicator reduction 
Simulation: 10% reduction GHG 10% reduction ACID 10% reduction EUT 10% reduction WST 
not not not not 
Variable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable 
Welfare" -2944 -1850 -2592 -1777 -5476 -1060 -14270 -12315 
Exchange rateb 0.99% 0.75% -0.15% 1.11% 0.20% 0.84% -4.23% 2.56% 
Welfare measured in 1993 million guilders. 
Exchange rate change in 1993 guilders per dollar. 
Appendix XTTI shows the welfare effects for the range of 0 to 15 per cent reduction of 
all environmental indicators. Reducing a certain level of acidification leads to the lowest 
welfare loss, while reducing waste emissions leads to the highest welfare loss. This can partly 
be explained by the extent of substitutability between commodities for industries and 
consumption. In the case of waste emissions and to a lesser extent of eutrophication, where 
emissions are related to aggregate output and aggregate consumption, substitution is hardly 
possible and a reduction of emissions will therefore be very costly. In the case of acidification 
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and greenhouse gas emissions, however, a reduction can mainly be achieved by subsuming 
zero or low emission commodities for high emission commodities. Moreover, in the latter 
case, emissions are widely distributed over all industries and consumers, which, especially in 
the case of tradeable emission permits, offers scope for an efficient allocation of the burden. 
Environment 
Table 5.9 shows that a 10 per cent reduction of greenhouse gases is achieved mainly by 
reducing CO2 emissions, both in the case of non-tradeable and tradeable permits, while N2O 
and CH4 emissions are reduced to a lesser extent. Again, this is because the latter two 
emissions are more related to aggregate output while CO2 is mainly related to inputs, which 
are easier to substitute. Clearly, a reduction of greenhouse gases also reduces acidification 
(and vice versa) since the underlying emissions are correlated (CO2, N O x and SO2 are all 
related to fossil fuels). Eutrophication is much less related to the other environmental 
indicators, because emissions are mainly related to different inputs. Moreover, the main part 
of eutrophication is caused by a few agricultural industries. 
Table 5.9 Effects on emissions and environmental indicators of 10% environmental indicator 
reduction (% change from benchmark) 
Simulation: 10% reduction GHG 10% reduction ACID 10% reduction EUT 10% reduction WST 
Emission not not not not 
Indicator tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable tradeable 
C 0 2 -10.3 -10.9 -10.3 -5.8 -8.7 -0.8 -12.2 -8.9 
N 20 -7.3 -3.3 -7.2 -4.2 -8.2 -3.0 -10.6 -13.3 
CH, -8.7 -2.8 -8.6 -7.9 -7.3 -7.9 -10.2 -11.3 
GHG -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -5.7 -8.6 -1.2 -12.0 -93 
NOx -9.0 -7.4 -10.4 -5.3 -9.2 -0.8 -13.2 -9.0 
S 0 2 -10.0 -20.2 -10.1 -18.1 -9.8 -0.7 -12.3 -7.2 
NHj -9.5 -2.5 -9.5 -11.0 -9.7 -7.9 -10.2 -16.0 
ACID -9.4 -7.7 -10.0 -10.0 -9.5 -5.2 -11.8 -11.6 
N -9.0 -3.3 -9.2 -8.5 -9.1 -8.2 -11.4 -15.0 
P -8.2 -2.7 -9.2 -9.6 -10.8 -11.5 -12.1 -20.5 
EUT -8.6 -3.0 -9.2 -9.1 -10.0 -10.0 -11.8 -18.0 
WST -2.9 -1.1 -3.7 -1.1 -5.2 -0.9 -10.0 -10.0 
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Interaction of environmental policies 
The fact that environmental indicators are related also has consequences when two or more 
environmental policy goals are set simultaneously. For example, the introduction of a 
reduction of acidification will be less restrictive when a certain level of greenhouse gas 
reduction is already achieved. This effect is shown in Figure 5.2, in which the interaction 
between the emission permit prices of greenhouse gas and acidification is plotted. The 
starting point of this picture is a 10 per cent reduction of greenhouse gases, while emission 
permits are assumed tradeable. From Table 5.3 it was already concluded that at a 10 per cent 
reduction of greenhouse gases, the shadow price of a restriction on greenhouse gas emissions 
is 0.04 guilders (1993) per kg C O 2 equivalent. Moreover, at this point, acidification will be 
reduced by 7.7 per cent (see Table 5.9). Hence, the origin of the picture represents the point 
without a restriction for acidification and thus the permit price for acidification is zero. 
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Figure 5.2: Interaction emission permit prices GHG and ACID (at 10% GHG reduction) when 
permits are tradeable 
84 Chapter 5 
The picture shows that if the acidification restriction is set beyond 7.7 per cent reduction, the 
permit price for greenhouse gases will decrease while the permit price for acidification 
increases. Clearly, when the acidification reduction aim becomes increasingly restrictive, it 
takes over part of the greenhouse gas restriction. At 19.8 per cent acidification reduction, the 
restriction is such that the greenhouse gas policy goal is no longer restrictive and hence the 
shadow price of a restriction on greenhouse gases becomes zero or negative. 
Table 5.10 shows the effects of a 10 per cent reduction of both greenhouse gas and 
acidification when permits are tradeable. Again, it is shown that in the case of a simultaneous 
10 per cent reduction of both indicators, shadow prices of both restrictions are lower than in 
the case of a 10 per cent reduction of each indicator separately. The table also shows that the 
welfare loss of a restriction on acidification in addition to a restriction on greenhouse gases is 
relatively small. Finally, from Table 5.10 it can be concluded that the effects on 
environmental indicators by the different groups of industries and consumption in the case of 
a simultaneous emission reduction are less different than in the case of a reduction of 
indicators separately. 
Table 5.10 Effects on welfare, shadow prices and environmental indicators, summarised for 
industries and consumers of 10% GHG and ACID reduction, assuming tradeable permits 
Simulation: 10% reduction GHG 10% reduction ACID 10% reduction GHG and ACID 
Welfare" -1850 -1777 -2144 
Shadow price" GHG ACID GHG ACID GHG ACID 
0.042 - - 0.184 0.033 0.076 
Environmental GHG ACID GHG ACID GHG ACID 
indicators0 
Agriculture -5.8 -2.5 -5.4 -11.4 -7.0 -7.2 
Agribusiness -9.7 -6.9 -5.4 -5.7 -9.9 -7.7 
Other industries -15.4 -20.3 -11.7 -18.5 -16.1 -22.1 
Public utilities -14.5 -14.9 -4.4 -4.5 -13.2 -13.5 
Services -5.9 -3.7 -2.5 -3.4 -5.6 -4.2 
Consumption -3.7 -3.4 -1.9 -3.1 -3.7 -3.9 
Total -10.0 -7.7 -6.1 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 
See Table 5.8. 
See Table 5.3. 
See Table 5.1. 
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5.6 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter analyses the environmental and economic effects of restricting greenhouse 
gases, acidification, eutrophication and waste accumulation. An AGE model is used, in which 
emissions are linked to inputs, aggregate output, consumer goods and aggregate consumption 
at a very detailed level. Attention is paid to the different effects of restricting single 
environmental indicators, the interaction effects of restricting different environmental 
indicators simultaneously and tradeability of emission permits. 
The results in this chapter show large differences in welfare losses as result of 
restricting different environmental indicators, which can be explained by the extent to which 
inputs, aggregate output, consumer goods and aggregate consumption can be substituted. In 
the case of waste emissions and to a lesser extent of eutrophication, where emissions are 
related to aggregate output and aggregate consumption, substitution is hardly possible and a 
reduction of emissions will therefore be very costly. In the case of acidification and 
greenhouse gas emissions, however, a reduction can mainly be achieved by substitution of 
zero or low emission commodities for high emission commodities, which entails relatively 
low costs. Moreover, in the latter case, emissions are widely distributed over all industries 
and consumers, which, especially in the case of tradeable emission permits, offers scope for 
an efficiënt allocation of the emission reduction. These results emphasise the need for a very 
detailed emission matrix at a disaggregated level as applied in this chapter. 
This chapter also shows that environmental policies might interact when different 
environmental indicators are related to the same economic variables. When two or more 
environmental policy goals are set simultaneously, individual restrictions are less restrictive 
and hence permit prices will be lower. In addition, the welfare loss of an additional 
environmental restriction is relatively small. 
Finally, the simulations in this chapter show the potential benefits of a system of 
tradeable permits over a system of non-tradeable permits. When permits are tradeable, permit 
prices for 1 kg C 0 2 equivalent (greenhouse effects), 1 mole ET (acidification), 1 kg N 
equivalent (eutrophication) and 1 kg waste (waste accumulation) at 10 per cent reduction of 
the concerning emissions are 0.04,0.18, 1.52 and 3.37 guilders (1993) respectively. These are 
lower than the average shadow prices in the case of non-tradeability (0.13, 1.03, 21.43 and 
9.41 respectively). The difference in welfare loss between non-tradeable and tradeable 
permits is largest in the case of eutrophication (5476 vs. 1060 million guilders), which is due 
to the large differences in eutrophication emission coefficients between agents. 
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The simulations give a good insight into the effects that stricter environmental policies 
might cause. Of course, the results are conditional on the model and data characteristics; e.g., 
functional forms, specification of agents and commodities, and the static nature of the model. 
More detail with respect to the links between emissions and economic variables is necessary 
(e.g., for waste emissions) to improve the simulation results of the model. In addition, the 
policy simulations themselves should be interpreted with care. To facilitate comparison, the 
applied reduction levels are chosen to be the same for each environmental indicator, which, 
most likely, is not the case in reality. Finally, a system of emission permits was chosen to 
simulate environmental policy. In reality, it can be hard to identify and quantify the emissions 
for each agent distinguished in this chapter. 
From a policy perspective, the results in this chapter give insight into the potential 
effects of achieving different environmental policy goals. Since both direct and indirect 
effects are taken into account in the AGE framework used, the links between environmental 
problems and economic activity are placed in a broad perspective. 
CHAPTER 6 
ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGY SWITCHES IN DUTCH DAIRY FARMING WHEN 
ENVTRONMENTAL AND AGRICULTURAL POLICIES ARE RESTRICTIVE 
Abstract 
In this chapter an applied general equilibrium (AGE) model written in mixed-
complementarity format is developed and used to analyse the effects of an increase in milk 
quota in the Netherlands when N emissions are restricted. The model combines the strengths 
of AGE models and mathematical programming models, which enables economy-wide policy 
analyses while technology switches are allowed. Results show that a welfare gain can be 
reached by increasing milk quota while keeping N emissions at the same level. Under such a 
policy change inactive N-extensive technologies in dairy farming become active and (partly) 
replace N-intensive technologies and output in other agricultural industries decreases. 
6.1 Introduction 
In order to be compatible with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay 
Round Agreement and to anticipate to future World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements 
and enlargement of the EU after 2000, the EU reforms its Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), known as Agenda 2000 (Boots, 1999). Milk quota will be increased (1.5 per cent in 
the Netherlands), the intervention prices for butter and skimmed milk powder will be 
decreased by 15 per cent and income losses will (partly) be compensated by direct income 
payments (Agra Europe, 1999). 
Some countries within the EU - Denmark, Sweden and the UK - proposed a more 
drastic dairy policy reform in 1998 in which quota abolition was the main objective 
(AgraFocus, 1998). One would have expected that the Netherlands, with probably one of the 
most competitive dairy industries in the EU, joined this group. However, they did not. The 
main reason for this is probably that the Netherlands is already confronted with an excess 
mineral supply of nitrate and phosphate. The Dutch government fears that quota abolition 
would lead to a strong growth in mineral production that would require additional 
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environmental policy measures. In particular, the growth in N emissions is unacceptable 
given the EU Nitrates Directive. It is very likely, however, that an increase in milk quota, in 
combination with an N emission restriction, will lead to the application of new low-emission 
technologies. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the effects of an increase in milk quota 
in the Netherlands when nitrogen (N) emissions are restricted, using an applied general 
equilibrium (AGE) model that considers the possible application of new technologies. 
AGE models are used for agricultural and environmental policy analysis if economy-
wide policy effects can be expected and are of interest. An AGE model is relevant in case of 
an increase in milk quota when total N emissions are restricted because of the linkages 
between dairy farming, the other agricultural industries (most agricultural industries have an 
N surplus) and the compound feed industry. In most AGE models, industries adopt a smooth 
well-behaved neoclassical production technology. Describing technologies this way can be 
criticised since policy changes can only lead to input substitution while technology switches 
cannot take place. Mathematical programming models on the other hand, allow for 
technology switches. Under the policy change mentioned above, it is likely that inactive, N-
extensive technologies in dairy farming become active and (partly) replace N-intensive 
technologies (see Berentsen, 1998, for an application of a mathematical programming model 
for environmental policy analysis in Dutch dairy farming). A drawback of mathematical 
programming models is that they take input and output prices as exogenous. 
In this chapter, both approaches are combined by formulating an AGE model as a non-
linear mixed-complementarity (MC) problem. If an AGE model is written in MC format 
(AGE-MC model), it allows the standard features of the AGE approach (strict equalities) to 
be combined with mathematical programming features (inequalities) to specify technical 
restrictions or technologies more accurately. Moreover, it consistently takes into account that 
prices and technology mutually influence each other. It also makes it possible that more than 
one technology is operational at given prices. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 elaborates on the MC 
features of the AGE model developed. Special attention is given to the modelling of 
technology switches and the description of different technologies in dairy farming. Policy 
simulations are described in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 discusses the results of the simulations 
while Section 6.5 provides the results of some sensitivity analyses. Finally, Section 6.6 
concludes with a summary and conclusions. 
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6.2 Model characteristics 
A standard AGE model, as described in Chapter 2, can be formulated as a system of 
simultaneous (non-linear) equations, all of which are strict equalities. It consists of well-
behaved neoclassical functions and a unique solution can be found with strictly positive 
prices, while all activities present in the benchmark year are active. The AGE-MC model in 
this chapter consists of a set of simultaneous (linear or non-linear) equations that are a mix of 
strict equalities and inequalities, with each inequality linked to a bounded variable in a 
complementary slackness condition (see also Rutherford, 1995; Folmer et al., 1995; Gunning 
and Keyzer, 1995). Hence, the AGE-MC model, combines the standard features of the AGE 
approach (strict equalities) with mathematical programming features (inequalities) to specify 
technical restrictions or technologies more accurately. Examples of AGE-MC applications for 
agricultural and environmental policy analysis are scarce. B6hringer (1998) uses a stylised 
model to show possible technology switches in electricity production in the case of emission 
taxes and LSfgren and Robinson (1999a) model inequality constraints on agricultural factor 
use in a simple AGE model of Egypt. Gohin and Guyomard (1999) use inequality constraints 
to model EU dairy policy instruments. Recent advances in software development make it 
possible to solve large-scale AGE-MC models (see Rutherford, 1995)1. This section provides 
the complementary-slackness conditions applied in the model to specify discrete technology 
switches in dairy farming and restrictions on N emissions in agriculture2. Finally, the data for 
both the active and latent Leontief technologies in dairy farming are described. 
6.2.1 Technology switches in dairy farming 
In most AGE models, each industry is represented by a smooth well-behaved neoclassical 
production technology that is fully specified by the original data set and exogenous 
parameters, using a calibration procedure. Since emissions do not have a price, they cannot 
be calibrated as an economic input. Hence, emissions are often assumed to be related to 
inputs and/or output. If emissions are mainly related to output, as is the case for N emissions 
in livestock farming, emission reduction can only be achieved by output reduction. In reality, 
1 The model is written and solved in the software package GAMS (see Brooke et al. (1988), using MILES (a 
Mixed Inequality and non-Linear Equation Solver) as MC solver (see Rutherford, 1995). 
2 The same approach could have been used to model under-utilisation of milk quota (see Gohin and 
Guyomard, 1999). However, milk quota in the Netherlands is binding, which is reflected by a high quota 
price. 
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however, it is feasible that new low-emission technologies come to the fore. Since these 
technologies are not observed in the initial situation, they are not in the domain of the single 
calibrated technology. In this chapter, this gap in the conventional calibration procedure is 
avoided by specifying different technologies where each technology is characterised by a 
different emission-input-output mix. This allows for technology switches, which make it 
feasible to reduce emissions without necessarily reducing output3. 
"There is no straightforward way to formulate neoclassical production technology so 
that production and input demand functions are defined mathematically when an activity is 
zero. The domains of the production functions and first-order conditions do not include zero 
for factor inputs" (Lôfgren and Robinson, 1999b, footnote 6). Hence, it is difficult to allow a 
production activity to close down or start up, using a neoclassical specification. Instead a set 
of Leontief technologies can be used, also called 'activity analysis' specification (Lôfgren and 
Robinson, 1999a) or hottom-up' technology (Bôhringer, 1998). 
Therefore, technology switches in dairy farming are modelled, using a Leontief 
specification for both active (old) and latent (new) technologies. Hence, demand for inputs 
INg,t for each technology t is a linear function of output Yt according to input-output 
coefficients Sgt :4 
IN„=S„Jt V g e G , W 6 r (6.1) 
The zero-profit condition for each technology is given in equation (6.2). The complementary-
slackness variable, the variable entering the complementary slackness condition (6.3) linked 
to equation (6.2), is output. 
Y,S^WINg-WY>0 Y^Q V teT (6.2) 
geG 
YJSg4WINg-WT Y.=0 V teT (6.3) 
where WINganà WY represent prices of inputs and output respectively. 
3 This way of describing technologies would also allow for new intermediate inputs or a technology specific 
input (e.g., knowledge) to be part of the production function. This would not be possible if an industry had 
been calibrated using a single, smooth well-behaved neoclassical production technology. 
4 Since this technology specification only applies for dairy farming, for simplicity, subscript b (indicating 
industries) is omitted. 
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Equations (6.2) and (6.3) imply that technologies that are active (Yt > 0) face zero-
profits, while technologies that run a loss at equilibrium prices are inactive (Yt = 0). In 
general, when a constraint is (not) binding5, the complementary-slackness variable is positive 
(zero). For example policy changes, which alter relative prices, potentially trigger active 
(inactive) technologies to become inactive (active). 
Bohringer (1998) also specifies a restricted technology specific factor Q,, which 
determines an upper bound on production for each technology. This capacity constraint is 
given in equation (6.4). The complementary-slackness condition linked to equation (6.4) is 
given in equation (6.5). The complementary-slackness variable is the shadow price (WQ,) of 
the specific factor. 
SQ.Y,-a<0 WQ,>0 V teT (6.4) 
(sQi.Y,-Q).WQ^0 V teT (6.5) 
Hence, if the capacity constraint is (not) binding, the shadow price of the specific factor 
WQ, is positive (zero). If the capacity constraint is binding, the shadow price WQ, also 
enters equations (6.2) and (6.3) 6. Due to this specification, a step-wise supply mapping 
emerges (see B6hringer, 1998)7. When relative prices change in favour of a latent technology 
(input prices decrease or output price increases), first equation (6.2) becomes binding and the 
latent technology becomes active. Production increases until equation (6.4) becomes binding 
and a shadow price for the capacity constraint occurs. An advantage of this specification is 
that a switch from one technology to another (specialisation) is not immediate since the rents 
'Binding' implies that the strict equality condition holds. 
Equations (6.2) and (6.3) then become: 
iX^tfWg +WQ,-WY> 0 Y,ZO v teT (6.2*) 
gsO 
f \ 
Y<SgrWINg + WQt-WY ,Y,=0 v t e T (6.3*) 
Figure 1 in B6hringer (1998), that shows such a supply mapping graphically, may lead to two 
misunderstandings. First, by drawing in two-dimensional space (aggregate output versus price), the figure 
suggests that different technologies become active and reach full capacity successively. The simulations in 
this chapter but also in the paper by BShringer show, however, that this might as well happen 
simultaneously. Secondly, the figure wrongly suggests a positive shadow price for a technology that has not 
yet reached full capacity (technology three). 
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for the capacity constraints serve as a kind of threshold . In this chapter this approach is 
applied only in a sensitivity analysis where it is assumed that production by the new low-
emission technology is restricted due to a technology specific factor ('new knowledge'). 
6.2.2 Restrictions on N emissions in agriculture 
N emissions in agriculture are mainly due to manure production in dairy farming, pig farming 
and poultry farming and the use of fertiliser in all agricultural industries. N emissions that 
result from manure production are assumed to be related to output by the industry concerned. 
Hence, N emissions in agriculture are defined as: 
leT b=2 gsG b=2 
where i// are emission coefficients expressed in kg N for output by Leontief technologies in 
dairy farming (Yt), inputs in other agricultural industries (INgJ>) and output in other 
agricultural industries (Ybf. In equation (6.7), it is assumed that total N emissions in 
agriculture (Nagr) will be restricted to the benchmark level Nagr by means of a system of 
tradeable N emission rights. The complementary-slackness condition linked to equation (6.7) 
is given in equation (6.8). The complementary-slackness variable is the shadow price (WN) 
of the emissions, or because of tradeability, the price of the N emission rights10. 
Nagr-Nagr<0 WN>0 (6.7) 
{Nagr~Nagr).WN=0 (6.8) 
BShringer (1998) creates such thresholds by assuming and calibrating a rent for capacity constraints in the 
benchmark already. This partly explains the fact that in his simulations five technologies in one industry can 
be active simultaneously. 
9 It is relevant whether emissions are linked to output or inputs. In the case of inputs, a reduction of emissions 
is less costly and hence the shadow price of emissions is lower, since substitution possibilities are greater 
(see also Chapter 5). A Leontief technology, however, does not allow for substitution and hence, it is 
indifferent whether emissions are related to input or output. Since in dairy farming a Leontief technology is 
assumed, N emissions of fertiliser are also linked to output. 
1 0 Hence, in this chapter WN is assumed to be the same over all commodities and agricultural industries. 
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Hence, if the N emission constraint is (not) binding, the shadow price of an N emission 
right WN is positive (zero). Because N emissions are related to inputs and output, WN enters 
the zero-profit condition (6.9) for the other agricultural industries": 
WYbYh = YWINsjJNtJi + WAPRb.APRb + £ J W ^ - f l V , , + WN¥r^.Yb V bEB (6.9) 
geG geG 
The shadow price WN also enters the zero profit condition (6.10) and complementary 
slackness condition (6.11) (with complementary-slackness variable F,) for each technology in 
dairy farming. 
Y$g,<WINg + WN.y/%rY, - WY>0 Y,Z0 V tmT (6.10) 
geG 
5 > w J t f D V , +WNjprhJr, -WY 
KgeG 
Y =0 V teT (6.11) 
Equations (6.6) to (6.8), (6.10) and (6.11) fully describe the discrete technology switches in 
dairy farming. When the N emission constraint in agriculture (6.7) is binding and hence the 
shadow price of N emissions becomes positive (6.8), for active N-intensive technologies, 
equation (6.10) becomes non-binding and eventually these technologies become inactive. 
Due to a higher price for output, equation (6.10) becomes binding for latent N-extensive 
technologies and these technologies become active. 
6.2.3 Technology description 
To describe both the active and latent technologies in dairy farming, input-output vectors for 
each individual technology are necessary. For dairy farming two active technologies are 
defined: an N-intensive active technology (technology 1: dirty active) and a less N-intensive 
technology (technology 2: clean active). For this purpose the average input-output vectors for 
two groups of farms, with more or less than the average N-emissions per unit of output are 
" In fact, equation (6.9) is a combination of equations (5.2) and (5.7) in Chapter 5 and replaces equations 1.22, 
1.23 and 1.24 for agricultural industries in the basic model (see Appendix I). 
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determined, using a stratified sample of specialised Dutch dairy farms that kept accounts on 
behalf of the Agricultural Economic Research Institute (LEI) farm accounting system (LEI, 
1992). These input-output vectors are used as prior information to divide the input-output 
vector of dairy farming taken from the 1993 SAM in a cross-entropy procedure (Golan, et al., 
1996). Appendix XTV provides a detailed representation of the distinguished technologies 
and the procedure that has been followed. 
The inactive, new technology (technology 3: clean latent) is assumed to be an N-
extensive technology. Results of a comparison between normal and N-extensive 
management of dairy farming at the 'Marke', a Dutch experimental farm, are used to describe 
the input vector of the third latent technology. Research at the 'Marke' showed that although 
the N extensive technology is feasible, due to more intensive use of non-N-intensive inputs 
(labour, capital and agricultural services), it would run at an economic loss at benchmark 
prices. Therefore, in the absence of an N emission restriction (zero shadow price for N) such 
a technology is not attractive to farmers compared to their currently applied technologies 1 2. 
Table 6.1 Summary of technologies in dairy farming 
Inputs in values and as % shares of output (values in million 1993 guilders) 
Use table 
Dairy farming 
Technology 1 
Dirty active 
Technology 2 Technology 3 
Clean active Clean latent 
Hired labour 193 1.7% 87 1.8% 106 1.7% 1.9% 
Capital" 3107 27.8% 1396 29.4% 1711 26.7% 31.7% 
Economic loss 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% -0.3% 
Cattle 1192 10.7% 563 11.8% 629 9.8% 11.8% 
Arable products 323 2.9% 124 2.6% 199 3.1% 0.5% 
Compound feed 2432 21.8% 1077 22.7% 1355 21.1% 22.4% 
Fertiliser 316 2.8% 121 2.5% 195 3.0% 1.0% 
Agricultural services 980 8.8% 376 7.9% 604 9.4% 9.6% 
Other input 2624 23.5% 1009 21.2% 1615 25.2% 21.4% 
Total 11167 100.0% 4753 100.0% 6414 100.0% 100.0% 
N emissions/output 0.032 0.034 0.030 0.020 
Including land and self employed labour. 
Table 6.1 summarises technologies 1 to 3, which are presented in detail in Appendix 
XTV. Of the two active technologies, technology 2 can be characterised as the more intensive 
technology: per unit of capital (incl. land) more fertiliser, agricultural services and other input 
are used. Moreover, the use of less livestock suggests that livestock is more productive. 
See Appendix XTV for a detailed representation of this technology. At the same level of output as the normal 
management system, the N-extensive management system uses 2 per cent more labour, 8% more capital, 22 
per cent more agricultural services, 10 per cent less feed and 60 per cent less fertiliser leading to 40 per cent 
less N emissions (PR, 1998, table 9). 
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Evidence for the phenomenon that more intensive farms are also more N efficient is also 
found by Reinhard (1999, p. 95). The new (latent) technology is less intensive. Less fertiliser 
and compound feed is used while more factor input (labour and capital) and agricultural 
services are used. The difference in technology and farm management 1 3 leads to lower N 
emissions. 
6.3 Policy simulations 
The Dutch government fears that milk quota enlargement or abolition would lead to a strong 
growth in mineral production that would require additional environmental policy measures. 
Especially the growth of N emissions is unacceptable given the EU Nitrates Directive. In the 
base simulation, a milk quota 1 4 increase is modelled with total N emissions in agriculture 
restricted at the benchmark level 1 5. 
Two sensitivity analyses are pursued. First, to show the effects of the restriction on total 
N emissions, the results of a quota increase in combination with three different N emission 
restrictions are compared: no restrictions on N emissions, N emissions restricted to the 
benchmark level (base simulation) and a 10 per cent reduction of total N emissions. The 
second sensitivity analysis concerns three alternative technology specifications of dairy 
farming. It compares the base simulation (Leontief technologies) with a CES specification of 
dairy farming (as in other chapters) and with a simulation in which output by the new 
Leontief technology is restricted. The latter simulation shows the effects of a specific factor 
linked to a new technology. The specific factor can be knowledge (human capital) needed to 
use and implement the new technology (technology 3). This knowledge is limited and 
therefore, given the Leontief production function, output of technology 3 is restricted to an 
arbitrarily assumed maximum of 5% of total output in dairy farming. 
1 3 Differences in farm management are, for example, an increase in own roughage production, more storage 
and transportation of manure and a longer stay of cows inside. 
1 4 The supply quota is modelled as a strict equality, using a variable ad valorem tax rate that induces a level of 
output by dairy farming equal to the quota. The 'tax revenue' of this tax equals the quota rent (see Hertel and 
Tsigas, 1991) that is set equal to 1500 mln (1993) guilders (see Appendix XTV for a calculation). 
1 5 Prices of milk and dairy products are endogenously determined in the model, however EU and world market 
prices of dairy products (milk is not traded) are exogenously fixed at the 1993 level. Therefore, under the 
quota enlargement simulations, EU and world market dairy prices are probably over-estimated. However, 
because (world market and EU) prices for dairy products are unknown the most simple assumption, namely 
constant prices, is adopted. 
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6.4 Results 
This section graphically presents some of the results of a milk quota increase with total N 
emissions in agriculture restricted at the benchmark level. Results of the base simulation are 
also provided in tables in Section 6.5 where the results of sensitivity analyses are presented. 
Figure 6.1 shows that an increase of milk quota leads, as quota rights become less 
scarce, to a lower value of milk quota. When the value of milk quota reaches zero (quota is 
no longer restrictive), the production of dairy farming has increased by 12.2 per cent (see 
third column of Table 6.2). Since N emissions in agriculture are restricted at the benchmark 
level, a higher production in dairy farming will lead to a positive and increasing shadow price 
of N emissions. At the point where milk quota is no longer restrictive, the shadow price is 
0.99 guilders (1993) per kg N (see third column of Table 6.2). The symmetry between the 
two curves in Figure 6.1 shows the mutual dependency between the value of milk quota and 
the shadow price of N emissions. Clearly, while the quota on dairy production becomes less 
restrictive, the constraint on N emissions in agriculture becomes more restrictive. 
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Figure 6.1 Effects milk quota increase for value milk quota and shadow price N emissions 
The kinks in Figure 6.1 are due to technology switches in dairy farming, which is 
shown in Figure 6.2. Initially, technology 2 (clean active) fully accounts for the increase of 
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production in dairy farming. This is the result of two effects that work in the same direction. 
First, since factor inputs are imperfectly mobile between industries (see Chapter 2), the 
technology that is less factor intensive (technology 2) has an advantage (see Table 6.1). 
Second, due to the increase in the shadow price of N emissions, output is shifted from 
technology 1 to the cleaner technology 2. At a milk quota increase of 5.4 per cent, technology 
1 becomes inactive, and all output is produced by technology 2. At this point, there is no 
longer substitution between technology 1 and technology 2, which causes the shadow price of 
N emissions to rise faster as dairy production increases. At a milk quota increase of 5.8 per 
cent the increase in the shadow price of N emissions slows down. At this point the shadow 
price of N emissions is high enough to trigger clean technology 3. Part of production by 
technology 2 is now shifted to technology 3. This takes place although technology 3 uses 
more imperfectly mobile factor inputs (see Table 6.1) 1 6. At the point where milk quota is no 
longer restrictive, 91 per cent of dairy production is produced by technology 2 and 9 per cent 
by technology 3 (see third column of Table 6.2). 
14000 7 
Change milk quota (%) 
Figure 6.2 Effects milk quota increase for output different dairy technologies 
1 6 Since factor inputs are imperfectly mobile, prices of factor inputs tend to increase faster than prices of 
intermediate inputs. Additional sensitivity analysis (not presented here) indeed shows that with increased 
factor mobility, the price increase of factor inputs is lower. In that case, technology 1 stays active longer 
while technology 3 becomes active earlier. 
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Figure 6.3 shows that as the shadow price of N emissions increases, production by pig 
and poultry farming decreases due to an increase of output and emissions in dairy farming, 
given that N emissions in agriculture are restricted to the benchmark level. The negative 
effect on income is partly offset by a decrease in feed prices (-1.4 per cent). At the point 
where milk quota is no longer restrictive, production by pig farming and poultry farming 
decreases by 7.5 per cent and 3.2 per cent respectively (see Table 6.2). Pig farming is most 
sensitive to an increase in milk quota when total N emissions are restricted since production 
is N-intensive while the reduced output hardly generates a price increase due to the 
homogeneity assumption for trade in pigs. 
Results further show that at the point where milk quota is no longer restrictive, the 
higher production by dairy farming increases the net export of dairy products and beef 
(respectively 21.8 per cent and 14.3 per cent, see Table 6.2). Moreover, welfare increases 
(242 mln 1993 guilders) and the exchange rate decreases (-0.21 per cent appreciation of the 
guilder, see Table 6.2) which reflects the improved international competitiveness. 
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Figure 6.3 Effects milk quota increase for output other livestock industries 
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6.5 Sensitivity analysis 
This section contains two sensitivity analyses. The first sensitivity analysis compares the 
effects of milk quota abolition at three different N emission restrictions: no restrictions on N 
emissions, N emissions restricted to the benchmark level (base simulation) and a 10 per cent 
reduction on total N emissions. The second sensitivity analysis concerns quota abolition at 
three alternative technology specifications of dairy farming: dairy farming represented by a 
single CES technology (as in other chapters), the multiple Leontief technology of the base 
simulation, and the multiple Leontief technology where output by the new Leontief 
technology is restricted. 
6.5.1 Alternative assumptions on the N emission restriction 
Results show that in the case of a milk quota increase without N restrictions, full 
specialisation towards the second technology takes place while the first technology becomes 
inactive. This is because the second technology uses less labour and capital per unit of output 
(see Table 6.1). However, since there are no restrictions on total emissions, technology 1 
stays active longer then in the base simulation (technology 1 becomes inactive at a milk quota 
increase of 6.9 per cent compared to 5.4 per cent in the base simulation). Technology 3 never 
becomes active since it uses more labour and capital per unit of output then technology 2 (see 
Table 6.1). Production of dairy farming is larger in the point where milk quota is no longer 
restrictive than in the base simulation (16.2 per cent increase compared to 12.2 per cent 
increase in the base simulation, see Table 6.2) because there is no negative effect of a 
restriction on N emissions on dairy production. The larger increase in dairy production also 
decreases the exchange rate and increases welfare more (-0.49 per cent and 485 mln 1993 
guilders respectively, see Table 6.2). 
In the welfare increase the negative utility of an increase in national N emissions (4.1 
per cent, see Table 6.2) is not incorporated. The negative welfare from this emission increase 
should be smaller than the extra welfare increase compared to the base simulation (485-
242=243 mln guilders) in the case quota would be abolished. Pig and poultry production is 
not negatively affected by the N restriction in this simulation. However, the higher feed 
prices, due to a larger demand for feed by the dairy industry, and the larger exchange rate 
decrease do lead to small negative effects on production and income in both industries. 
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Table 6.2 Effects on Dutch economy of milk quota abolition under different restrictions on N 
emissions in agriculture (in % changes from benchmark) 
Variable" No restriction N Base simulation 10% reduction N 
emissions emissions 
Output 
7.7 Dairy farming (11167) 16.2 12.2 
Share technology 1 (0.43) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Share technology 2 (0.57) 1.00 0.91 0.56 
Share technology 3 (0.00) 0.00 0.09 0.44 
Pig farming (5646) -0.4 -7.5 -10.1 
Poultry farming (2415) -0.2 -3.2 -4.4 
Arable farming (2941) -1.1 -2.0 -2.2 
Compound feed industry (9489) 3.9 -1.2 -3.4 
Fertiliser industry (1714) 3.0 1.4 -3.4 
Prices 
Labour in dairy farming 23.7 17.9 18.6 
Capital in dairy farming 20.6 16.6 20.9 
Compound feed -0.7 -1.4 -1.5 
Fertiliser 4.1 2.1 -3.6 
Agricultural services 7.1 5.4 4.1 
Input fertiliser 
Dairy farming (249) 24.8 13.7 -18.0 
Arable farming (136) -2.2 -3.7 -3.3 
Net export 
Dairy products (4851) 27.4 21.8 14.5 
Beef (3053) 18.7 14.3 7.8 
Pigs (746) 2.7 -43.9 -62.6 
Pig meat (3111) -1.7 -1.3 -0.7 
Poultry meat (1327) -0.6 -3.4 -4.3 
Fertiliser (862) -2.3 -1.2 0.4 
N emissions 
Dairy farming (355) 11.3 4.4 -12.1 
Pig farming (159) -0.4 -7.5 -10.1 
Poultry farming (60) -0.2 -3.2 -4.4 
Arable farming (39) -2.2 -3.7 -3.3 
Horticulture under glass (8) -1.2 -0.9 -0.2 
Other horticulture (7) -1.3 -1.1 -0.2 
Agriculture (628) 6.1 0.0 -10.0 
TOTAL (976) 4.1 0.1 -6.4 
Miscellaneous 
Shadow price N emissions'1 0 0.99 1.35 
Exchange rate" -0.49 -0.21 -0.01 
Welfare" 485 242 22 
Base-year quantities, in mln 1993 guilders and mln kg N emissions, between parentheses. 
In 1993 guilders per kg N. 
Changes in 1993 guilders per dollar. 
In mln 1993 guilders. 
A 10 per cent reduction of total N emissions compared to the benchmark level makes 
technology 1 immediate inactive and technology 3 immediate active. A milk quota increase 
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leads then to a continuous substitution of output produced by technology 3 for output 
produced by technology 2, although technology 3 uses more factor inputs per unit of output. 
The cleaner production in dairy farming is also shown by a reduction of N emissions in dairy 
farming of 12.1 per cent. 
As quota increases, the shadow price of N emission rights increases faster than in the 
base simulation. This makes milk quota non-restrictive faster (7.7 per cent milk quota 
increase compared to 12.2 per cent in the base simulation). At that point there is a welfare 
increase of 22 mln guilders (see Table 6.2). Therefore the welfare gain from making milk 
quota no longer restrictive is larger than the welfare loss of reducing total N emissions with 
10 per cent. Production in pig and poultry farming decreases more than in the base 
simulation. This has a negative effect on the exports of both industries. Therefore the 
exchange rate appreciates with only -0.01 per cent. 
6.5.2 Restrictions on technologies 
It could be the case that new technologies cannot be used by all farms since certain 
knowledge or "human capital' is limited available. Given a Leontief technology, the presence 
of such a technology specific fixed factor puts a maximum on the output level that can be 
produced with the technology. It is assumed that the output by technology 3 cannot be larger 
than 5 per cent of total output in dairy farming. The presence of a technology specific fixed 
factor is compared with the base simulation. In addition, the base simulation is compared 
with a CES technology specification in dairy farming 1 7. 
The third column in Table 6.3 shows that the 5 per cent output restriction on technology 
three leads to a smaller increase in the production of dairy farming and a lower production of 
pig and poultry farming at the point where milk quota is no longer restrictive. If the output 
maximum is reached for technology 3', lower N emissions can only be achieved by reducing 
production. These lower production levels lead to smaller exports and a smaller decrease of 
the exchange rate. The large reduction in export of pigs (homogeneity assumption) avoids a 
large decrease of pig meat exports. Because the specific factor in technology 3 is restrictive, a 
shadow price for this capacity constraint occurs. Although the abolition of milk quota 
removes a restriction in the economy, the N emission restriction and the restriction on 
This specification has been applied in the other chapters. In this specification, approximately 40% of the N 
emissions is related to the input of fertiliser and 60% to output. 
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technology 3 partly take over this role. This is represented by the higher shadow price of N 
emissions of 1.22 guilders per kg and lower welfare increase of 202 million 1993 guilders. 
Table 6.3 Effects on Dutch economy of milk quota abolition under different technology restrictions 
with N emissions in agriculture restricted to the benchmark (% change from benchmark) 
Variable8 Base simulation Technology 3 < 5% CES technology 
output dairy dairy farming 
farming 
Output 
Dairy farming (11167) 12.2 11.9 6.7 
Share technology 1 (0.43) 0.00 0.00 -
Share technology 2 (0.57) 0.91 0.95 -
Share technology 3 (0.00) 0.09 0.05 -
Pig farming (5646) -7.5 -9.2 -14.6 
Poultry farming (2415) -3.2 -3.9 -7.0 
Arable farming (2941) -2.0 -2.3 -2.2 
Compound feed industry (9489) -1.2 -2.4 -5.1 
Fertiliser industry (1714) 1.4 1.9 1.1 
Prices 
Labour in dairy farming 17.9 16.1 9.8 
Capital in dairy farming 16.6 14.7 8.7 
Compound feed -1.4 -1.6 -1.5 
Fertiliser 2.1 2.5 1.2 
Agricultural services 5.4 5.2 1.6 
Input fertiliser 
Dairy farming (249) 13.7 16.2 8.4 
Arable farming (136) -3.7 -4.2 -4.1 
Net export 
Dairy products (4851) 21.8 21.5 13.2 
Beef (3053) 14.3 14.2 6.3 
Pigs (746) -43.9 -54.9 -81.2 
Pig meat (3111) -1.3 -1.2 -0.5 
Poultry meat (1327) -3.4 -4.0 -5.4 
Fertiliser (862) -1.2 -1.2 -0.2 
N emissions 
Dairy farming (355) 4.4 5.3 7.2 
Pig farming (159) -7.5 -9.2 13.0 
Poultry farming (60) -3.2 -3.9 -5.6 
Arable farming (39) -3.7 -4.2 -4.1 
Horticulture under glass (8) -0.9 -0.9 0.5 
Other horticulture (7) -1.1 -1.2 -0.8 
Agriculture (628) 0.0 0.0 0.0 
TOTAL (976) 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Miscellaneous 
Shadow price N emissionsb 0.99 1.22 1.68 
Exchange rate" -0.21 -0.16 0.12 
Welfare11 242 202 -71 
Technology rent technology 3 e - 2.2 -
"•bAd See Table 6.2. 
Inmln 1993 guilders. 
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The fourth column in Table 6.3 shows that assuming the CES technology is more 
restrictive than assuming multiple Leontief technologies (with or without restriction). With 
the CES technology it is less easy to reduce N emissions, which leads to a higher shadow 
price for N emissions of 1.68 guilders per kg and a welfare reduction. Output of dairy 
farming only increases by 6.7 per cent while output in other agricultural industries is reduced 
more. The lower output in agriculture leads to smaller exports and an increase of the 
exchange rate (depreciation of the guilder). 
6.6 Summary and conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the effects of an increase in milk quota in the 
Netherlands when nitrogen (N) emissions are restricted, using an AGE model written in 
mixed-complementarity format (AGE-MC model). The AGE-MC model combines the 
strengths of AGE models and mathematical prograrruning models, which enables economy-
wide policy analyses while technology switches are allowed. Contrary to most other AGE 
models where each industry is represented by a single smooth well-behaved neoclassical 
production technology, in this chapter dairy farming is represented by a series of different 
technologies, where each technology is characterised by a different emission-input-output 
mix. The advantage of this approach over the single technology approach is that new, low-
emission technologies can be taken into account. Consequently, technology switches make it 
feasible to reduce emissions without necessarily reducing output, which would be the case if 
emissions had been related to output in a well-behaved neoclassical production technology. A 
disadvantage of the proposed approach is that a Leontief specification is required to allow for 
zero activity. This specification underestimates the substitution possibilities within each 
technology. Ideally, one could approximate a continuous production frontier by specifying an 
infinite number of Leontief technologies. Due to data-limitations, the number of technologies 
in this chapter is limited to three. Further efforts in this direction might prove fruitful in 
future research. 
Several other aspects also deserve further attention in future research. The treatment of 
existing quota rents (milk quota) in the benchmark and the determination of its value as part 
of value added needs further attention. Further, attempts could be made to closer approximate 
Dutch mineral policy, in which N emissions per hectare land are restricted and not total N 
emissions as such. By linking the N emission restriction to land, policy simulations would 
generate the effect of mineral policies on land prices. In addition, the relationship between 
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livestock production and arable farming would be more pronounced. 
The results in this chapter show that a welfare gain can be reached by increasing milk 
quota while keeping N emissions at the same level. Under such a policy change inactive N-
extensive technologies in dairy farming become active and (partly) replace N-intensive 
technologies. Moreover, output in other agricultural industries decreases. Given these results, 
the Dutch government should not fear an increase in milk quota. An important task for the 
government, however, could be to stimulate the development of new low-emission 
technologies in agriculture, the introduction of which can partly offset the potential increase 
in N emissions. 
The simulations in this chapter have shown that the results are sensitive to technology 
specification in dairy farming. Especially latent technologies are difficult to specify because 
of a lack of information. However, if this information is available, the AGE-MC approach 
proves to be a useful tool for policy analysis in cases where technology switches can be 
expected as a result of policy changes. 
CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
This final chapter discusses the research in this thesis and draws conclusions. In Section 7.2, 
methodological and model issues are discussed. Section 7.3 gives feedback on the objectives 
of the thesis, summarises the simulation results and derives policy implications. Finally, some 
suggestions for future research are given in Section 7.4. 
7.2 Methodological and model issues 
The basic tool used in this thesis is a static, single-country applied general equilibrium (AGE) 
model for the Dutch economy. Without being exhaustive, some methodological and model 
issues that are relevant in the light of the simulations in this thesis are dealt with in this 
section. Specific model assumptions were already discussed in Chapter 2. 
AGE modelling and other approaches 
The analyses in this thesis have shown that an AGE model is an appropriate tool for analysing 
the economy-wide environmental and economic effects of environmental and agricultural 
policies and the interactions between these policies, in the Netherlands. Alternatives such as 
input-output analyses (Harthoorn and Wossink, 1987; Peerlings and Komen, 1998) or partial 
analyses are rather restrictive for various reasons. Input-output analysis assumes fixed input-
output coefficients, perfectly elastic factor supplies, and exogenously determined final demands. 
The simulations in this thesis have shown that these assumptions may be too restrictive if large 
policy changes are analysed or when substitution possibilities are important. Partial models 
analyse just a single part of the economy, assuming fixed agricultural input and output prices 
while linkages with the rest of the economy are often ignored. AGE analysis, on the other hand, 
does not suffer from these restrictions and is therefore very useful in tracing and measuring 
inter-industry linkages between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Moreover, because 
AGE analysis encompasses the whole economy, there will be no 'leakage' during welfare 
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analyses. Furthermore, the closed system of the SAM offers not only a theoretical but also an 
accounting consistency check, available from general equilibrium theory (Walras' Law), that is 
not available to partial equilibrium modellers (Hertel, 1990 and 1992). Finally, when substantial 
policy changes affect a number of sectors simultaneously, empirical modelling shows that partial 
equilibrium estimates are not likely to be robust (see de Melo and Robinson, 1981). 
Calibration year and aggregation level 
Although the model as applied in this thesis is calibrated on data of 1990 (Chapters 3 and 4) 
or 1993 (Chapters 5 and 6), it should not be viewed as out of date. Unless the structure of 
expenditure shares or factor shares has significantly changed, one may view the model as a 
representation of the present economy. 
The simulations in this thesis have shown that the aggregation level is important for 
several reasons. First, since the focus of most policy simulations in this thesis is on 
agriculture, a sufficient level of disaggregation should be applied to be able to identify 
individual agricultural industries and commodities. If a policy is typical for one or a few 
agricultural industries (e.g., restricting intensive livestock farming, Chapter 3), simulation 
results are not very clear when such industries are part of a larger industry. For example, the 
reduction of the manure problem might cause horticulture under glass to reduce its 
production if agriculture had not been disaggregated in the model 1. Second, a high level of 
disaggregation takes into account that industries and commodities are potentially 
heterogeneous with respect to policy variables (see also Just et al., 1991). This prevents 
overestimation of policy effects on those industries for which the policy variable is not 
relevant. Finally, a sufficient level of disaggregation enables an adequate linking of emissions 
to economic variables. The simulations in Chapter 5 have shown that such linking is highly 
relevant since outcomes depend on whether emissions are linked to inputs, aggregate output, 
consumer goods or aggregate consumption. Moreover, the heterogeneity among industries 
and commodities with respect to emission coefficients shows the potential benefits of a 
tradeable emission permit system over a non-tradeable permit system. 
Model applicability 
The range of simulations for which the AGE model can be used is limited. Each policy 
simulation involves different policy variables and is therefore biased to particular parts of the 
1 For example, Brockmeier et al. (1993) very likely overestimated the economy-wide effects of reduced 
pesticide application for Germany, due to an insufficient level of detail in the agricultural sectors. 
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economy. This could necessitate additional disaggregation, model specifications and data 
work. The pitfall is that once an AGE model is developed, it becomes more complicated after 
each policy simulation. Such a complicated model might cause solution problems. Moreover, 
the driving factors behind the model results are more difficult to trace. In this thesis the 
problem is partly circumvented by describing a basic version of the model in Chapter 2 that 
forms the basis for the modifications that were made in the following chapters. 
Trade 
It should be noticed that the way international trade is modelled limits the possibility for 
policy simulations related to trade liberalisation or reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) in the European Union (EU). The small country assumption implies that the model is 
feasible only for policies from which no change in world market prices can be expected, 
unless there is a priori information on changes in world market prices, for example obtained 
by a separate trade model (Komen, 1995). Moreover, an adequate treatment of the CAP 
reform requires that the international trade is separated into trade with the EU and the rest of 
the world while additional model specifications and data are required to model the CAP 
instruments (Gohin et al., 1998) and budgetary flows between the Netherlands and the EU. 
Technology specification 
In most AGE models, each industry is represented by a smooth well-behaved neoclassical 
production technology that is calibrated on the original data set using exogenously specified 
elasticities. A limitation of this approach is that new technologies are not taken into account, 
since they are not part of the current data set. The latter might be the case when policy 
changes trigger new technologies (e.g., lower emissions, less energy intensive production 
etc.) or abatement activities (see Nestor and Pasurka, 1995). In this thesis, these limitations 
are also in force for the policy simulations in Chapters 3 to 5 while in Chapter 6 technology 
switches are explicitly incorporated. It should be noticed, however, that this has only been 
applied for dairy farming. Application of technology switches throughout the whole model 
requires data to describe all the alternative technologies, which are often not available (see 
also Section 7.4 on future research). 
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13 Research goal, simulation results and policy implications 
The main objective of this thesis, as described in Chapter 1, was to determine the economy-
wide environmental and economic effects of agricultural and environmental policies and the 
interactions between these policies, in the Netherlands. Some of the most relevant policy 
simulations are dealt with in this thesis: (1) the manure policy; (2) the small-user energy tax; 
(3) the reduction of emissions causing eutrophication, the greenhouse effect, acidification and 
waste accumulation; and (4) the increase of milk quota under a nitrogen restriction. The aim 
was to quantify these policy effects, providing insight into the nature of the different 
environmental problems, the linkages between the economy and the environment, and the 
economic consequences of government intervention. 
This section assesses the contribution of the policy simulations to the research goal, 
recapitulates the main results and derives policy implications. The results of the policy 
simulations are compared to the benchmark equilibrium. For Chapters 3 and 4, the 
benchmark year is 1990; for Chapters 5 and 6, the benchmark year is 1993. Discussion of the 
specific policy simulation results is found in the respective chapters. 
Restricting intensive livestock production 
Chapter 3 quantifies the effects on the Dutch economy of different reductions in 
intensive livestock production necessary to achieve environmentally acceptable phosphate 
losses. The simulations give a good insight into the economic effects of a stricter mineral 
policy. It is shown that the introduction of an environmental policy that is specific for 
agriculture entails economy wide effects, revealing the linkages that exist between agriculture 
and the rest of the economy. 
A decrease in livestock production to achieve a phosphate loss of 30 kg/ha (policy goal 
in 2002) will decrease income from pig and poultry farming by 2.6 and 1.0 per cent, 
respectively. If pig production alone is reduced, the income from pig farming will decrease 
by 4.8 per cent. This is under the assumption that livestock farmers do not incur manure 
transportation costs and pay no levies. However, as this is unrealistic, the effects on income 
are underestimated. Nevertheless, the fact that the perfect homogeneity assumption in pig 
trade is used tends to overestimate the negative effects on income. The lower production in 
pig and poultry farming affects the production and income of the compound feed, pig and 
poultry meat industries more seriously than the livestock industries because of the absence of 
quota rents as part of income. The effects on trade are that net exports of livestock and net 
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imports of feedstuffs decrease. Moreover, in all cases, the exchange rate appreciates, which 
indicates that the trade position of the Netherlands would deteriorate because of the livestock 
reduction. In the case of a permitted phosphate loss of 30 kg/ha when only pig production is 
reduced, welfare decreases by 800 mln. 1990 guilders, which is only 0.15 per cent of national 
income. This welfare reduction would be offset by environmental improvements that are not 
included in the welfare measure. 
The results of the policy simulation in Chapter 3 form the background to discussions on 
the advantages and disadvantages of reducing livestock production in Dutch agriculture and 
on the design of policies in other countries that deal with the same environmental problems. 
They show the linkages that are present between livestock production and the rest of the 
economy. An important policy implication is the fact that industries related to the livestock 
industries (compound feed, pig and poultry meat industries) suffer a greater fall in income 
than the livestock industries themselves. This result is mainly due to the compensating effect 
of the quota rents for current farmers. However, the value of this quota (production rights) 
forms an entry barrier and has a negative effect on the structure of intensive livestock 
farming. 
Introduction of an energy tax 
In Chapter 4, the environmental and economic effects of the introduction of a unilateral 
energy tax are analysed. The effects of a small-user energy tax and a general energy tax are 
compared while taking into account different tax recycling mechanisms (e.g., reducing taxes 
on labour). Such an energy tax might improve the environment (first dividend) but also 
reduce the distortionary costs of the tax system (second dividend). The introduction of an 
energy tax is a typical general environmental policy that might potentially affect agriculture, 
in particular horticulture under glass that is both energy and labour intensive. 
The simulations in Chapter 3 show that the small-user energy tax (25 per cent for gas, 
15 per cent for electricity, 25 per cent for coal and 20 per cent for other fuels for heating) 
causes a CO2 reduction of 3.5 per cent while total emissions of greenhouse gases are reduced 
by 3.1 per cent. By recycling revenues of the small-user energy tax, employment increases by 
0.10 per cent and existing tax distortions decrease (second best welfare improvements), 
resulting in a higher national welfare of 0.06 per cent. When the tax base is broadened to all 
energy users and exemptions are ignored, welfare decreases by 0.02 per cent and the 
exchange rate increases by 0.25 per cent. This illustrates that in the case of the general energy 
tax, international competitiveness of the large energy-using industries deteriorates. Within 
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agriculture, horticulture under glass is the most affected industry although the effects are 
small. Sensitivity analyses of the results show that the positive welfare effects of a small-user 
energy tax only apply at low tax rates. At higher tax rates, the negative distortionary effects 
of the introduction of a small-user energy tax dominate the positive effect of redistributing 
existing distortions from labour to capital. At a CO2 reduction higher than 25 per cent, 
welfare costs of a small-user energy tax even become higher than welfare costs of a general 
energy tax, which is due to a broader tax base of the general tax. 
The CO2 reduction obtained is less than the target of 3-5 per cent reduction in 1989-
1990 C 0 2 levels by 2000, established by the Dutch government, because economic growth is 
not considered in the simulations. The results are hardly comparable with other studies 
focusing on the effects of an energy tax for the Netherlands, which is due to different 
modelling assumptions and policy simulations. The results show that it is rational to exempt 
large users from an energy tax to avoid loss of international competitiveness. Only at high 
reduction levels might it be more efficient to tax large energy users as well, since then an 
increased tax base proves to be less distorting. Under the restrictions of the model used, a 
second dividend can be achieved by the introduction of a small-user energy tax. At low tax 
rates, a welfare improvement is even possible when the revenues of a small-user energy tax 
are recycled in a lump sum fashion. These typical second-best results occur due to an ineffic-
ient initial distribution of the tax burden. From a policy perspective the question remains, 
however, whether introducing an energy tax is the appropriate tool to reduce distortions 
caused by other taxes. 
Multiple environmental policy goals 
Chapter 5 analysed the environmental and economic effects of restricting greenhouse 
gases, acidification, eutrophication and waste accumulation by means of a system of emission 
permits. Emissions are linked to inputs, aggregate output, consumer goods and aggregate 
consumption at a very detailed level. Attention is paid to the different effects of reducing 
single environmental indicators, the interaction effects of reducing different environmental 
indicators simultaneously and the tradeability of emission permits. Although policy 
simulations in this chapter are fictitious general environmental policies that affect agriculture 
(10% reduction of environmental indicators), they contribute to the aim of this thesis. The 
simulations provide insight into the nature of the different environmental problems, the 
linkages between the economy and the environment and the potential economic consequences 
of government intervention in the Netherlands. Moreover, possible interaction between 
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environmental policies is revealed. 
The results in this chapter show large differences in welfare losses as result of 
restricting different environmental indicators, which can be explained by the extent to which 
inputs, aggregate output, consumer goods and aggregate consumption can be substituted. In 
the case of waste emissions and to a lesser extent of eutrophication, where emissions are 
related to aggregate output and aggregate consumption, substitution is hardly possible and a 
reduction of emissions will therefore be very costly. In the case of acidification and 
greenhouse gas emissions, however, a reduction can mainly be achieved by substitution of 
zero or low emission commodities for high emission commodities, which entails relatively 
low costs. Moreover, in the latter case, emissions are widely distributed over all industries 
and consumers, which, especially in the case of tradeable emission permits, offers scope for 
an efficient allocation of the emission reduction. These results emphasise the need for a very 
detailed emission matrix at a disaggregated level as applied in this chapter. The simulations 
also show that environmental policies might interact, when different environmental indicators 
are related to the same economic variables. When two or more environmental policy goals 
are set simultaneously, individual restrictions are less restrictive and hence shadow prices of 
restrictions will be lower. In addition, the welfare loss of an additional environmental 
restriction is relatively small. Finally, the simulations in this chapter show the potential 
benefits of a system of tradeable permits over a system of non-tradeable permits. When 
permits are tradeable, permit prices for 1 kg C O 2 equivalent (greenhouse effects), 1 mole H + 
(acidification), 1 kg N equivalent (eutrophication) and 1 kg waste (waste accumulation) at 10 
per cent reduction of the concerning emissions are 0.04, 0.18, 1.52 and 3.37 guilders (1993) 
respectively. These are lower than the average shadow prices in the case of non-tradeability 
(0.13, 1.03, 21.43 and 9.41 respectively). The difference in welfare loss between non-
tradeable and tradeable permits is largest in the case of eutrophication (5476 vs. 1060 million 
guilders), which is due to the large differences in eutrophication emission coefficients 
between agents. 
From a policy perspective, the simulations in this chapter give insight into the potential 
effects of achieving different environmental policy goals. Since both direct and indirect 
effects are taken into account in the AGE framework used, the links between environmental 
problems and economic activity are placed in a broad perspective. The simulation results 
show that the economic impact of an emission reduction depends largely on substitution 
possibilities. Since these possibilities are often limited, especially when emissions are related 
to output, there is a potential pay-off to increasing the search for low-emission technologie • 
112 Chapter 7 
Moreover, confirming the results obtained in earlier studies, the gain of a tradeable emission 
permit system over a non-tradeable system shows the need for a market-based approach when 
emissions are to be reduced. Finally, since restrictions on different environmental indicators 
might interact, there is clearly scope for policy co-ordination when multiple environmental 
policy goals are to be met. 
Trade-off between environmental and agricultural policies 
Chapter 6 analyses the effects of an increase in milk quota in the Netherlands when 
nitrogen (N) emissions in agriculture are restricted. This policy simulation is the only 
example in this thesis of an agricultural policy change that entails environmental effects. In 
addition, it clearly shows the linkages that exist between agricultural industries. The 
contribution of this chapter is also of a methodological nature, since the AGE model is 
written in mixed-complementarity format (AGE-MC model). The AGE-MC model combines 
the strengths of AGE models and mathematical programming models. Contrary to the other 
chapters, where technology in each industry is fixed, this format enables economy-wide 
policy analyses while technology switches are allowed. 
The results show that as milk quota rights become less scarce, the value of milk quota 
reaches zero. Since N emissions in agriculture are restricted, a higher production in dairy 
farming will lead to a positive and increasing shadow price of N emissions. At the point 
where milk quota is no longer restrictive, the shadow price is 0.99 guilders (1993) per kg N. 
The mutual dependency between the shadow prices of milk quota and N emissions shows that 
while the quota on dairy production becomes less restrictive, the constraint on N emissions in 
agriculture becomes more restrictive. Still, a welfare gain can be reached by increasing milk 
quota while keeping N emissions at the same level. Under such a policy change, inactive N-
extensive technologies in dairy farming become active and (partly) replace N-intensive 
technologies, due to an increase in the shadow price of N emissions. For the same reason, 
output in other agricultural industries decreases, which shows that policy measures taken in 
one industry may indirectly (through the market for N emission permits) affect other 
industries. 
The simulations in Chapter 6 have shown that the results are sensitive to the 
specification of technology in dairy farming. The AGE-MC approach, using multiple 
Leontief technologies, seems to be more flexible than using a single CES technology. If the 
AGE-MC approach is adopted, results depend on the specification of the alternative (both 
existing and latent) technologies. Especially latent technologies are difficult to specify 
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because of a lack of information. However, if this information is available the AGE-MC 
approach proves to be a useful tool for policy analysis in cases where technology switches 
can be expected as a result of policy changes. 
From a welfare perspective, the Dutch government should not fear an increase in milk 
quota. It is important to note, however, the increasing shadow price of N emissions, which 
indicates an increasing pressure on the 'market' for environmentally harmful N emissions, 
indirectly affecting the other agricultural industries. Given the results obtained, an important 
task for the government could be to stimulate the development of new low-emission 
technologies in agriculture, the introduction of which can partly offset the potential increase 
in N emissions. 
7.4 General remarks and future research 
General remarks 
The policy simulations in this thesis are used to reveal the economy-wide environmental and 
economic effects of agricultural and environmental policies and the interactions between 
these policies, in the Netherlands. Although the most important policy issues are dealt with, 
the policy simulations in this thesis do not cover the total field of potential policy issues to be 
analysed with the AGE model. Another environmental policy in the Netherlands affecting 
agriculture is the pesticides policy, and an example of agricultural policies that potentially 
entail environmental effects is the Agenda 2000 reform of the CAP in the EU (Hanley and 
Oglethorpe, 1999). 
The simulations give a good insight into the effects of policy changes. However, the 
results should be interpreted with care for several reasons. First, since real policies are usually 
too complicated to be tackled in an economic model, there is always the chance of a certain 
degree of policy mis-specification. For example, the presence of energy covenants (in 
horticulture) or seasonal manure application norms are difficult to deal with in an AGE 
model. Second, it is worth mentioning that policies could be subject to large changes during 
the time period in which applied policy research can be completed. Policies that first look 
premature, may eventually be implemented and finally turn out to be replaced or 
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supplemented by other policies 2. The changing policy environment is also reflected by the 
different policy simulations in this thesis 3. Finally, the results are conditional on the model 
and data characteristics; for example, functional forms, specification of agents and 
commodities, and the static nature of the model. Therefore, for some of the critical 
assumptions (factor mobility, trade, and labour supply) sensitivity analyses were performed. 
Future research 
Considering the remarks and conclusions in the preceding chapters, several suggestions for 
future research can be made. In order to get more insight into the interaction between 
agricultural and environmental policies, there are still some policy simulations left to deal 
with, like other environmental policies (pesticides policy) and policy simulations related to 
CAP reform. 
A drawback of AGE models is that they are not econometrically estimated. Although 
full econometric estimation is impossible (Gunning and Keyzer, 1995) it is possible to estimate 
components of an AGE model like the input demand system, export supply, import demand or 
household demand (see Kemfert, 1998, on substitution elasticities of nested CES production 
functions and Shiells and Reinert, 1993, and Shiells et al., 1986, on trade substitution 
elasticities). Maximum entropy econometrics, an estimation techniques for small samples 
(Golan, et al. 1996) in combination with frequently published SAMs could be used in the future 
to (partially) estimate AGE models. 
An interesting area of research might be to incorporate micro-econometric simulation 
models 4 into AGE models. Many issues in environmental economics require both detailed 
insight at the level of the decision-making units (individual farms) and the consequences of 
such decisions for the environment and the economy as a whole (Oglethorpe and Sanderson, 
2 In fact this is the case for the policy described in Chapter 3. At the time the policy simulations were 
performed (1996), a restriction of intensive livestock production was politically not feasible. In 1998, 
however, this policy has actually been introduced for pig farming with a system of pig production rights, 
aiming at reduction levels similar to the policy simulations in Chapter 3. In 1999, the reduction of these 
production rights has partly been cancelled by a lawsuit against the Dutch government and was 
supplemented by a system of manure sales contracts. In spring 2000, again supplementary policy has been 
introduced. The government stimulates pig farmers to quit by buying production rights, while in specific 
parts of the Netherlands farmers receive a subsidy to dismantle their stables. 
3 For example, the mineral or manure problem has been dealt with in three different ways in this thesis. In 
Chapter 3 the focus was on phosphate and livestock numbers and in Chapter 6 the focus was on nitrogen, 
while in Chapter 5 eutrophication as a whole is considered. 
4 Micro-econometric simulation models are defined here as econometric models of firms or farms, based on 
micro-economic theory, that are used to simulate the effects of policies on farm-level and in some cases 
sector level (see Oude Lansink, 1997). 
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1999). Micro-econometric simulation models provide detailed insight at the level of the farm 
(sometimes sector) and incorporate technological differences between farms (Oude Lansink 
and Peerlings, 1997; Vatn et al., 1997). However, they do not take into account the linkages 
with the rest of the economy. AGE models, on the other hand, focus on these linkages but are 
less detailed. Theoretically a link is possible, given that both types of model are based on 
micro-economic theory. However, when micro-econometric simulation models are to be 
incorporated in an AGE model, a number of requirements have to be met and problems to be 
solved. Some of the issues at stake are: (1) the aggregation level of both commodities and 
industries has to be equal in both approaches; (2) assumptions on factor demand (e.g., 
mobility of labour, capital and land) correspond; (3) increasing returns to scale technology in 
AGE models are difficult to deal with in order to find a unique equilibrium, which is less of a 
problem in micro-econometric models; (4) the estimated values of demand and supply should 
be consistent with the data given in the SAM and NAMEA. 
Finally, it may be interesting in further research to consider regional differences in 
agriculture, using regional Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs). The appearance and 
functioning of rural areas is receiving increasing attention because of issues like rural 
employment and countryside maintenance (Strijker, 2000). Since agriculture contributes to 
rural activity and largely determines the appearance of the countryside, regional 
differentiation is appropriate. In addition, issues like wildlife conservation need further 
attention. However, regional SAMs should be in accordance with the national SAM while 
wildlife benefits are not represented in national accounts. Therefore, these topics also imply 
further needs for data development. 
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Appendix I Model description 
Demand and supply equations 
Aggregate output is composed of a hypothetical aggregate energy input (AENb), a hypothetical 
aggregate materials input (AINb) and a hypothetical aggregate factor input (APRb) according a CES 
production function with constant returns to scale (see glossary at the end of this appendix for 
overview of variables, coefficients and sets). Intermediate energy and material inputs (INb,g) are 
transformed into aggregate energy and aggregate materials input, respectively, according CES 
production functions with constant returns to scale. Labour (PRb,i) and capital (PRbj) are transformed 
into the aggregate factor input, using a CES production function with constant returns to scale. Labour 
in the agricultural industries is composed of mobile (hired) labour and immobile (own) labour. Labour 
in the non-agricultural industries equals mobile labour, because it is assumed that there is no 
immobile labour. Cost minimisation yields CES demand functions for aggregate material, energy and 
factor inputs (1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 respectively), intermediate inputs (1.4 and 1.5), factors (1.6), mobile 
labour (1.7 and 1.9) and immobile labour (1.8): 
MN> = fZSYb,WAENb,WAINb,WAPRb) V è e 5 (1.1) 
MN„ = f%?b(Yb,WAENb,WAINb,WAPRb) V ô e 5 (1-2) 
APRb = f^(Yb,WAENb,WAINb,WAPRb) (1.3) 
INbtg = f™(AENb,WIN„) (1.4) 
INbtg = f™(AINb,WINt) (1-5) 
PRbj = f™(APRb,WPR„) \/beB,\/jeJ (1.6) 
MPR^ = f^iPRu.WMPRu.WlPRu) VbeSagr (1-7) 
IPR„,x = f^PRbil,WMPRb,,WIPRb,) Vb*Sagr (1.8) 
MPRbi = PRb, VbtSagr (1.9) 
Supply of output g by industry b (Yb_g) is proportional to the aggregate output (Yb) by industry b (1.10). 
Aggregation of outputs over industries gives domestic production (DPg) of commodity g (1.11): 
\g = 5lsYb HKs=1 V ô e f i . V g e G (1.10) 
DP* = t 7» 
6=1 
V g e G (1.11) 
Domestic production (DPg) and imports (IMg) are aggregated into total supply of commodity g (SPg) 
using a CES production function with constant returns to scale for commodities for which the 
Armington assumption is adopted. For these commodities, total supply is then divided into domestic 
use (DUg) and exports (EXg) using a CET product transformation function with constant returns to 
scale. Cost rrunimisation yields CES demand equations for domestic production (1.12) and imports 
(1.13) and revenue maximisation yields CET supply equations for domestic use (1.14) and exports 
(1.15): 
DPg = f™(SPg,WDPg,WIMg) V g e ^ 0-12) 
IMg = f™(SPg,WDPg,WIMg) V g e S ^ (1.13) 
DUg = f^(SPg>WDU^',WEXg) V g e S ^ (1.14) 
EXg = f^(SPg,WDU^',WEXg) V g s ^ 0-15) 
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Domestic production (DPg) is equal to the sum of net trade (TRADg: exports minus imports) and 
domestic use (DUg) for those commodities for which the homogeneity instead of the Armington 
assumption is adopted: 
DPg = TRADg + DUg V g e S ^ (L16) 
Total mobile labour (j=l) and total capital (j=2) available in the economy (TPRj) are divided into 
supply of mobile labour (MPRb,,) and capital (PRbi2) by industry using CET product transformation 
functions with constant returns to scale. Revenue maximisation yields supply functions for mobile 
labour and capital (1.17 and 1.18 respectively): 
MPRbl = f^(JPRx,WMPRj) VbeB (1.17) 
PRB,2 = f%l(TPR2,WPR2) VbeB (1.18) 
Maximisation of the CES utility functions yields CES demand equations for the private household 
(1.19) and government (1.20): 
K" = f™(.EXP°°\WDUaM) V g e S ^ (119) 
XT = f^s(EXP^,WDU) V g e 5 O T M 0-20) 
The demand for investment goods (Xgv) is given by: 
= S'g"vJNV 2> g f e v =l V g e S ^ (1.21) 
gsSam 
Zero profit conditions 
The value of disaggregated outputs equals the value of aggregate output and the value of aggregate 
inputs by industry: 
gsG 
= WAENb.AEN„ + WAIN„.AINb + WAPRb.APRb 
The value of the aggregate energy and materials input equals the value of intermediate energy and 
materials inputs, respectively, by industry (1.23 and 1.24). The value of the aggregate factor input 
equals the value of labour and capital by industry (1.25): 
WAENb.AENb = YMN**JN>* V B S B ( L 2 3 ) 
g*sm 
WAIN„.AINb = Y W I N b , g J N b , g V 6 e 5 ( L 2 4 ) 
WAPR^'.APRb = YWPRbJPRbj VbeB (1.25) 
The value of total supply (SPg) equals the value of domestic production and imports (1.26) and the 
value of domestic use and exports by commodity (1.27): 
WSPg.SPg = WDPg.DPg+WIMgJMg Vg6 5 f l m (1.26) 
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WSPgJSPg = WDU^JDUg+WEXg£Xg V g e S ^ (1-27) 
The value of the supply of mobile labour and capital equals the value of the total availability of labour 
and capital (1.28 and 1.29 respectively). The value of mobile and immobile labour equals the value of 
total labour in the six agricultural industries (1.30). Moreover, in the non-agricultural industries the 
price of mobile labour equals the price of labour (1.31): 
YWMPRffMPRbl = WTPRiJPRl (L28) 
Yj^Rbt-PKi = WTPRi-TPRi (1-29) 
WPRbvPRbl = WIPRblJPRbi+WMPRblMPRbl Vt>eSagr (1.30) 
WMPRbA = WPRb, V 6 g 5 a g r (1.31) 
The value of the demand for individual investment goods equals the expenditure on investment: 
Y,WDUg-XgV = WINV^'JNV (1-32) 
Margins 
The total demand for wholesale margins, retail margins and export margins (MAR) is equal to supply: 
MAR = Y(mtm^ur'-Dug+m7"wDug-xr^+ (°3) 
Y m?WEXB.EX, + yxa^WTRAD^IRAD, 
DP, = — V g e S ^ (1.34) 
* WDP 
Price equations 
Indirect taxes and wholesale margins drive a wedge between the buyers' and sellers' price of domestic 
use (1.35). For industries the price of intermediate inputs equals the price of domestic use (1.36). 
Retail margins drive an additional wedge between the price of private household consumption and the 
price of domestic use (1.37): 
WDUg = (1 + tfm + m?" )WDUf Vg e Scom (1.35) 
WINbtg = WDUg VbeB,VgeScom (1.36) 
WDUgm= (\ + mgm)WDUg V g e S ^ (137) 
Taking into account export margins and taxes/subsidies, domestic import (WIMg) and export prices 
(WEXg) of commodities for which the Arrriington assumption is adopted are related to world market 
prices (respectively WPIMg and WPEXg) according to: 
WPIMg.ER = WIMg V g e S „ (1.38) 
WPEX.ER = (l + t^+m^).WEXe V g e ^ (1.39) 
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Similarly, net trade prices (WTRADg) of commodities for which the Armington assumption is not 
adopted are related to world market prices (WPTRADg) according to: 
WPTRADg £R = (1 + + mj"- )WTRADg Vg e S f o M 0-40) 
Value added taxes are levied on total consumption (1.41). Investments are confronted with a value 
added tax and an investment tax. Moreover, the price of investments including taxes is equal to the 
price of private savings (1.42): 
WCON = {\ + tv'acm).WCONml 0-41) 
WSAV = WINV = (l + r a r t n v +tim').WINVac' 0-42) 
Indirect non-product related taxes and value added taxes' drive a wedge between the buyers' and 
sellers' price of the aggregate factor input (APRt): 
WAPRb = (\ + tZ +tvbaapr)WAPRf VbeB 0-43) 
Employers in each industry pay labour taxes on mobile labour 0-44). Suppliers of labour (employees) 
and capital pay labour taxes (1.45) and capital taxes 0-46), respectively. These taxes are all modelled 
as ad valorem taxes: 
WMPRbl = WMPRb*f.(l + tZbsec) VbeB 0-44) 
WTPR, = WTPR?c'.(l + tM"°') 0-45) 
WTPR2 = WTPR2m:'.(l + tav"") 0-46) 
The price of leisure is equal to the price of labour, corrected for income taxes: 
WLEIS = WTPR^'il-t^) 0-47) 
Equilibrium conditions 
Total domestic use equals intermediate, private household, government and investment demand: 
DUg = £ / J V 4 ) g + X™ + Xf + X? Vg e Smm (1.48) 
beB 
Income formation and distribution 
Labour income (/"*), gross capital income (/«"*), net capital income (ƒ**) and capital depreciation 
(DEP) are given by: 
= WTPR^cl.TPRl+ Y,WIPRblJPRbA+TR",iJSR 0-49) 
= WTPR2.TPR2 0-50) 
= / « " " . ( 1 - r ^ ) 0-51) 
1 Value added tax (VAT) is normally imposed (and modelled accordingly) on final use (consumption and 
investments). For a few services producing industries, however, sales are exempted from VAT. Hence, in 
those industries VAT paid on intermediate inputs cannot be deducted from received VAT. Since the division 
of VAT over intermediate inputs is not known, they are modelled as taxes on factor input (value added). 
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DEP = i ^ r ^ (1.52) 
Private household income (Fon) is given by net capital income (F"*), labour income (/"*) and 
domestic income transfers (f™) corrected for income taxes, expenditure on leisure and the balance of 
exogenous income transfers with the rest of the world: 
jcon = yncap + jU, + jum ^ _(inc-) + WLEISJLEIS + TR™ ER (1.53) 
The welfare of the representative private household is determined by future consumption (savings), 
leisure and current consumption according a nested CES utility function. In the first stage of the 
multi-stage budgeting a choice is made between future consumption (SAV) and current consumption 
(CUR: a composite of leisure and aggregate consumption). In the second stage, the current budget is 
divided into leisure (LETS) and aggregate consumption (CON). Total imperfectly mobile labour 
supply (TPRi) hence results from the difference between the time endowment (TLAB) and leisure 
(LEIS). The following equations hold: 
S A V = f^f(Icm,WSAV,WCUR) (1.54) 
CUR = ,WSAV,WCUR) (1.55) 
LEIS = f°*(EXPar,WLEIS,WCON) (1.56) 
CON = /^(EXP™,WLEIS,WCON) (1.57) 
TPRX = TLAB-LEIS (1.58) 
Tax revenues (TX) are given by: 
T X = YsCmwDU7l-DUg + <L59) 
£ tg WEXg.EXg + Ytg"*WTRADgIRADg + 
+ C^'WAPR™'.APRb + t1b°bsccWMPRbJ! MPRbA)+ 
t™"" .WTPR™' .TPRl +tavU"WTPRfc'.TPR2 + 
tvacon.WCONexcl.CON + 
(<"* + t'^WINV™1 INV + + J'"* + 1 * - ^ * " 
The government deficit (DEF) is assumed to be a fixed part of tax revenues: 
DEF = rd4.TX (1.60) 
The government budget (F"1) is determined by tax revenues (TX) and government deficit (DEF) 
corrected for the balance of income transfers with the rest of the world (TR?0V): 
= TX + DEF + TRgov.ER (1.61) 
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The government budget is used for domestic income transfers (ƒ"*"*) and public expenditures (EXP30"): 
EXPg0V — Tgm r g m 
exp trans r%:+r
gZ=\ (1.62) 
trans 
Total value of investments is determined by private savings and capital depreciation corrected for the 
government deficit and the balance of trade: 
WINVJNV = WSA V.SA V + DEP - DEF - BBAR.ER 0-63) 
Trade balance 
The trade balance (BBAR) is assumed to be fixed: 
BBAR = - £ WPIMgIMg + £ WPEXg£Xg + £WPTRAD g . 7 / f t iL \ - (1.64) 
« e S « m g&Stam 
Price numeraire 
The price numeraire (PNUM) is given by: 
YjfWYb 
PNUM = - * f l — - = = = • = 1 (1.65) 
YYbM.WYbM 
b<=B 
Environment 
Emissions (EMm), are linked to intermediate inputs, aggregate output, consumer goods and aggregate 
consumption (1.66). 
EMm = f X C . * ^ + & : ^ + T^:.K"+CN-CON VmeM (1.66) 
»=1 geS^, 6=1 geS^, 
Welfare change 
Welfare change measured by the equivalent variation is equal to the difference in expenditures on a 
household consumption bundle between utility levels in two equiUbria (e.g. before and after a policy 
change), using the prices of the initial equilibrium. The equivalent variation for the private household 
can be calculated at all (sub)utility levels of the multi-stage budgeting: the equivalent variation at sub-
utility level aggregate consumption (EQVARCON, 1.67); the equivalent variation at sub-utility level 
current consumption (EQVARam, 1-68); and the equivalent variation at total utility level of the private 
household (EQVARCON, 1.69). Similarly, the welfare change from public consumption (EQVAJF0*) can 
be derived (1.70). 
EQVARcm = e(COAT,WDUr,'",/)-e(COiV",tó,WDU"",'oW) (IA1) 
EQVARcm = e(CUR,WLEISoli ,WCONM)-e(CURM ,WLEIS°U ,WCONM) (1.6%) 
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EQVARcon = e(Um,WSAVM,WCURM)-e(Uœn-M,WSAVM,WCURM) (L69) 
EQVARS0V = e(Ugov,WDVf)-e(Ugov-oU,WDV0gu) (1.70) 
where e(U,w) are expenditure functions, measuring expenditures at (sub)utility level U, given prices 
w.2 
An alternative welfare measure is the Laspeyres measure of real income change, which compares 
commodity bundles between two equilibria (e.g. before and after a policy change), using the prices of 
the initial equilibrium (1.71). This welfare measure allows for the calculation of the welfare effects of 
savings other than the private savings of which the underlying optimising behaviour is not modelled 
explicitly (i.e. capital depreciation, government deficit and the balance of trade).3 Since savings are 
equal to investments, the bundle of investment commodities represent welfare derived from saving. 
WELF = V WDUam-°u.Xe0" - YWDUcm'M jr°",°w + (1.71) 
i t S g f l g s 
WLEISoli ZEIS - WLEISMXEISM + 
£ WDUfjCf - YWDU°GU•xr'M 
gsSam geSaa 
Glossary 
Variables: 
AEN: aggregate energy inputs 
AIN: aggregate materials inputs 
APR: aggregate factor inputs 
BBAR: balance of trade (in dollar) 
CON: private current consumption 
CUR: private current expenditures 
DEF: government deficit 
DEP: capital depreciation 
DP: domestic production 
DU: domestic use 
EN: environmental themes 
EQVAR: equivalent variation 
ER: exchange rate (in guilder per dollar) 
EX: exports 
2 CON and CUR are sub-utility levels in the multi-stage budgeting and therefore take the form of both utility 
and quantity. Hence CON and CUR occur in the expenditure functions to define equivalent variation at sub-
utility levels (Shoven and Whalley, 1992, p. 192). 
3 For sub-utility levels the Laspeyres measure of real income change and the equivalent variation are identical 
(Shoven and Whalley, 1992, p. 192): 
EQVARcm = e(CON,WDVcon'M)-e(CONM, WDV^"""14 ) = WCONold.CON - WCONold. CON' 
EQVARCUR = e(CUR, WLEISM,WCONM) - e(CURM. WLEISM ,WCONM ) = WCURM'.CUR - WCURM. CUR' 
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EXP: expenditure 
I: income 
IM: imports 
IN: intermediate inputs 
INV: investments 
IPR: immobile factor inputs 
LEIS: leisure 
MAR: market margins 
MPR: mobile factor inputs 
PNUM: price numeraire 
PR: factor inputs 
SAV: private savings 
SP: total supply 
TPR: total factor inputs 
TR: net transfers from the rest of the world (in dollar) 
TRAD: net export of homogeneous commodities 
TX: tax revenues 
W: domestic prices 
WELF: welfare change 
WP: world market prices 
X: consumer, government and investment demand 
Y: outputs 
Coefficients: 
m: market margin rates 
r: rate (government deficit, expenditure, income transfers, capital depreciation) 
t: tax rates 
&, input-output coefficient 
£ emission coefficient 
Sets and subsets: 
B: industries, b = 1 to 37 (see appendix IV) 
G: goods, g = 1 to 45 (see appendix IV) 
J: factors, j = 1 (labour) j = 2 (capital) 
M: emissions, m = 1 to 9 (see appendix IV) 
subset agricultural industries: b = 1,...,6 
subset Armington commodities: g = 1,3,...,12,14,...,44 
subset commodities: g = 1,...,44 
5 C T c G : subset energy commodities: g = 24,27,. ..,30 
c
 G '• subset homogeneous commodities: g = 2,13 
subset trade and transport margins: g = 45 
subset materials: g = 1,...,23,25,26,31,...,44 
Miscellaneous 
captot = total capital; CES = Constant Elasticity Substitution; CET = Constant Elasticity of 
Transformation; con = private household; dom = domestic; en = energy; excl = excluding taxes and 
margins; gov = government; inc = income; inv = investment; lab = labour; labsec = mobile labour by 
industry; labtot = total labour; neap = net capital; old = base year value; trans = domestic transfer; 
vatapr = VAT aggregate factor input; vatcon = VAT consumption; vatinv = VAT investments. 
Bold printed variables represent a vector; variables with a bar represent exogenous variables. 
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Figure 1.1 Production structure of the AGE model 
• i 
> 
Appendix II Social Accounting Matrices 
Table II. 1 Social Accounting Matrix 1990for the Netherlands" 
Account 
Commodities 
1. 
Commodities 
Production 
2. 
Industries 
Income formation 
3a. 3b. 4. 5. 
Labour Labour tax Capital Taxes 
income employer income 
Income 
distribution 
6. 7. 
House- Govern-
holds ment 
institutions 
8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
House- Govern- Capital Invest- R.o.w. R.O.W. 
holds ment ment current capital 
14. 
Total 
Commodities 
1. Commodities 471829 280134 74795 105640 279746 1212144 
Production 
2. Industries 948964 948964 
Income formation 
3a. Labour income 
3b. Labour tax employer 
4. Capital income 
5a. Non-prod, related taxes 
5b. VAT 
5c. Net tax on investment 
239939 
27803 
198924 
3269 
7200 
1614 
22962 8426 
392 
239939 
27803 
200538 
3269 
38588 
392 
Income distribution 
6. Households 
7. Government 7352 
190609 122638 
49050 27803 19670 40635 
149913 
74610 
463160 
219120 
Institutions 
8. Households 
9. Government 
10. Capital 
11. Investment 
12. R.O.W. current 
13. R.O.W. capital 
255828 
58230 
280 
391320 
62557 
-2770 6650 
88224 -12238 
114458 
19758 
19758 
391320 
62557 
134216 
114458 
279746 
19758 
14. Total 1212144 948964 239939 27803 200538 42249 463160 219120 391320 62557 134216 114458 279746 19758 
Million 1990 guilders 
Source: CBS-1 (1993) 
öle II.2 Social Accounting Matrix 1993for the Netherlands'' 
ccount 
Commodities 
1. 
Commodities 
Production 
2. 
Industries 
Income formation 
3a. 3b. 4. 5. 
Labour Labour tax Capital Taxes 
income employer income 
Income 
distribution 
6. 7. 
House- Govern-
holds ment 
Institutions 
8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
House- Govern- Capital Invest- R.O.W. R.O.W. 
holds ment ment current capital 
14. 
Total 
ommodities 
Commodities 0 501332 326604 86215 98773 293180 1306104 
reduction 
Industries 1037273 1037273 
icome formation 
L Labour income 
>. Labour tax employer 
Capital income 
u Non-prod, related taxes 
.. VAT 
Net tax on investment 
277260 
31509 
213167 
5785 
8220 
1955 
25117 8558 
516 
277260 
31509 
215122 
5785 
41895 
516 
come distribution 
Households 
Government 11329 
217290 125502 
59760 31509 21010 46241 
173119 
94740 
515911 
264589 
stftutions 
Households 
Government 
). Capital 
1. Investment 
I. R.O.W. current 
t. R.o.w. capital 
257502 
68610 
210 
426141 
79330 
-4970 12140 
74420 -6885 
107847 
28298 
28298 
426141 
79330 
136145 
107847 
293180 
28298 
1. Total 1306104 1037273 277260 31509 215122 48196 515911 264589 426141 79330 136145 107847 293180 28298 
Million 1993 guilders 
rce: CBS-1 (1996) 
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Appendix III Eliminating hidden data 
Consider a matrix A, representing the make table of the Dutch economy. 
Aold = 
S!2 ç GUI) 
In this matrix, Mlu is a matrix for all the known commodities and industries where each entry 
m\ is the value of commodity / produced by industry j . S\J+X is a column vector of i 
commodities produced by an unknown (hidden) industry S ( 2 + l y is a row vector of / 
industries producing an unknown (hidden) commodity sMJ+l is a balancing scalar for 
which the following conditions hold: 
Sometimes a clear relationship is observed between commodities of column vector S 7 and 
industries of row vector S2 (e.g. fertiliser is clearly produced by the fertiliser industry). Hence, a 
matrix Mf; can be identified where each entry mfj is the value of commodity i produced by 
industry j which was unknown in matrix A°u. Now define the following matrix: 
'K KM B = 
F2 p 
for which the following conditions hold: 
J 
i 
To eliminate (part of) the hidden industries and commodities a new make table A"*" of the Dutch 
economy can be derived: 
( m .3) 
(ffl.4) 
(ffl.5) 
( m . 6 ) 
Anew=Aold +B 
The same procedure can be applied for the use tables. 
( f f l . 7 ) 
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Appendix IV 
Classification of industries, commodities, emissions and environmental indicators 
Industries Commodities 
B1 Dairy farming and other animal production 
B2 Pig farming 
B3 Poultry farming 
B4 Arable farming 
BS Horticulture under glass 
B6 Other horticulture 
B7 Forestry and agricultural services 
B8 Fishery 
B9 Beef and other meat industry 
BIO Pig meat industry 
B11 Poultry meat industry 
B12 Dairy products manufacturing 
B13 Compound feed industry 
B14 Sugar industry 
B15 Margarine industry 
B16 Starch industry 
B17 Other food products manufacturing 
B18 Oil and gas extraction 
B19 Other mining industries 
B20 Clothing/wood/paper industry 
B21 Petroleum industry 
B22 Fertiliser industry 
B23 Chemical pesticides manufacturing 
B24 Other chemical industries 
B25 Synthetics and building materials industry 
B26 Basic metal industry 
B27 Machinery and metal products manufacturing 
B28 Transport equipment industry 
B29 Electrical products and other industries 
B30 Electricity supply 
B31 Gas distribution 
B32 Water supply 
B33 Construction 
B34 Wholesale and retail trade 
B35 Transport and storage industry 
B36 Cleaning services industry 
B37 Other services 
Emissions 
Ml COî 
M2 
M3 
M4 
M5 
M6 
M7 
M8 
M9 
NO x 
S 0 2 
N 2 0 
ca, 
NH3 
P 
N 
Waste 
G1 Cattle and other animals 
G2 Pigs 
G3 Poultry 
G4 Flowers and plants 
G5 Grain 
G6 Other arable farming products 
G7 Milk 
G8 Vegetables and fruits 
G9 Oils and fat 
G10 Starch 
G11 Compound feed 
G12 Dairy products 
G13 Eggs 
G14 Fish and fish products 
G15 Beef and other meat 
G16 Pig meat 
G17 Poultry meat 
G18 Sugar 
G19 Other agricultural/food products 
G20 Beverages and tobacco 
G21 Raw materials leather/textiles/paper 
G22 Other minerals 
G23 Building materials 
G24 Coal 
G25 Other raw materials energy 
G26 Fuels for vehicles 
G27 Other fuels for heating 
G28 Natural gas* 
G29 Distributed gas8 
G30 Electricity 
G31 Water 
G32 Fertiliser 
G33 Other chemical products 
G34 Pesticides 
G35 Rubber and synthetics 
G36 Semi-manufactured metal products 
G37 Metal products and machinery 
G38 Transport equipment and parts 
G39 Furniture, electronics, packing etc. 
G40 Garden and agricultural services 
G41 Construction and ground work 
G42 Transport services 
G43 Cleaning services 
G44 Other services 
G45 Trade and transport margins 
Groups of industries 
Environmental indicators 
GHG Greenhouse gases 
ACID Acidification 
EUT Eutrophication 
WST Waste accumulation 
Agriculture: 
Agribusiness: 
Other industries: 
Public utilities: 
Services: 
B1-B6 
B7, B9-B17 
B8,B18-B29,B33 
B30-B32 
B34-B37 
Natural gas and distributed gas are oUfferent commodities. Natural gas is provided directly to large users and f 
distribution companies. Distributed gas is provided to small users, using the gas distribution network. 
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Table V.l Summarised make table 199(f 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B9 BIO B l l Total Imports Total 
Dairy Pig Poultry Arable Horticult Other Beef Pig meat Poultry domestic 
farming farming farming farming under horticult 
glass 
industry industry meat 
industry 
production 
Gl Cattle 4516 4516 642 5158 
G2 Pigs 7649 7651 24 7675 
G3 Poultry 1422 1424 82 1506 
G4 Flowers and plants 4901 1899 7057 834 7891 
G5 Grain 460 460 1943 2403 
G6 Arable products n.e.c. 3087 3096 4823 7919 
G7 Milk 7959 7959 7959 
G8 Vegetables/fruits 2458 2723 5206 2826 8032 
G9 Oils and fat 110 114 1 2780 1072 3852 
G10 Starch 1380 386 1766 
Gll Compound feed 9 8520 383 8903 
G12 Dairy products 72 12324 3416 15740 
G13 Eggs 1129 1129 48 1177 
G14 Fish and fish products 2154 1335 3489 
G15 Beef and other meat 4908 485 56 5464 952 6416 
G16 Pig meat 7838 7842 223 8065 
G17 Poultry meat 2083 2083 298 2381 
G18 Sugar 1707 125 1832 
G19 Food products n.e.c. 6 150 253 65 21917 7814 29731 
G20 Beverages and tobacco 8541 3011 11552 
G21 Raw matleather/textiles/paper 149 267 31227 21404 52631 
G22 Other minerals 838 2184 3022 
G23 Building materials 12609 8301 20910 
G24 Coal 1755 1755 
G25 Other raw materials energy 9256 18390 27646 
G26 Fuels for vehicles 11609 2056 13665 
G27 Other fuels for heating 2996 947 3943 
G28 Natural gas 15412 418 15830 
G29 Distributed gas 7905 7905 
Table V.l continued to 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B9 BIO Bl l Total Imports Total 
Dairy Pig Poultry Arable Horticult Other Beef Pig meat Poultry domestic 
farming farming fanning farming under horticult 
glass 
industry industry meat 
industry 
production 
G31 Water 1953 1953 
G32 Fertiliser 1934 436 2370 
G33 Other chemical products 42246 24722 66968 
G34 Pesticides 553 467 1020 
G35 Rubber and synthetics 1016 670 1686 
G36 Semi-manufact. metal products 15737 14003 29740 
G37 Metal products and machinery 34093 41964 76057 
G38 Transport equipment and parts 16030 21366 37396 
G39 Furniture, electr., packing etc. 1 1 37693 30938 68631 
G40 Garden and agricultural services 2944 2944 
G41 Construction and ground work 77850 58 77908 
G42 Transport services 33109 33109 
G43 Cleaning services 2536 2536 
G44 Other services 59 99 26 369663 35097 404760 
G45 Trade and transport margins 32 20 6 9 19 12 13 22 6 96925 96925 
TOTAL MAKE 12734 7669 2557 3556 7378 4634 5508 8812 2246 948964 255828 1204792 
Million 1990 guilders in sellers' prices 
Sources: CBS-2 (1993), CBS-3 (1993) and own calculations 
t 
8 
Table V.2 Summarised use table 199CP 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B9 B10 B l l Total Cons.+ Exports Margins Taxes/ Total 
Dairy Pig Poultry Arable Hort Hort Beef Pig Poultry inter- Invest Subsidies 
farming farming farming farming glass other, industry meat meat mediate 
industry industry use 
Gl Cattle 1025 4346 5371 150 389 -769 17 5158 
G2 Pigs 1375 5613 6988 31 1040 -384 7675 
G3 Poultry 17 1402 1419 14 250 -180 3 1506 
G4 Flowers and plants 246 188 1 981 2036 7057 -2110 -73 7891 
G5 Grain 38 24 2470 -1 197 -228 -35 2403 
G6 Arable products n.e.c. 375 6 324 44 7319 448 1928 -1724 -52 7919 
G7 Milk 7904 55 7959 
G8 Vegetables/fruits 128 141 1331 4325 5523 -3045 -102 8032 
G9 Oils and fat 50 65 16 2287 549 1425 -372 -37 3852 
GIO Starch 4 4 1 627 -15 1306 -264 112 1766 
Gi l Compound feed 2750 3600 1517 8345 -1 963 -449 45 8903 
G12 Dairy products 3 3 4 1 3758 5540 6931 -2034 1545 15740 
G13 Eggs 18 218 362 934 -372 35 1177 
G14 Fish and fish products 1094 935 2443 -945 -38 3489 
G15 Beef and other meat 247 831 4067 3203 -1797 112 6416 
G16 Pig meat 1268 1811 3228 4737 -1747 36 8065 
G17 Poultry meat 286 414 912 1383 -325 -3 2381 
G18 Sugar 1276 257 437 -254 116 1832 
G19 Food products n.e.c. 81 42 55 14 10309 13806 11149 -5579 46 29731 
G20 Beverages and tobacco 3390 9281 5890 -2788 -4221 11552 
G21 Raw matleather/textiles/paper 23 4 1 7 4 5 28 36 9 25687 25893 14206 -13002 -153 52631 
G22 Other minerals 37 14 3203 111 691 -983 3022 
G23 Building materials 34 6 1 9 33 7 18546 3093 4174 -4878 -25 20910 
G24 Coal 1657 165 244 -171 -140 1755 
G25 Other raw materials energy 21 1 13 24 4 1 22721 1293 4288 -651 -5 27646 
G26 Fuels for vehicles 156 12 4 85 17 33 6 8 2 5311 6207 10206 -2150 -5909 13665 
G27 Other fuels for heating 2 2 1 35 2 1 1 1062 8 3112 -197 -42 3943 
G28 Natural gas 1 2 1 10215 5799 -184 15830 
G29 Distributed gas 45 52 15 7 766 50 10 13 3 3328 4577 7905 
G30 Electricity 132 42 14 22 101 36 22 28 7 7257 2747 31 10035 
Table V.2 continued 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B9 B10 Bl l Total Cons.+ Exports Margins Taxes/ Total 
Dairy Pig Poultry Arable Hort Hort Beef Pig Poultry inter- Invest Subsidies 
farming farming farming farming glass Other, industry meat meat mediate 
industry industry use 
G31 Water 71 22 8 7 22 8 1 1 1 607 1346 1953 
G32 Fertiliser 424 8 236 23 14 937 43 1794 -403 -1 2370 
G33 Other chemical products 41 7 2 12 8 9 14 19 5 28935 9388 38786 -9853 -288 66968 
G34 Pesticides 31 3 1 165 50 62 506 84 600 -168 -2 1020 
G35 Rubber and synthetics 801 31 978 -123 -1 1686 
G36 Semi-manufact metal products 9 1 1 1 19807 1151 12867 -4041 -44 29740 
G37 Metal products and machinery 18 3 1 5 4 4 7 9 2 26487 26896 36035 -12742 -619 76057 
G38 Transport equipment and parts 8443 23214 13635 ^961 -2935 37396 
G39 Furniture, electr., packing etc. 8 139 88 127 164 41 23926 37085 25225 -17236 -369 68631 
G40 Garden and agricultural services 547 60 14 777 204 125 1 2747 197 2944 
G41 Construction and ground work 121 48 11 59 61 69 10 12 3 30338 46012 1558 77908 
G42 Transport services 1 3 4 1 4579 5360 19566 3604 33109 
G43 Cleaning services 13 2 1 4 2 3 6 8 2 1288 1248 2536 
G44 Other services 943 190 43 231 680 640 254 327 81 155298 218441 28766 2255 404760 
G45 Trade and transport margins 96925 96925 
Total intermediate use 6904 5467 1669 1971 2584 1546 5183 7645 1879 471829 460569 279746 0 -7352 1204792 
Non product related taxes/subsidies 276 47 10 63 109 123 51 81 21 10469 
Wages/social premiums hired labour 120 54 27 185 1168 520 158 635 279 260172 
Self employed labour income 3133 945 228 903 1233 1128 7570 
Capital income 2301 1156 623 434 2284 1317 116 451 67 198924 
TOTAL USE 12734 7669 2557 3556 7378 4634 5508 8812 2246 948964 
Million 1990 guilders in buyers' prices 
Sources: CBS-2 (1993), CBS-3 (1993) and own calculations 
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Table V.3 continued 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B9 BIO B l l Total Imports Total 
Dairy Kg Poultry Arable Horticult Other Beef Pig meat Poultry domestic 
farming farming farming farming under horticult industry industry meat production 
glass industry 
G31 Water 2316 2316 
G32 Fertiliser 1470 383 1853 
G33 Other chemical products 38222 25001 63223 
G34 Pesticides 585 481 1066 
G35 Rubber and synthetics 707 672 1379 
G36 Semi-manufact metal products 14209 11104 25313 
G37 Metal products and machinery 35537 41806 77343 
G38 Transport equipment and parts 14459 20368 34827 
G39 Furniture, electr., packing etc. 1 1 35837 32309 68146 
G40 Garden and agricultural services 3264 3264 
G41 Construction and ground work 83655 35 83690 
G42 Transport services 38885 38885 
G43 Cleaning services 3578 3578 
G44 Other services 62 71 25 440224 41964 482188 
G45 Trade and transport margins 35 16 7 8 21 13 22 25 9 108229 108229 
TOTAL MAKE 12667 5646 2415 2941 7710 4559 6578 7253 2675 1037273 257502 1294775 
Million 1993 guilders in sellers' prices 
Sources: CBS-2 (1996), CBS-3 (1996) and own calculations 
Table V.4 Summarised use table 1993" 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B9 B10 Bl l Total Cons.+ Exports Margins Taxes/ Total 
Dairy Pig Poultry Arable Hort Hort Beef Pig Poultry inter- Invest Subsidies 
farming farming farming farming glass Other, industry meat meat mediate 
industry industry use 
Gl Cattle 1192 4819 6011 -274 459 -884 22 5334 
G2 Pigs 813 4475 5288 38 912 -512 5726 
G3 Poultry 43 1451 1494 43 232 -226 4 1547 
G4 Flowers and plants 359 147 1 1257 2163 8096 -2467 -92 8957 
G5 Grain 69 17 2453 -52 365 -236 99 2629 
G6 Arable products n.e.c. 323 5 200 36 6086 595 1874 -1718 3 6840 
G7 Milk 7893 48 7941 
G8 Vegetables/fruits 119 121 1327 4333 6162 -3654 -98 8070 
G9 Oils and fat 68 63 20 2582 663 1882 -487 -30 4610 
GIO Starch 5 5 1 656 16 1326 -304 168 1862 
Gil Compound feed 2432 3417 1791 8131 1324 -527 19 8947 
G12 Dairy products 4 3 2 1 4258 5522 7604 -2358 2039 17065 
G13 Eggs 42 268 390 829 -399 44 1132 
G14 Fish and fish products 1138 1061 2461 -1055 -42 3563 
G15 Beef and other meat 316 1020 4385 4020 -2080 438 7783 
G16 Pig meat 1310 1879 3420 3622 -2270 46 6697 
G17 Poultry meat 545 703 919 1806 -476 28 2980 
G18 Sugar 1287 245 290 -269 156 1709 
G19 Food products n.e.c. 85 34 31 10 11205 14970 12597 -6554 203 32421 
G20 Beverages and tobacco 3973 10793 7047 -3448 -5125 13240 
G21 Raw mat leather/textiles/paper 36 5 1 9 6 8 31 29 9 24861 27850 14387 -15160 -210 51728 
G22 Other minerals 30 13 2747 104 617 -1021 2447 
G23 Building materials 43 6 2 10 21 9 19004 2944 4465 -5384 -23 21006 
G24 Coal 1512 7 241 -169 -302 1289 
G25 Other raw materials energy 18 1 10 23 4 1 18617 171 3699 -752 -7 21728 
G26 Fuels for vehicles 144 12 3 70 18 32 8 8 2 6022 8588 8864 -2639 -8770 12065 
G27 Other fuels for heating 2 3 1 37 2 1 1 899 126 2354 -190 -38 3151 
G28 Natural gas 2 2 11319 6391 -799 16911 
G29 Distributed gas 42 66 19 5 863 48 12 12 4 3993 5255 9248 
G30 Electricity 122 43 15 20 113 42 29 27 9 7792 3030 27 10849 
Table VA continued 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B9 BIO B l l Total Cons.+ Exports Margins Taxes/ Total 
Dairy Pig Poultry Arable Hort Hort Beef Pig Poultry inter- Invest Subsidies 
farming farming farming fanning glass Other, industry meat meat mediate 
industry industry use 
G31 Water 69 24 8 11 64 24 2 2 728 1588 2316 
G32 Fertiliser 316 5 173 15 12 724 91 1381 -342 -1 1853 
G33 Other chemical products 54 8 2 13 9 11 20 18 6 27755 11046 35883 -11141 -320 63223 
G34 Pesticides 31 3 1 145 39 75 528 69 647 -175 -3 1066 
G35 Rubber and synthetics 721 5 771 -117 -1 1379 
G36 Semi-manufact metal products 12 1 1 1 17228 498 11500 -3870 -43 25313 
G37 Metal products and machinery 16 2 1 4 2 3 8 8 3 26969 24881 39921 -13700 -728 77343 
G38 Transport equipment and parts 8453 20699 14053 -4877 -3501 34827 
G39 Furniture, electr., packing etc. 7 140 85 148 137 45 24885 35424 26957 -18768 -352 68146 
G40 Garden and agricultural services 980 66 . 16 433 246 139 1 3010 254 3264 
G41 Construction and ground work 247 66 16 13 50 24 12 12 4 33836 48054 1800 83690 
G42 Transport services 2 4 3 1 5193 6842 23248 3602 38885 
G43 Cleaning services 18 3 1 5 3 3 11 10 3 1951 1627 3578 
G44 Other services 1610 248 61 352 528 440 345 321 104 183676 263161 33066 2285 482188 
G45 Trade and transport margins 108229 108229 
Total intermediate use 7867 4813 2023 1480 2685 1278 5882 6477 2219 501332 511592 293180 0 -11329 1294775 
Non product related taxes/subsidies 348 52 12 84 53 73 83 91 34 14005 
Wages/social premiums hired labour 193 57 51 104 1397 623 548 514 253 308769 
Self employed factor income 2459 385 246 963 3010 2061 9124 
Capital income 1800 339 83 310 565 524 65 171 169 204043 
TOTAL USE 12667 5646 2415 2941 7710 4559 6578 7253 2675 1037273 
Million 1993 guilders in buyers' prices 
Sources: CBS-2 (1996), CBS-3 (1996) and own calculations 
Appendix VI Margin and tax tables 
Market margins Taxes/subsidies'* 
Export Domestic use Consumption TOTAL Export Domestic use TOTAL 
Gl Cattle -52 -717 0 -769 0 17 17 
G2 Pigs -50 -334 0 -384 0 0 0 
G3 Poultry -27 -153 0 -180 0 3 3 
G4 Flowers and plants -502 -888 -720 -2110 0 -73 -73 
G5 Grain -28 -200 0 -228 0 -35 -35 
G6 Arable products n.e.c. -293 -1295 -136 -1724 0 -52 -52 
G7 Milk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G8 Vegetables/fruits -917 -1195 -933 -3045 0 -102 -102 
G9 Oils and fat -79 -172 -121 -372 0 -37 -37 
G10 Starch -174 -90 0 -264 112 0 112 
Gil Compound feed -43 -406 0 -449 0 45 45 
G12 Dairy products -415 -437 -1182 -2034 1196 349 1545 
G13 Eggs -196 -96 -80 -372 37 -2 35 
G14 Fish and fish products -285 -359 -301 -945 0 -38 -38 
G15 Beef and other meat -147 -340 -1310 -1797 151 -39 112 
G16 Pig meat -273 -439 -1035 -1747 37 -1 36 
G17 Poultry meat -16 -23 -286 -325 16 -19 -3 
G18 Sugar -40 -154 -60 -254 159 -43 116 
G19 Food products n.e.c. -776 -1838 -2965 -5579 270 -224 46 
G20 Beverages and tobacco -427 -1043 -1318 -2788 39 -4260 ^221 
G21 Raw matleather/textiles/paper -1309 -3466 -8227 -13002 0 -153 -153 
G22 Other minerals -104 -857 -22 -983 0 0 0 
G23 Building materials -433 -3871 -574 -4878 0 -25 -25 
G24 Coal -10 -161 0 -171 0 -140 -140 
G25 Other raw materials energy -50 -591 -10 -651 0 -5 -5 
G26 Fuels for vehicles -482 -1148 -520 -2150 0 -5909 -5909 
G27 Other fuels for heating -112 -82 -3 -197 0 -42 -42 
G28 Natural gas 0 0 0 0 0 -184 -184 
G29 Distributed gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G30 Electricity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table VI. 1 Margin and tax table 199(f 
Table VI. 1 continued 
Market margins Taxes/subsidies" 
Export Domestic use Consumption TOTAL Export Domestic use. TOTAL 
G31 Water 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G32 Fertiliser -174 -193 -36 -403 0 -1 -1 
G33 Other chemical products -1982 -4391 -3480 -9853 10 -298 -288 
G34 Pesticides -60 -85 -23 -168 0 -2 -2 
G35 Rubber and synthetics -64 -55 -4 -123 0 -1 -1 
G36 Semi-manufact metal products -933 -3097 -11 -4041 0 -44 -44 
G37 Metal products and machinery -2919 -9653 -170 -12742 0 -619 -619 
G38 Transport equipment and parts -381 -3424 -1156 -4961 0 -2935 -2935 
G39 Furniture, electr., packing etc. -1975 -7575 -7686 -17236 0 -369 -369 
G40 Garden and agricultural services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G41 Construction and ground work 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G42 Transport services 0 0 0 0 120 3484 3604 
G43 Cleaning services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G44 Other services 0 0 0 0 0 2255 2255 
G45 Trade and transport margins 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL -15728 -48828 -32369 -96925 2147 -9499 -7352 
" Million 1990 guilders 
b Negative numbers are taxes, positive numbers are subsidies 
Source: CBS-2 (1993), CBS-3 (1993) and own calculations 
Table VI.2 Margin and tax table 1993" 
Market margins Taxes/subsidies 
Export Domestic use Consumption TOTAL Export Domestic use Import TOTAL 
Gl Cattle -67 -817 0 -884 22 0 0 22 
G2 Pigs -75 -437 0 -512 0 0 0 0 
G3 Poultry -30 -196 0 -226 4 0 0 4 
G4 Flowers and plants -598 -1046 -823 -2467 0 0 -92 -92 
G5 Grain -50 -186 0 -236 126 0 -27 99 
G6 Arable products n.e.c. -322 -1262 -134 -1718 29 0 -26 3 
G7 Milk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G8 Vegetables/fruits -1183 -1383 -1088 -3654 68 0 -166 -98 
G9 Oils and fat -114 -215 -158 -487 0 0 -30 -30 
G10 Starch -195 -109 0 -304 168 0 0 168 
Gil Compound feed -68 -459 0 -527 19 0 0 19 
G12 Dairy products 
Eggs 
-490 -495 -1373 -2358 2029 60 -50 2039 
G13 -188 -118 -93 -399 50 0 -6 44 
G14 Fish and fish products -298 -403 -354 -1055 0 0 -42 -42 
G15 Beef and other meat -195 -396 -1489 -2080 476 0 -38 438 
G16 Pig meat -268 -592 -1410 -2270 48 0 -2 46 
G17 Poultry meat -29 -38 -409 -476 62 0 -34 28 
G18 Sugar -30 -171 -68 -269 133 26 -3 156 
G19 Food products n.e.c. -919 -2092 -3543 -6554 401 0 -198 203 
G20 Beverages and tobacco -542 -1290 -1616 -3448 32 -5157 0 -5125 
G21 Raw matleather/textiles/paper -1453 -3882 -9825 -15160 3 0 -213 -210 
G22 Other minerals -111 -880 -30 -1021 0 0 0 0 
G23 Building materials -494 -4193 -697 -5384 0 0 -23 -23 
G24 Coal -12 -157 0 -169 0 -302 0 -302 
G25 Other raw materials energy -63 -673 -16 -752 0 -7 0 -7 
G26 Fuels for vehicles -443 -1542 -654 -2639 0 -8770 0 -8770 
G27 Other fuels for heating -97 -90 -3 -190 0 -38 0 -38 
G28 Natural gas 0 0 0 0 0 -799 0 -799 
G29 Distributed gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G30 Electricity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table VI.2 continued 
Market margins Taxes/subsidiesb 
Export Domestic use Consumption TOTAL Export Domestic use. Import TOTAL 
G31 Water 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G32 Fertiliser -136 -164 -42 -342 0 0 -I -1 
G33 Other chemical products -1934 -4689 -4518 -11141 19 -14 -325 -320 
G34 Pesticides -64 -86 -25 -175 0 0 -3 -3 
G35 Rubber and synthetics -57 -55 -5 -117 0 0 -1 -1 
G36 Semi-manufact metal products -931 -2926 -13 -3870 0 0 -43 -43 
G37 Metal products and machinery -3467 -10051 -182 -13700 0 0 -728 -728 
G38 Transport equipment and parts -403 -3234 -1240 -4877 0 -3214 -287 -3501 
G39 Furniture, electr., packing etc. -2217 -7867 -8684 -18768 0 0 -352 -352 
G40 Garden and agricultural services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G41 Construction and ground work 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G42 Transport services 0 0 0 0 96 3506 0 3602 
G43 Cleaning services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G44 Other services 0 0 0 0 0 2285 0 2285 
G45 Trade and transport margins 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL -17543 -52194 -38492 -108229 3785 -12424 -2690 -11329 
Million 1993 guilders 
b Negative numbers are taxes, positive numbers are subsidies 
Source: CBS-2 (1996), CBS-3 (1996) and own calculations 
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Appendix Vu Emission tables 
Table VII. 1 C02 emissions in 1990for industries and consumption, distributed by economic 
variable" 
Emissions related to: Output Fuels for Coal Other fuels Natural gas Distributed TOTAL 
vehicles for heating gas 
Dairy farming 294 321 0 18 0 187 820 
Pig farming 204 25 0 18 0 216 463 
Poultry farming 102 8 0 9 0 62 181 
Arable farming 0 175 0 0 0 29 204 
Horticulture under glass 0 35 0 323 0 6352 6710 
Other horticulture 0 68 0 18 0 207 293 
Forestry and agricultural services 0 238 0 0 0 21 259 
Fishery 0 0 0 290 0 0 290 
Beef and other meat industry 0 20 0 9 7 68 104 
Pig meat industry 0 26 0 9 14 90 139 
Poultry meat industry 0 6 0 0 7 21 34 
Dairy products rrianufacturing 0 41 0 8 512 266 827 
Compound feed industry 0 8 0 17 0 153 178 
Sugar industry 0 0 226 0 509 21 756 
Margarine industry 0 10 0 0 172 143 325 
Starch industry 0 0 0 8 465 14 487 
Other food products rnanufacturing 279 100 0 59 218 994 1650 
Oil and gas extraction • 0 13 0 0 1407 0 1420 
Other mining industries 0 0 0 168 142 0 310 
Clothing/woodVpaper industry 11 132 0 67 1388 382 1980 
Petroleum industry 476 78 0 8598 1120 108 10380 
Fertilizer industry 143 0 0 133 2774 3 3053 
Chemical pesticides rnanufecturing 40 6 0 0 7 10 63 
Other chemical industries 2650 275 1033 3292 5762 322 13334 
Synthetics and building mat. industry 822 87 83 482 859 597 2930 
Basic metal industry 948 54 0 1158 2542 298 5000 
Machinery/metal products manufacturing 51 207 0 158 0 1064 1480 
Transport equipment industry 23 67 0 50 0 23 163 
Electrical products and other industries 87 117 0 0 17 396 617 
Electricity supply 0 144 23015 391 14697 23 38270 
Gas distribution 0 5 0 0 50 0 55 
Water supply 0 15 0 0 0 110 125 
Construction 218 1272 0 153 22 155 1820 
Wholesale and retail trade 5 473 0 0 0 611 1089 
Transport and storage industry 7 7713 0 395 0 1455 9570 
Environmental cleaning 3089 303 0 0 0 308 3700 
Other services 44 2394 0 722 0 6481 9641 
SUBTOTAL 9493 14726 24357 16263 32691 21190 118720 
Consumption 1600" 13740 61 745 0 18424 34570 
TOTAL 11093 28466 24418 17008 32691 39614 153290 
* C 0 2 emissions in million kg 
h Emissions related to aggregate consumption 
Source:CBS-6 (1996), CBS-7 (1992), CBS-8 (1993) and own calculations 
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Table VII.2 NOx emissions in 1990for industries and consumption, distributed by economic 
variable" 
Emissions related to: Output Fuels tor Coal Other fuels Natural gas Distributed TOTAL 
vehicles for heating gas 
Dairy farming 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 
Pig farming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poultry fitrming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arable farming 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 
Horticulture under glass 0 1 0 0 0 8 9 
Other horticulture 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Forestry and agricultural services 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 
Fishery 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 
Beef and other meat industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pig meat industry 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Poultry meat industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dairy products manufacturing 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Compound feed industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sugar industry 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Margarine industry 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Starch industry 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Other food products manufacturing 0 1 0 0 0 2 3 
Oil and gas extraction 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 
Other mining industries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Clothing/woocVpaper industry 0 2 0 0 3 1 6 
Petroleum industry 0 1 0 21 0 0 22 
Fertilizer industry 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 
Chemical pesticides manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other chemical industries 17 4 2 6 13 1 43 
Synthetics and building material industry 0 1 0 4 6 2 13 
Basic metal industry 1 1 0 8 2 0 12 
Machinery/metal products manvrfacturing 0 3 0 0 0 1 4 
Transport equipment industry 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Electrical products and other industries 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Electricity supply 0 2 49 1 23 0 75 
Gas distribution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Water supply 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Construction 0 14 0 0 0 0 14 
Wholesale and retail trade 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 
Transport and storage industry 0 108 0 0 0 2 110 
Environmental cleaning 5 4 0 0 0 0 9 
Other services 0 27 0 1 0 6 34 
SUBTOTAL 23 194 51 41 62 26 397 
Consumption 2" 156 0 1 0 18 177 
TOTAL 25 350 51 42 62 44 574 
a NO, emissions in million kg 
b Emissions related to aggregate consumption 
Source:CBS-6 (1996), CBS-7 (1992), CBS-8 (1993) and own calculations 
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Table VII.3 S02 emissions in 1990for industries and consumption, distributed by economic 
variable" 
Emissions related to: Output Fuels for Coal Other fuels Natural j >as Distributed TOTAL 
vehicles for heating gas 
Dairy ranning 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Pig farming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poultry farming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arable 6rming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Horticulture under glass 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Other horticulture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Forestry and agricultural services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fishery 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Beef and other meat industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pig meat industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poultry meat industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dairy products manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Compound feed industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sugar industry 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Margarine industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Starch industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other food products manufacturing 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Oil and gas extraction 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Other mining industries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Clothing/wood/paper industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Petroleum industry 10 0 0 61 0 0 71 
Fertilizer industry 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Chemical pesticides manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other chemical industries 11 0 3 9 0 0 23 
Synthetics and building material industry 3 0 1 2 0 0 6 
Basic metal industry 10 0 0 4 0 0 14 
Machinery/metal products manufacturing 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Transport equipment industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Electrical products and other industries 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Electricity supply 0 0 45 2 0 0 47 
Gas distribution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Water supply 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Construction 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Wholesale and retail trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Transport and storage industry 0 16 0 1 0 0 17 
Environmental cleaning 3 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Other services 0 2 0 3 0 0 5 
SUBTOTAL 39 21 50 85 2 0 197 
Consumption 0 4 0 1 0 0 5 
TOTAL 39 25 50 86 2 0 202 
* SO2 emissions in million kg 
Source: CBS-6 (1996), CBS-7 (1992), CBS-8 (1993) and own calculations 
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Table VLI.4 N and P emissions in 1990for industries and consumption, distributed by economic 
variable" 
N emissions P emissions 
Emissions related to: Output Fertiliser Other Indirect TOTAL 
chemical to NO„ 
products N 2 0 and 
NBU 
Output Fertiliser Other TOTAL 
chemical 
products 
Dairy farming 27 0 0 99 126 3 0 0 3 
Pig farming 396 0 0 62 458 44 0 0 44 
Poultry farming 260 0 0 30 290 28 0 0 28 
Arable farming 0 138 0 20 158 0 37 0 37 
Horticulture under glass 0 99 0 3 102 0 12 0 12 
Other horticulture 0 61 0 0 61 0 8 0 8 
0 Forestry and agricultural services 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Fishery 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Beef and other meat industry 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Pig meat industry 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 
Poultry meat industry 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Dairy products manufacturing 4 0 0 1 5 1 0 0 1 
Compound feed industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sugar industry 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Margarine industry 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Starch industry 9 0 0 0 9 4 0 0 4 
Other food products manufacturing 8 0 0 1 9 3 0 0 3 
Oil and gas extraction 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Other mining industries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Clothing/wood/paper industry 4 0 0 2 6 3 0 0 3 
Petroleum industry 0 0 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 
Fertilizer industry 0 0 0 2 2 3 0 0 3 
Chemical pesticides manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other chemical industries 0 0 0 18 18 2 0 0 2 
Synthetics and building materials industry 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 
Basic metal industry 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 
Machinery/metal products manufacturing 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
Transport equipment industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Electrical products and other industries 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Electricity supply 0 0 0 23 23 0 0 0 0 
Gas distribution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Water supply 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Construction 1 0 0 4 5 0 0 0 0 
Wholesale and retail trade 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 
Transport and storage industry 0 0 0 33 33 0 0 0 0 
Environmental cleaning 49 0 0 4 53 19 0 0 19 
Other services 6 0 0 11 17 6 0 0 6 
SUBTOTAL 770 298 0 337 1405 118 57 0 175 
Consumption 0 0 60 66 126 0 0 14 14 
TOTAL 770 298 60 403 1531 118 57 14 189 
* N and P emissions in million kg 
Source:CBS-6 (1996), CBS-9 (variousyears), CBS-10 (variousyears), CBS-11 (1997), CBS-12 (variousyears), CBS-13 
(1992) and own calculations 
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Table VII.5 Miscellaneous emissions in 1990 related to output industries and total consumption' 
Emissions related to output: N 2 0 CH. NH 3 Waste 
Dairy farming 16 250 106 205 
Pig farming 1 174 74 124 
Poultry farming 0 87 37 41 
Arable farming 10 0 16 92 
Horticulture under glass 0 0 0 165 
Other horticulture 0 0 0 104 
Forestry and agricultural services 0 0 0 37 
Fishery 0 0 0 172 
Beef and other meat industry 0 0 0 106 
Pig meat industry 0 0 0 170 
Poultry meat industry 0 0 0 43 
Dairy products manufacturing 0 0 0 281 
Compound feed industry 0 0 0 192 
Sugar industry 0 0 0 38 
Margarine industry 0 0 0 90 
Starch industry 0 0 0 38 
Other food products manufacturing 0 0 0 652 
Oil and gas extraction 0 80 0 20 
Other mining industries 0 0 0 140 
Clothing/wood/paper industry 0 0 0 730 
Petroleum industry 0 0 0 50 
Fertilizer industry 1 0 0 157 
Chemical pesticides manufacturing 0 0 0 45 
Other chemical industries 9 3 3 2918 
Synthetics and building material industry 0 0 0 490 
Basic metal industry 1 0 0 160 
Machinery/metal products manufacturing 0 0 0 230 
Transport equipment industry 0 0 0 77 
Electrical products and other industries 0 0 0 153 
Electricity supply 0 0 0 580 
Gas distribution 0 72 0 24 
Water supply 0 0 0 6 
Construction 0 0 0 4920 
Wholesale and retail trade 0 0 0 503 
Transport and storage industry 2 1 0 310 
Environmental cleaning 1 4 0 990 
Other services 1 3 0 2047 
SUBTOTAL 42 674 236 17100 
Consumption 7 14 11 6440 
TOTAL 49 688 247 23540 
* N 2 0 , CHi, NH3 and waste emissions in million kg 
Source: CBS-6 (1996), CBS-8 (1993) and own calculations 
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Table VII.6 C02 emissions in 1993for industries and consumption, distributed by economic 
variable" 
Emissions related to: Output Fuels for 
vehicles 
Coal Other fuels 
for heating 
Natural 
gas 
Distributed 
gas 
TOTAL 
Dairy farming 395.9 336.1 0.0 22.7 0.0 185.5 940.2 
Pig farming 138.4 28.0 0.0 34.0 0.0 291.5 491.9 
Poultry farming 65.7 7.0 0.0 11.3 0.0 83.9 167.9 
Arable farming 0.0 163.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.1 185.5 
Horticulture under glass 0.0 42.0 0.0 419.8 0.0 7622.2 8084.1 
Other horticulture 0.0 74.7 0.0 22.7 0.0 212.0 309.4 
Forestry and agricultural services 0.0 261.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.5 287.9 
Fishery 0.0 324.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 324.4 
Beef and other meat industry 0.0 20.8 0.0 16.9 22.7 68.2 128.7 
Pig meat industry 0.0 20.8 0.0 16.9 22.7 68.2 128.7 
Poultry meat industry 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.7 27.9 
Dairy products manufacturing 0.0 41.6 0.0 0.0 602.6 295.6 939.8 
Compound feed industry 0.0 44.2 41.3 16.9 91.0 142.1 335.6 
Sugar industry 245.6 2.6 206.7 0.0 534.4 39.8 1029.1 
Margarine industry 0.0 18.2 0.0 0.0 181.9 176.2 376.4 
Starch industry 0.0 2.6 0.0 16.9 477.5 22.7 519.8 
Other food products manufacturing 0.0 137.9 0.0 118.6 91.0 1171.1 1518.6 
Oil and gas extraction 2.0 60.8 0.0 0.0 1653.7 1.7 1718.1 
Other mining industries 0.0 32.8 0.0 95.9 264.1 0.0 392.8 
Clothing/wood/paper industry 8.5 223.5 16.0 41.1 1550.0 516.7 2355.8 
Petroleum industry 536.8 113.9 0.0 9028.9 1200.7 95.4 10975.7 
Fertilizer industry 1279.6 9.5 0.0 112.7 2119.8 2.1 3523.6 
Chemical pesticides manufacturing 0.0 9.5 0.0 59.2 12.5 3.1 84.3 
Other chemical industries 1748.4 350.1 587.1 4560.5 4844.6 218.5 12309.2 
Synthetics and building material industry 1092.2 124.5 104.2 400.7 1079.7 591.9 3393.2 
Basic metal industry 910.0 52.3 0.0 2637.6 1351.9 162.6 5114.4 
Machinery/metal products manufacturing 52.0 263.6 0.0 93.3 14.6 1113.1 1536.6 
Transport equipment industry 26.3 60.3 0.0 61.8 0.0 150.8 299.3 
Electrical products and other industries 45.7 158.0 0.0 0.0 6.9 380.5 591.1 
Electricity supply 0.0 130.5 20672.9 2055.7 15766.2 23.3 38648.6 
Gas distribution 0.0 3.7 0.0 0.0 146.3 0.0 150.0 
Water supply 0.0 11.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 330.7 341.9 
Construction 250.4 1374.0 0.0 39.6 41.9 86.5 1792.5 
Wholesale and retail trade 11.8 703.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1612.9 2328.6 
Transport and storage industry 8.0 8353.9 0.0 1342.0 0.0 862.7 10566.6 
Environmental cleaning 2470.0 314.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 360.0 3144.3 
Other services 43.8 2417.6 0.0 1119.4 0.0 6391.8 9972.5 
SUBTOTAL 
Consumption 
9331.1 
1600.0" 
16298.8 
13962.2 
21628.3 
57.6 
22345.3 
652.5 
32076.7 
0.0 
23354.6 
19932.9 
125034.8 
36205.2 
TOTAL 10931.1 30261.0 21685.9 22997.8 32076.7 43287.5 161240.0 
" C 0 2 emissions in million kg 
b Emissions related to aggregate consumption 
Source:CBS-l (1996), CBS-7 (1992), CBS-8 (1993) and own calculations 
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Table VII.7 N0X emissions in 1993for industries and consumption, distributed by economic 
variable" 
Emissions related to: Output Fuels for Coal Other fuels Natural Distributed TOTAL 
vehicles for heating gas gas 
Dairy farming 0.0 4947.2 0.0 18.9 0.0 217.5 5183.7 
Pig farming 0.0 412.3 0.0 28.4 0.0 341.9 782.5 
Poultry farrning 0.0 103.1 0.0 9.5 0.0 98.4 210.9 
Arable farming 0.0 2404.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.9 2430.8 
Horticulture under glass 0.0 618.4 0.0 349.9 0.0 8939.9 9908.2 
Other horticulture 0.0 1099.4 0.0 18.9 0.0 248.6 1366.9 
Forestry and agricultural services 0.0 3847.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.1 3878.9 
Fishery 0.0 4775.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4775.4 
Beef and other meat industry 11.6 219.8 0.0 21.0 48.0 143.9 444.3 
Pig meat industry 12.8 219.8 0.0 21.0 48.0 143.9 445.5 
Poultry meat industry 4.7 55.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 48.0 107.6 
Dairy products rnaBufactiiring 24.4 439.6 0.0 0.0 1270.7 623.4 2358.1 
Compound feed industry 16.8 467.1 54.2 21.0 191.8 299.7 1050.6 
Sugar industry 3.0 27.5 271.0 0.0 1126.8 83.9 1512.2 
Margarine industry 8.2 192.3 0.0 0.0 383.6 371.6 955.7 
Starch industry 3.2 27.5 0.0 21.0 1007.0 48.0 1106.6 
Other food products manufecturing 57.4 1456.3 0.0 147.2 191.8 2469.5 4322.2 
Oil and gas extraction 0.0 471.2 0.0 0.0 5578.4 5.6 6055.2 
Other mining industries 0.0 346.5 0.0 71.4 236.6 0.0 654.5 
Clothing/wood/paper industry 9.9 2454.5 25.0 21.0 3170.5 1056.8 6737.7 
Petroleum industry 325.0 1520.2 0.0 20118.8 706.6 56.1 22726.7 
Fertilizer industry 5696.1 118.1 0.0 130.2 3561.8 3.5 9509.7 
Chemical pesticides manufacturing 0.0 118.1 0.0 99.1 31.6 7.9 256.7 
Other chemical industries 2538.3 4367.9 1266.8 7627.4 12275.4 553.7 28629.5 
Synthetics and building material industry 1556.8 1243.6 203.0 1451.1 6919.0 3793.3 15166.8 
Basic metal industry 230.8 748.4 0.0 8199.0 2449.7 294.6 11922.4 
Machinery/metal products manufacturing 255.2 2740.5 0.0 40.4 13.0 995.6 4044.6 
Transport equipment industry 312.8 508.5 0.0 19.7 0.0 111.6 952.7 
Electrical products and other industries 391.0 1331.8 0.0 0.0 5.1 281.6 2009.5 
Electricity supply 0.0 1775.0 37739.5 386.0 21675.7 32.0 61608.3 
Gas distribution 0.0 18.6 0.0 0.0 447.6 0.0 466.2 
Water supply 0.0 55.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 232.4 288.2 
Construction 742.2 9975.1 0.0 18.6 25.2 52.1 10813.2 
Wholesale and retail trade 1.8 5993.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1408.5 7404.2 
Transport and storage industry 2.8 110099.4 0.0 1042.0 0.0 806.0 111950.3 
Environmental cleaning 5197.8 3733.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 308.0 9239.1 
Other services 6.6 20587.6 0.0 812.4 0.0 5581.8 26988.5 
SUBTOTAL 17409.1 189521.4 39559.6 40693.9 61363.9 29716.2 378264.1 
Consumption 2000.0b 147304.2 47.3 448.6 0.0 20471.2 170271.2 
TOTAL 19409.1 336825.6 39606.8 41142.5 61363.9 50187.3 548535.3 
a NO„ emissions in 1000 kg 
b Emissions related to aggregate consumption 
Source: CBS-1 (1996), CBS-7 (1992), CBS-8 (1993) and own calculations 
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Table VII.8 SO2 emissions in 1993for industries and consumption, distributed by economic 
variable-
Emissions related to: Output Fuels for Coal Other fuels Natural Distributed TOTAL 
vehicles for heating gas gas 
Dairy fkming 0.0 339.3 0.0 18.4 0.0 0.5 358.3 
Kg farming 0.0 28.3 0.0 27.6 0.0 0.9 56.8 
Poultry farming 0.0 7.1 0.0 9.2 0.0 0.2 16.5 
Arable farming 0.0 164.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 165.0 
Horticulture under glass 0.0 42.4 0.0 341.0 0.0 22.4 405.8 
Other horticulture 0.0 75.4 0.0 18.4 0.0 0.6 94.4 
Forestry and agricultural services 0.0 263.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 264.0 
Fishery 0.0 327.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 327.5 
Beef and other meat industry 3.5 18.6 0.0 77.3 0.0 0.0 99.4 
Pig meat industry 3.9 18.6 0.0 77.3 0.0 0.0 99.7 
Poultry meat industry 1.4 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 
Dairy products manufacturing 7.3 37.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.5 
Compound feed industry 5.0 39.5 65.1 77.3 0.0 0.0 187.0 
Sugar industry 0.9 2.3 325.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 329.0 
Margarine industry 2.4 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.7 
Starch industry 1.0 2.3 0.0 77.3 0.0 0.0 80.6 
Other food products manufacturing 17.2 123.2 0.0 540.9 0.0 0.0 681.4 
Oil and gas extraction 0.0 45.3 0.0 0.0 2155.6 2.2 2203.1 
Other mining industries 0.0 31.2 0.0 118.4 1.4 0.0 150.9 
Clothing/wood/paper industry 4.4 220.7 31.0 11.8 0.0 0.0 267.9 
Petroleum industry 11285.4 110.1 0.0 63198.7 62.2 4.9 74661.4 
Fertilizer industry 532.1 8.1 0.0 1034.8 0.0 0.0 1574.9 
Chemical pesticides manufacturing 0.0 8.1 0.0 133.9 0.0 0.0 142.0 
Other chemical industries 3433.2 298.7 1534.3 10313.2 3.4 0.2 15582.9 
Synthetics and building material industry 4798.3 104.1 483.1 1506.2 0.0 0.0 6891.7 
Basic metal industry 7116.5 56.4 0.0 3633.0 384.7 46.3 11236.9 
Machinery/metal products manufacturing 214.5 230.0 0.0 82.2 0.0 0.0 526.7 
Transport equipment industry 0.0 39.5 0.0 216.7 0.0 0.0 256.1 
Electrical products and other industries 666.6 103.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 770.0 
Electricity supply 0.0 133.6 25619.1 912.1 110.9 0.2 26775.8 
Gas distribution 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 
Water supply 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.7 35.4 
Construction 129.1 953.9 0.0 210.0 0.9 1.9 1295.8 
Wholesale and retail trade 17.4 484.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.1 515.9 
Transport and storage industry 0.0 17478.1 0.0 716.6 0.0 1.9 18196.6 
Environmental cleaning 3307.8 334.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 119.8 3762.1 
Other services 64.2 1663.8 0.0 2326.9 0.0 55.9 4110.8 
SUBTOTAL 31612.1 23818.7 28058.3 85679.3 2719.2 304.8 172192.4 
Consumption 0.0 3815.4 248.8 517.6 0.0 104.4 4686.2 
TOTAL 31612.1 27634.1 28307.1 86196.9 2719.2 409.1 176878.5 
* S 0 2 emissions in 1000 kg 
Source:CBS-l (1996), CBS-7 (1992), CBS-8 (1993) and own calculations 
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Table VTI.9 N20 emissions in 1993for industries and consumption, distributed by economic 
variable" 
Emissions related to: Output Fuels for Coal Other fuels Natural Distributed TOTAL 
vehicles for h eating gas gas 
Dairy farming 16263.4 84.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16348.2 
Pig farming 565.2 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 572.3 
Poultry farming 138.4 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 140.1 
Arable farming 7235.7 41.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7276.9 
Horticulture under glass 130.6 10.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 141.2 
Other horticulture 1275.6 18.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1294.5 
Forestry and agricultural services 0.0 65.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 65.9 
Fishery 0.0 81.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81.8 
Beef and other meat industry 6.8 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 12.3 
Pig meat industry 7.5 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 13.0 
Poultry meat industry 2.8 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 
Dairy products manufacturing 14.2 10.6 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 26.3 
Compound feed industry 9.8 11.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 21.5 
Sugar industry 1.7 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.1 3.5 
Margarine industry 4.8 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 10.0 
Starch industry 1.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 3.3 
Other food products manufacturing 33.5 35.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.9 70.9 
Oil and gas extraction 0.0 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.0 
Other mining industries 0.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 
Clothing/wood/paper industry 6.0 54.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.7 63.0 
Petroleum industry 189.0 28.0 0.0 16.4 0.6 0.0 234.0 
Fertilizer industry 2500.2 2.5 0.0 0.1 2.9 0.0 2505.8 
Chemical pesticides manufacturing 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.6 
Other chemical industries 7600.8 92.0 1.0 6.3 10.1 0.5 7710.6 
Synthetics and building material industry 907.0 35.0 0.2 1.2 5.6 3.1 952.0 
Basic metal industry 134.0 11.0 0.0 6.7 2.0 0.2 154.0 
Machinery/metal products manufacturing 25.0 65.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 91.0 
Transport equipment industry 182.2 19.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 202.1 
Electrical products and other industries 227.8 52.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 279.9 
Electricity supply 0.0 29.0 173.5 1.8 99.6 0.1 304.0 
Gas distribution 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Water supply 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 
Construction 0.0 399.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 1.1 401.0 
Wholesale and retail trade 3.8 221.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.2 256.5 
Transport and storage industry 6.0 1605.0 0.0 23.1 0.0 17.9 1652.0 
Environmental cleaning 529.0 64.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 600.0 
Other services 14.2 760.6 0.0 18.0 0.0 123.8 916.5 
SUBTOTAL 38017.0 3860.0 174.9 74.3 126.9 189.9 42443.0 
Consumption 4216.0b 2720.0 1.0 9.9 0.0 454.0 7401.0 
TOTAL 42233.0 6580.0 176.0 84.2 126.9 643.9 49844.0 
" N 2 0 emissions in 1000 kg 
b Emissions related to aggregate consumption 
Source: CBS-1 (1995) and own calculations 
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Table VII. 10 CH4 emissions in 1993for industries.and consumption, distributed by economic 
variable" 
Output Fuels for 
vehicles 
Natural gas Distributed 
gas 
TOTAL 
Dairy farming 294030.9 57.1 0.0 78.6 294166.6 
Pig farming 102780.7 4.8 0.0 123.5 102909.0 
Poultry farming 48788.3 1.2 0.0 35.6 48825.1 
Arable farming 0.0 27.8 0.0 9.4 37.1 
Horticulture under glass 0.0 7.1 0.0 3229.9 3237.1 
Other horticulture 0.0 12.7 0.0 89.8 102.5 
Forestry and agricultural services 0.0 44.4 0.0 11.2 55.6 
Fishery 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Beef and other meat industry 3.4 2.0 2.5 7.5 15.4 
Pig meat industry 3.7 2.0 2.5 7.5 15.7 
Poultry meat industry 1.4 0.5 0.0 2.5 4.4 
Dairy products manufacturing 7.0 4.0 66.5 32.6 110.2 
Compound feed industry 4.8 4.2 10.0 15.7 34.8 
Sugar industry 0.9 0.2 59.0 4.4 64.5 
Margarine industry 2.4 1.7 20.1 19.5 43.6 
Starch industry 0.9 0.2 52.7 2.5 56.4 
Other food products manufacturing 16.6 13.1 10.0 129.3 169.0 
Oil and gas extraction 80200.0 6.0 1357.6 1.4 81565.0 
Other mining industries 0.0 3.0 114.0 0.0 117.0 
Clothing/wood/paper industry 2.0 20.0 86.3 28.8 137.0 
Petroleum industry 219.0 14.0 239.9 19.1 492.0 
Fertilizer industry 997.6 1.1 134.2 0.1 1133.1 
Chemical pesticides rnanufacturing 0.0 1.1 0.8 0.2 2.1 
Other chemical industries 3611.4 41.7 306.8 13.8 3973.8 
Synthetics and building material industry 150.0 12.0 63.3 34.7 260.0 
Basic metal industry 110.0 5.0 208.0 25.0 348.0 
Machinery/metal products manufacturing 10.0 22.0 1.5 118.5 152.0 
Transport equipment industry 10.2 6.1 0.0 6.7 23.0 
Electrical products and other industries 17.8 15.9 0.3 17.0 51.0 
Electricity supply 0.0 15.0 121.8 0.2 137.0 
Gas distribution 79400.0 0.5 74.8 0.0 79475.3 
Water supply 0.0 1.5 0.0 169.2 170.7 
Construction 1.0 139.0 1.0 2.0 143.0 
Wholesale and retail trade 528.0 69.9 0.0 580.5 1178.4 
Transport and storage industry 1267.0 542.0 0.0 682.0 2491.0 
Environmental cleaning 4205.0 26.0 0.0 114.0 4345.0 
Other services 1953.0 240.1 0.0 2300.5 4493.6 
SUBTOTAL 618323.0 1367.0 2933.9 7913.1 630537.0 
Consumption 0.0 4773.0 0.0 8203.0 12976.0 
TOTAL 618323.0 6140.0 2933.9 16116.1 643513.0 
* CH4 emissions in 1000 kg 
Source: CBS-1 (1995) and own calculations 
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Table VII. 11 N and P emissions in 1993for industries and consumption, distributed by economic 
variable" 
N emissions P emissions 
Emissions related to: Output Fertiliser Indirect 
to NO, 
andNH, 
TOTAL Output Fertiliser Other 
chemical 
products 
TOTAL 
Dairy farming 146000.0 102000.0 106578.2 354578.2 22000.0 6000.0 0.0 28000.0 
Pig farming 110000.0 4000.0 45238.2 159238.2 31000.0 0.0 0.0 31000.0 
Poultry farming 48000.0 0.0 12064.2 60064.2 12000.0 0.0 0.0 12000.0 
Arable farming 0.0 36000.0 2740.1 38740.1 -1000.0 0.0 0.0 -1000.0 
Horticulture under glass 0.0 5000.0 3016.6 8016.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other horticulture 0.0 7000.0 416.2 7416.2 0.0 1000.0 0.0 1000.0 
Forestry and agricultural services 0.0 0.0 1181.0 1181.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Fishery 0.0 0.0 1453.9 1453.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Beef and other meat industry 1979.5 0.0 198.1 2177.6 0.0 0.0 506.0 506.0 
Pig meat industry 2182.6 0.0 204.9 2387.5 0.0 0.0 557.9 557.9 
Poultry meat industry 805.0 0.0 58.3 863.3 0.0 0.0 205.8 205.8 
Dairy products manufacturing 5490.5 0.0 849.4 6339.9 0.0 0.0 1403.5 1403.5 
Compound feed industry 2597.6 0.0 410.5 3008.1 0.0 0.0 664.0 664.0 
Sugar industry 413.9 0.0 476.4 890.4 0.0 0.0 105.8 105.8 
Margarine industry 1022.6 0.0 335.0 1357.6 0.0 0.0 261.4 261.4 
Starch industry 377.4 0.0 354.0 731.4 0.0 0.0 96.5 96.5 
Other food products manufacturing 8833.9 0.0 1625.6 10459.5 0.0 0.0 2258.1 2258.1 
Oil and gas extraction 5.0 0.0 1843.5 1848.5 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 
Other mining industries 2.0 0.0 199.3 201.3 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 
Clothing/wood/paper industry 5228.0 0.0 2104.8 7332.8 0.0 0.0 2521.0 2521.0 
Petroleum industry 0.0 0.0 6925.9 6925.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Fertilizer industry 479.4 0.0 5042.4 5521.8 0.0 0.0 2937.3 2937.3 
Chemical pesticides manufacturing 0.0 0.0 78.1 78.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other chemical industries 2719.6 0.0 9487.4 12207.0 0.0 0.0 567.7 567.7 
Synthetics and building materials industry 239.0 0.0 5054.4 5293.4 0.0 0.0 106.0 106.0 
Basic metal industry 496.0 0.0 3821.5 4317.5 0.0 0.0 290.0 290.0 
Machinery/metal products manufacturing 548.0 0.0 1248.7 1796.7 0.0 0.0 393.0 393.0 
Transport equipment industry 0.0 0.0 290.0 290.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Electrical products and other industries 401.0 0.0 952.3 1353.3 0.0 0.0 294.0 294.0 
Electricity supply 90.0 0.0 18757.1 18847.1 0.0 0.0 39.0 39.0 
Gas distribution 0.0 0.0 141.9 141.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Water supply 22.0 0.0 87.7 109.7 0.0 0.0 17.0 17.0 
Construction 196.0 0.0 3292.2 3488.2 0.0 0.0 151.0 151.0 
Wholesale and retail trade 1895.6 0.0 2254.4 4150.0 0.0 0.0 1571.6 1571.6 
Transport and storage industry 431.0 0.0 34085.7 34516.7 0.0 0.0 317.0 317.0 
Environmental cleaning 57520.0 0.0 2817.0 60337.0 0.0 0.0 11589.0 11589.0 
Other services 7011.4 0.0 8217.5 15228.9 0.0 0.0 5813.4 5813.4 
SUBTOTAL 404987.0 154000.0 283902.5 842889.5 64000.0 7000.0 32672.0 103672.0 
Consumption 72294.0b 0.0 60969.4 133263.4 0.0 0.0 13258.0 13258.0 
TOTAL 477281.0 154000.0 344871.8 976152.8 64000.0 7000.0 45930.0 116930.0 
a N and P emissions in 1000 kg 
b Emissions related to aggregate consumption 
Source:CBS-l (1996), CBS-9 (various years), CBS-10 (various years), CBS-11 (1997), CBS-12 (various years), CBS-13 
(1992), MVROM (1995) and own calculations 
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Table VII. 12 NH3 and waste emissions in 1993for industries and consumption, distributed by 
economic variable'' 
NR, emissions Waste 
Emissions related to: Output Fertiliser Total Output 
Dairy farming 120373.1 7295.3 127668.4 218.7 
Pig fanning 54715.0 0.0 54715.0 97.5 
Poultry farming 14590.7 0.0 14590.7 41.7 
Arable farming 0.0 2431.8 2431.8 88.7 
Horticulture under glass 0.0 0.0 0.0 163.9 
Other horticulture 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.9 
Forestry and agricultural services 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.9 
Fishery 0.0 0.0 0.0 166.7 
Beef and other meat industry 76.4 0.0 76.4 134.8 
Pig meat industry 84.2 0.0 84.2 148.6 
Poultry meat industry 31.1 0.0 31.1 54.8 
Dairy products manufacturing 159.9 0.0 159.9 298.0 
Compound feed industry 110.2 0.0 110.2 203.0 
Sugar industry 19.5 0.0 19.5 40.3 
Margarine industry 53.5 0.0 53.5 95.0 
Starch industry 20.8 0.0 20.8 40.3 
Other food products manufacturing 376.6 0.0 376.6 690.2 
Oil and gas extraction 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.0 
Other mining industries 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.0 
Clothing/wood/paper industry 65.0 0.0 65.0 688.0 
Petroleum industry 8.0 0.0 8.0 62.0 
Fertilizer industry 2610.6 0.0 2610.6 81.5 
Chemical pesticides manufacturing 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.0 
Other chemical industries 937.4 0.0 937.4 1872.5 
Synthetics and building material industry 531.0 0.0 531.0 423.0 
Basic metal industry 233.0 0.0 233.0 164.0 
Machinery/metal products manufacturing 21.0 0.0 21.0 212.0 
Transport equipment industry 0.0 0.0 0.0 108.5 
Electrical products and other industries 414.0 0.0 414.0 188.5 
Electricity supply 0.0 0.0 0.0 208.0 
Gas distribution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Water supply 0.0 0.0 0.0 54.0 
Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 4240.0 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.2 0.0 0.2 588.0 
Transport and storage industry 2.0 0.0 2.0 618.0 
Environmental cleaning 5.0 0.0 5.0 1047.0 
Other services 0.8 0.0 0.8 2175.0 
SUBTOTAL 195438.8 9727.1 205165.9 15500.0 
Consumption11 11100.0 0.0 11100.0 5845.0 
TOTAL 206538.8 9727.1 216265.9 21345.0 
" NH 3 emissions in 1000 kg; waste emissions in million kg 
b Emissions related to aggregate consumption 
Source:CBS-l (1996), CBS-11 (1997), CBS-12 (various years), CBS-13 (1992), MVROM (1995) and own calculations 
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Appendix Vin Mineral balances Dutch agriculture 
MANURE PRODUCTION 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
452 158 75 0 0 0 
FERTILISER 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
262 4 0 108 9 7 
DEPOSITION ETC. 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
32 0 16 0 2 
Bl 
666 
B2 
118 
SOIL 
B3 B4 
48 125 
B5 
11 
B6 
12 
RETURN CROPS 
BI B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
13 0 0 3 2 3 
EXPORT 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
0 0 15 0 0 0 
CROPS 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
393 4 0 86 4 2 
SURPLUS SOIL 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
248 114 48 36 5 7 
Bl: Dairy farming 
B2: Pig &ming 
B3: Poultry farming 
B4: Arable farming 
B5: Horticulture under glass 
B6: Other horticulture 
SURPLUS AIR 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
105 45 12 2 
Figure VÏÏI. 1 Nitrogen balance in 1993for Dutch agriculture (in mln kg N) 
Sources: Own calculations and CBS-10 (1995), CBS-11 (1997), CBS-12 (1997), CBS-13 (1992), LEI/CBS (1994), LEI 
(1997) and MLNV (1995) 
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MANURE PRODUCTION 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
56 32 15 0 0 0 
FERTILISER 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
15 0 0 12 2 1 
DEPOSITION ETC. 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
3 0 0 1 0 0 
Bl B2 B3 
SOIL 
B4 B5 B6 
74 29 15 15 2 2 
RETURN CROPS 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
0 0 0 2 0 1 
EXPORT 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
0 0 0 0 0 
CROPS 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
46 1 0 14 2 0 
SURPLUS SOIL 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
28 31 12 -1 0 1 
Bl: Dairy farming 
B2: Pig farming 
B3: Poultry farming 
B4: Arable farming 
B5: Horticulture under glass 
B6: Other horticulture 
Figure VÏÏI.2 Phosphate balance in 1993for Dutch agriculture (in mln kg P) 
Sources: Own calculations and CBS-10 (1995), CBS-11 (1997), CBS-12 (1997), CBS-13 (1992), LEI/CBS (1994), LE 
(1997) and MLNV (1995) 
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Appendix IX Elasticities 
Table DC. 1 Substitution and transformation elasticities industries and commodities 
Industry CES between CES CES between Commodity CES between CET between 
aggregate primary, between intermediate energy domestic domestic use 
aggregate energy labour and inputs and between production and export 
and aggregate capital intermediate material and import 
material inputb inputs1" 
B1-B8 0.4 0.3 0.15 G1-G8* 4.5 -4.5 
B9 0.6 0.3 0.3 G9 0.5 -0.5 
BIO 0.6 0.3 0.3 G10 0.5 -0.5 
Bl l 0.6 0.3 0.3 Gil 1.5 -1.5 
B12 0.6 0.3 0.3 G12 2.0 -2.0 
B13 0.4 0.2 0.2 G13 4.5 -4.5 
B14 0.4 0.2 0.2 G14 1.15 -1.15 
B15 0.7 0.4 0.3 G15-G17* 3.0 -3.0 
B16 0.7 0.4 0.3 G18 1.15 -1.15 
B17 0.7 0.4 0.3 G19 0.5 -0.5 
B18 0.9 0.5 0.5 G20 1.5 -1.5 
B19 2.0 0.8 1.3 G21 1.8 -1.8 
B20 0.6 0.6 0.5 G22 2.0 -2.0 
B21 0.9 0.5 0.5 G23 1.5 -1.5 
B22 0.3 0.15 0.2 G24 4.0 -4.0 
B23 0.3 0.15 0.2 G25 4.0 -4.0 
B24 0.3 0.15 0.2 G26 2.5 -2.5 
B25 0.7 0.4 0.3 G27 2.5 -2.5 
B26 0.15 0.15 0.15 G28 4.0 -4.0 
B27 0.7 0.4 0.2 G29 0.2 -0.2 
B28 0.3 0.3 0.15 G30 2.0 -2.0 
B29 0.6 0.15 0.6 G31 0.15 -0.15 
B30' 0.15 0.15 0.15 G32 2.0 -2.0 
B31 0.15 0.15 0.15 G33 2.8 -2.8 
B32 0.15 0.15 0.15 G34 2.0 -2.0 
B33 1.15 0.7 0.3 G35 2.0 -2.0 
B34 1.7 0.9 0.9 G36 1.5 -1.5 
B35 0.7 0.4 0.3 G37 1.6 -1.6 
B36 1.15 0.4 0.5 G38 1.7 -1.7 
B37 1.15 0.4 0.5 G39 2.0 -2.0 
G40 0.15 -0.15 
G41 0.2 -0.2 
G42 0.2 -0.2 
G43 0.2 -0.2 
G44 0.25 -0.25 
G45 0.15 -0.15 
Most elasticities are calculated and adjusted from Zeelenberg et al. (1991). Elasticities denoted with * are based upon 
own approximations. 
Also valid in case intermediate energy and material inputs are nested in a single aggregate intermediate input 
(Chapter 3). 
Table IX.2 Miscellaneous elasticities" 
Transformation elasticity mobile labour distribution* -0.5 
Transformation elasticity capital distribution* -0.6 
Substitution elasticity mobile/immobile labour* 1.5 
Substitution elasticity saving/current consumption* 1.15 
Uncompensated labour supply elasticity* 0.1 
Substitution elasticity private consumption 0.3 
Substitution elasticity public consumption 0.2 
Elasticities are from Zeelenberg et al. (1991). Elasticities denoted with * are based upon own approximations. 
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Appendix X Effects on environmental indicators of energy taxes 
Table X. 1 Effects on greenhouse gas emissions by industries and consumption of energy taxes 
(% change from benchmark) 
Greenhouse gas excluding CFK's 
co 2 N 20 CR, Total 
Small General Small General Small General Small General 
Agriculture 0.2 -3.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -1.3 
Agribusiness 1.5 -5.4 - - - - 1.5 -5.4 
Other industries -2.7 -6.0 0.3 -1.6 -0.9 -1.6 -2.5 -5.6 
Public utilities -4.7 -3.1 - - -6.0 -3.6 -4.7 -3.1 
Services -6.3 -2.8 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -6.0 -2.7 
Consumption -2.9 -1.3 0.0 0.1 -5.2 -2.2 -2.7 -1.2 
Waste dumping - - - - 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 
TOTAL -3.5 -3.5 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -3.1 -3.1 
Table X.2 Effects on acidification emissions by industries and consumption of energy taxes 
(% change from benchmark) 
Acidification 
NO, S 0 2 NH 3 Total 
Small General Small General Small General Small General 
Agriculture 0.4 -1.8 -0.9 -1.9 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
Agribusiness 1.0 -4.2 -1.2 -4.9 - - 0.6 -4.3 
Other industries -1.9 -4.5 -6.6 -5.1 0.2 -0.8 -4.4 -4.7 
Public utilities -4.6 -3.0 -4.8 -3.2 - - -4.7 -3.1 
Services -0.9 -0.3 -2.1 -0.9 - - -1.1 -0.5 
Consumption -0.6 -0.4 -0.9 -0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.5 -0.3 
TOTAL -1.5 -1.8 -5.4 -4.0 -0.2 -0.1 -1.6 -1.5 
Table X.3 Effects on eutrophication emissions and waste by industries and consumption of energy 
taxes (% change from benchmark) 
Eutrophication Waste 
N P Total 
Small General Small General Small General Small General 
Agriculture -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Agribusiness 0.3 -0.8 0.2 -0.3 0.2 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 
Other industries -1.5 -3.4 0.5 -4.3 -0.3 -4.0 0.2 -0.5 
Public utilities -4.7 -3.1 - - -4.7 -3.1 -4.3 -2.8 
Services -0.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Consumption -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 
TOTAL -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 
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Appendix XI Effects on emissions in agriculture of energy taxes 
Table XI. 1 Effects on greenhouse gas emissions in agriculture of energy taxes (% change from 
benchmark) 
Greenhouse gas excluding CFK's 
CQ2 N 2 0 CH, Total 
Small General Small General Small General Small General 
Dairy farming -1.5 -0.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 
Pig farming -3.5 -1.3 -0.3 -0.0 -0.3 -0.0 -0.9 -0.3 
Poultry farming -2.6 -0.9 - - -0.2 0.1 -0.6 -0.1 
Arable farming -0.9 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2 - - -0.1 -0.2 
Horticulture under glass 1.0 -3.6 - - - - 1.0 -3.6 
Other horticulture -5.1 -1.8 - - - - -5.1 -1.8 
TOTAL 0.2 -3.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -1.3 
Table XI.2 Effects on acidification emissions in agriculture of energy taxes (% change from 
benchmark) 
Acidification 
NO x S 0 2 NH 3 Total 
Small General Small General Small General Small General 
Dairy farming -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 
Pig farming - - - - -0.3 -0.0 -0.3 -0.0 
Poultry farming - - - - -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1 
Arable farming -0.1 -0.4 - - -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 
Horticulture under glass 1.0 -3.3 -1.8 -3.5 - - 0.6 -3.3 
Other horticulture -0.4 0.2 - - - -0.4 0.2 
TOTAL 0.4 -1.8 -0.9 -1.9 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
Table XI.3 Effects on eutrophication emissions and waste in agriculture of energy taxes (% change 
from benchmark) 
Eutrophication Waste 
N P Total 
Small General Small General Small General Small General 
Dairy farming -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 
Pig farming -0.3 -0.0 -0.3 -0.0 -0.3 -0.0 -0.3 -0.0 
Poultry fanning -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1 
Arable farming -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 
Horticulture under glas s 0.2 -0.8 0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.7 0.2 -0.7 
Other horticulture -0.4 0.2 -0.4 0.2 -0.4 0.2 -0.3 0.1 
TOTAL -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
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Appendix XII Effects of restrictions on emissions: a partial analysis 
To understand the results it is helpful to identify some of the main factors that determine the effects 
obtained in Chapter 5. The following partial analysis is restricted to the effects for the shadow price of 
an emission permit of emissions that are related to one input by a single industry. The level ENg and 
change dENg of emissions related to an input g are (subscripts e and b are omitted for convenience): 
ENg = V,gN.INg (XH.1) 
dENg=WgN.dINg (XII.2) 
Assuming perfectly elastic supply of inputs, a change of input can be written using the own price 
elasticity of input demand : 
IN 
dIN, = e™.dWlNs. g— (XH3) 
g " g WINg 
The price change is due to the restriction and, assuming perfectly elastic supply, can be calculated 
using the value of the rent which is equal to the total value of emission permits (XII.4): 
RENT™ WEN .EN 
dWIN, = — = g- g- (XII.4) 
S ™g INg 
Substituting (XII.4) and (XII.3) in (XII.2) gives: 
WEN 
dENg = ^ . e ^ . - ^ . E N g (XII.5) 
From (XII.5) the shadow price of an emission permit can be derived as: 
dEN, WINe ^TT ^ WEN = * (XII.6) 
g EN v,m s g g r g •bwmz 
Assurning perfectly elastic supply of inputs, the following relation exists between the own price 
elasticity of input demand, the cost share of input (Sm) and the Allen Partial Elasticity of Substitution 
between inputs (<Jm) that is used in the model (see Berndt and Christensen, 1973, and applying 
Euler's Law): 
^={Sm,-r)xrm (XII.7) 
Finally, substituting (XII.7) in (XII.6) we have: 
WIN 
WENZ = EN.—JT; * (XII.8) 
<rf . (S W f - l ) .<r w 
where EN is relative environmental indicator reduction. 
Since t r w is positive, from this it can be concluded that the shadow price of an emission permit related 
to a specific input as result of an emission reduction, is lower: 
* the smaller is the cost share of the input to which emissions are related; 
* the greater is the substitution elasticity between inputs; 
* the greater is the emission coefficient; 
* the smaller is the reduction. 
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Appendix XHI Welfare costs of reducing environmental indicators 
7 8 9 
% r e d u c t i o n G H G 1 2 1 3 14 15 
10 11 1 2 1 3 14 15 
% r e d u c t i o n A C I D 
Figure XIII. 1 Welfare costs of reducing GHG, A CID, EUT and WST indicators 
162 Appendices 
Appendix XIV Technology description dairy farming 
This appendix describes how the technologies in dairy farrrring, distinguished in Chapter 6, are 
defined. First the two technologies that are active in the benchmark are determined, using a 
cross-entropy procedure (Golan et al., 1996). Second, a latent clean technology is defined, using 
data from a Dutch experimental farm. All technologies are surnmarised in Table XTV. 1 that also 
shows the use table for dairy farming (see Chapter 2), corrected for a milk quota rent of 1500 
mln. (1993) guilders.1 
Description active technologies 
For dairy farming two active technologies are defined in the benchmark: a nitrogen (N) intensive 
technology (technology 1: dirty active) and a less N intensive technology (technology 2: clean 
active). The technologies are defined, using a stratified sample of specialised Dutch dairy farms 
that kept accounts on behalf of the Agricultural Economic Research Institute (LEI) farm 
accounting system (hereafter called LEI-sample). First, the average phosphate emissions per unit 
of milk output are determined for the whole LEI-sample2. The farms with more than the average 
phosphate emissions per unit of milk are denoted dirty; the farms with less than the average are 
denoted clean. The average farm of the dirty class has 10% more emissions per unit of milk than 
the average farm of the clean class.3 The vector ƒ of output by technologies in the AGE model is 
determined by the output share of the dirty and clean farms in the LEI-sample. To complete the 
production structure of the two technologies in the AGE model, also the input vector x has to be 
divided over the two technologies. The matrix Q of input shares for the two classes of farms, 
known from the LEI-sample can be used as prior information to deterrriine a matrix P of input 
shares in the AGE model benchmark. 
1 The market value (lease price) of milk quota in 1993 is 0.34 guilders per kg (Boots, 1999, p. 83). The Dutch 
quota rent at market prices therefore would be 11.109 kg milk * 0,34 = 3750 million guilders which would 
absorb a large part of total value added in dairy farming. There are several reasons for the high market prices 
of milk quota among which are: market imperfections, strategic behaviour of farmers and tax deductibility of 
quota. Taking into account that investments in milk quota are tax deductible (highest marginal tariff is 60%), 
the quota rent is set, rather arbitrarily, equal to 1500 mln (1993) guilders. 
2 Since N emissions are not presented in the LEI-sample, the distribution of P emissions is taken as a proxy for 
the distribution of N emissions, which is not a too crude assumption given the rather fixed relationship 
between these emissions. 
3 This rather small difference is caused by the fact that the distribution of emission per unit of milk of the 
specialised dairy farms in the LEI-sample is condensed around the mean. If more than two classes had been 
distinguished, greater differences between classes would be expected. However, this would increase the 
number of active technologies and accordingly require more data. 
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Following Golan et al. (1996, p.59-64) the matrix P with I inputs for T technologies can 
be found, defining a cross-entropy problem that can be formalised as follows: 
Min YTiPu AnP>J -TiTiPu ANA<J (XTV.l) 
P,.i teT iel 
Subject to: 
y = P .x 
2X=' 
(XIV.2) 
(XTV.3) 
where p^rnid qtii are elements of the matrices P and Q. 
Since the aggregation level of the inputs in the LEI-sample and the AGE model is not the 
same, only five inputs could be distinguished: labour (i=l), capital (i=2), cattle (i=3), compound 
feed (1=4) and other inputs (i=5).4 From the LEI-sample the following prior matrix Q was 
obtained with five input shares for two technologies (clean and dirty): 
2 = 
0.462 0.460 0.483 0.454 0.394 
0.538 0.540 0.517 0.546 0.606 
Using y = 
4753 
6414 
and x = 
193 
3107 
1192 
2432 
4243 
, P can be found: 
0.451 0.449 0.472 0.443 0.384 
0.549 0.551 0.528 0.557 0.616 
Matrix P says that, for example, 45.1% of total labour (i=l) in dairy farming (193 million 
guilders) is used by technology 1 (87 million) and 54.9% is used by technology 2 (106 million). 
Hence, using P the input vector x can be divided in an input matrix X. 
In future research, more efforts should be made to match the level of aggregation in the LEI-sample and the 
AGE model to improve the description of distinguished technologies. Moreover, it should be taken into 
account that the LEI-sample represents specialised dairy farms (that partly produce other products than 
dairy) while the industries distinguished in the AGE model are fully specialised. 
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87 1396 563 1077 1628 
106 1711 629 1355 2615 
Appendices 
This matrix is adjusted to the aggregation level of the AGE model presented in Table XTV.1, 
where the distribution of inputs G5, G6 and G12-G44 over the two technologies is identical to 
'other inputs' (i=5) of matrix Z (see Table XTV.l). 
Table XTV. 1 Input table technologies in dairy farming (values in million guilders at 1993 prices) 
Use table Technology 1 Technology 2 Technology 3 
Dairy farming Dirty active Clean active Clean new 
Input Value Share Value Share Value Share Share 
Hired labour 193 0.017 87 0.018 106 0.017 0.019a 
Capital (incl. self employed) 3107 0.278 1396 0.294 1711 0.267 0.317" 
Economic loss 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 -0.003° 
Gl Cattle 1192 0.107 563 0.118 629 0.098 0.118 
G5 Grain 69 0.006 26 0.005 43 0.007 0.005 
G6 Arable products n.e.c. 323 0.029 124 0.026 199 0.031 o.oos"1 Gil Compound feed 2432 0.218 1077 0.227 1355 0.211 0.224e 
G12 Dairy products 4 0.000 2 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 
G19 Food products n.e.c. 85 0.008 33 0.007 52 0.008 0.007 
G21 Raw mat.leather/textiles/paper 36 0.003 14 0.003 22 0.003 0.003 
G23 Building materials 43 0.004 17 0.004 26 0.004 0.004 
G25 Other raw materials energy 18 0.002 7 0.001 11 0.002 0.001 
G26 Fuels for vehicles 144 0.013 55 0.012 89 0.014 0.012 
G27 Other fuels for heating 2 0.000 1 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 
G29 Distributed gas 42 0.004 16 0.003 26 0.004 0.003 
G30 Electricity 122 0.011 47 0.010 75 0.009 0.010 
G31 Water 69 0.006 26 0.005 43 0.007 0.005 
G32 Fertiliser 316 0.028 121 0.025 195 0.030 0.010f 
G33 Other chemical products 54 0.005 21 0.004 33 0.005 0.004 
G34 Pesticides 31 0.028 12 0.003 19 0.003 0.003 
G36 Semi-manufact. metal products 12 0.001 5 0.001 7 0.001 0.001 
G37 Metal products and machinery 16 0.001 6 0.001 10 0.002 0.001 
G40 Garden and agr. services 980 0.088 376 0.079 604 0.094 0.0968 
G41 Construction and ground work 247 0.022 95 0.020 152 0.024 0.020 
G42 Transport services 2 0.000 1 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 
G43 Cleaning services 18 0.002 7 0.001 11 0.002 0.001 
G44 Other services 1610 0.144 618 0.130 992 0.155 0.130 
TOTAL 11167 1.000 4753 1.000 6414 1.000 1.000 
Milk quota rent 1500 
TOTAL incl. quota rent 12667 
N Emissions (million kg N) 354.58 159.56 195.02 
N Emission /output 0.032 0.034 0.030 0.02011 
" 2% more labour than technology 1 
b 8% more capital than technology 1 
c The input shares sum up to more than 100% of output since at benchmark prices there is an economic loss 
d G6 in technology 1 consist of approximately 60% roughage, which is not bought under the new technology 
e 1% less compound feed than technology 1 
f 60% less fertiliser than technology 1 
8 22% more agricultural services than technology 1 
h 40% less N emissions than technology 1 
Appendix, XIV: Technology description dairy farming 165 
Description latent technology 
The inactive, latent technology (technology 3: clean new) is assumed to be an N extensive 
technology. Results of a comparison between normal and N extensive management of dairy 
farming at the "Marke", a Dutch experimental farm, are used to describe the input vector of the 
third latent technology. Research at the "Marke' showed that although the N extensive 
technology is feasible, due to more intensive use of non-N intensive inputs (labour, capital and 
agricultural services), it would run at an economic loss at benchmark prices in the AGE model 
(see: PR, 1998, table 9). The last column in table XTV.l describes the new technology that 
represents the N extensive management at the "Marke1. Assuming that technology 1 is equivalent 
to the normal management at the "Marke', technology 3 is derived using the differences 
explained in the footnotes to the table. 
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SUMMARY 
There is a growing awareness of actual and potential threats to the natural environment in the 
form of the exhaustion of natural resources, the pollution of air, land and water resources, and 
the deterioration of bio-diversity. As in most industrialised countries, the concern for 
mamtaining or improving environmental quality has taken a firm place on the policy agenda 
in the Netherlands. Hence, for policy makers and interest groups, it is important to understand 
the nature of different environmental problems, the linkages between the economy and the 
environment, and the economic and environmental consequences of government intervention. 
The Dutch economy, agriculture and environment are highly interrelated. Agriculture, 
industries that are directly related to agriculture (agribusiness) and international trade in 
agricultural and food products form a substantial part of Dutch economic activity. Moreover, 
agricultural production causes a number of specific environmental problems, primarily 
related to the use of industrial inputs like fertiliser and pesticides. In addition, agriculture also 
contributes to some general environmental problems like the greenhouse effect, acidification 
and eutrophication. 
Three relevant categories of policies can be distinguished that stress the changing 
policy environment of agriculture and the linkages that exist between the economy, the 
environment and agriculture: (1) environmental policies that are specific for agriculture; (2) 
general environmental policies that affect agriculture; and (3) agricultural policies that entail 
environmental effects. In addition, the importance of environmental policies relatively to 
other policies in agriculture is increasing. Hence, there is scope for empirical analysis of 
Dutch agriculture and agribusiness, in order to unravel the qualitative and quantitative 
relation between the environment and economic activity. 
The purpose of this thesis is to quantify the economy-wide environmental and 
economic effects of agricultural and environmental policies and the interactions between 
these policies, in the Netherlands. Some of the most important policy issues are dealt with in 
this thesis. Policy simulations are: (1) the manure policy; (2) the introduction of a small-user 
energy tax; (3) the reduction of emissions contributing to the environmental indicators 
eutrophication, the greenhouse effect, acidification and waste accumulation; and (4) the 
increase of milk quota under a nitrogen emission restriction. 
The basic tool used in this thesis is a static, single-country applied general equilibrium 
(AGE) model for the Dutch economy, in which environmental relations are incorporated 
explicitly. Given the linkages described and the economy-wide and trade effects that can be 
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expected from agricultural and environmental policies, using an AGE for a small open 
economy is appropriate. Moreover, the availability of new environmental data at a very 
disaggregated level for the Netherlands makes it possible, and from a scientific point of view 
interesting, to link environmental data to economic activity in an AGE model. Finally, an 
AGE model provides useful information on several variables that are relevant for policy 
makers and interest groups. 
Chapter 2 presents and discusses the AGE model and data used. Since in the different 
policy simulations different modifications of the model are used, the description of the model 
is not exhaustive. Modifications of the model, used in the different policy simulations, are 
dealt with in the concerning chapters. A complete description of the basic model is presented 
in appendices. The chapter also deals with the economic and environmental data used. Data 
obtained from own calculations (e.g., detailed environmental data and disaggregation of 
agricultural data) are summarised in appendices. 
In Chapter 3, the effects on the Dutch economy of a reduction in intensive livestock 
production are analysed. Such a reduction is a possible solution to environmental problems 
linked with the excess supply of minerals to the environment. 
A decrease in intensive livestock production to achieve a phosphate loss of 30 kg/ha 
(policy goal in 2002) will decrease income from pig and poultry farming by 2.6 and 1.0 per 
cent, respectively. If pig production alone is reduced, the income from pig farming will 
decrease by 4.8 per cent. The lower production in pig and poultry farming affects the 
production and income of the compound feed, pig and poultry meat industries more seriously 
than the livestock industries because of the absence of quota rents as part of income. The 
effects on trade are that net exports of livestock and net imports of feedstuff's decrease. 
Moreover, in all cases, the exchange rate appreciates, which indicates that the trade position 
of the Netherlands would deteriorate because of the livestock reduction. In the case of a 
permitted phosphate loss of 30 kg/ha when only pig production is reduced, welfare decreases 
by 800 mln 1990 guilders which is only 0.15 per cent of national income. This welfare 
reduction would be offset by environmental improvements that are not included in the 
welfare measure. 
The simulations give a good insight into the economic effects of a stricter mineral 
policy. It clearly shows that the introduction of an environmental policy that is specific for 
agriculture entails economy wide effects, revealing the linkages that exist between agriculture 
and the rest of the economy. The results form the background to discussions on the 
advantages and disadvantages of reducing Dutch livestock production and on the design of 
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policies in other countries that deal with the same environmental problems. An important 
policy implication is the fact that industries related to the livestock industries (compound 
feed, pig and poultry meat industries) are affected more seriously than the livestock 
industries. This result is mainly due to the compensating effect of the quota rents for current 
farmers. However, the value of this quota (production rights) forms an entry barrier and has a 
negative effect on the structure of intensive livestock farming. 
Chapter 4 deals with a general environmental policy that also has consequences for 
individual agricultural industries. In 1996, the Dutch government implemented an energy tax 
on fossil fuels for heating and electricity by households and 'small' energy users (small-user 
energy tax). The revenues of the energy tax are used to lower the pre-existing distortionary 
taxes related to labour. The research in this chapter shows the detailed environmental and 
economic effects of this Dutch unilateral environmental tax reform. Special attention is paid 
to the double-dividend argument that the introduction of a small environmental tax reform 
not only improves the environment (first dividend) but might also raise non-environmental 
welfare, due to an improvement in the efficiency of the tax structure (second dividend). The 
effects of the small-user energy tax are compared with a general energy tax, while also 
different tax recycling mechanisms are considered. 
The simulations in this chapter show that the small-user energy tax (25 per cent for gas, 
15 per cent for electricity, 25 per cent for coal and 20 per cent for other fuels for heating) 
causes a CO2 reduction of 3.5 per cent while total emissions of greenhouse gases are reduced 
by 3.1 per cent. By recycling revenues of the small-user energy tax, employment increases by 
0.10 per cent and existing tax distortions decrease, resulting in a higher national welfare of 
0.06 per cent. The second best welfare improvement occurs due to the redistribution of 
existing tax distortions from labour to capital. When the tax base is broadened to all energy 
users and exemptions are ignored, welfare decreases by 0.02 per cent and the exchange rate 
increases by 0.25 per cent. This illustrates that in the case of a general energy tax, internati-
onal competitiveness of the large energy-using industries deteriorates. Within agriculture, 
horticulture under glass is the most affected industry although the effects are small. 
Sensitivity analyses of the results show that the positive welfare effects of a small-user 
energy tax only apply at low tax rates. At higher tax rates, the negative distortionary effects 
of the introduction of a small-user energy tax dominate the positive effect of redistributing 
existing distortions from labour to capital. At a CO2 reduction higher than 25 per cent, 
welfare costs of a small-user energy tax even become higher than welfare costs of a general 
energy tax, which is due to a broader tax base of the general tax. 
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The results show that it is rational to exempt large users from an energy tax to avoid 
loss of international competitiveness. Only at high reduction levels might it be more efficient 
to tax large energy users as well, since then an increased tax base proves to be less distorting. 
Under the restrictions of the model used, a second dividend can be achieved by the 
introduction of a small-user energy tax. At low tax rates, a welfare improvement is even 
possible when the revenues of a small-user energy tax are recycled in a lump sum fashion. 
These typical second-best results occur due to an inefficient initial distribution of the tax 
burden. From a policy perspective the question remains, however, whether introducing an 
energy tax is the appropriate tool to reduce distortions caused by other taxes. 
The Dutch government has developed environmental policy targets, specified in terms 
of environmental indicators that measure phenomena like the greenhouse effect, acidification, 
eutrophication, and waste accumulation. Typically, each policy target entails a reduction in 
emissions that cause the environmental problem measured by the indicator. Chapter 5 
analyses the environmental and economic effects of restricting these indicators, using a 
system of emission permits for the Netherlands. Indicators are linked to inputs, aggregate 
output, consumer goods and aggregate consumption at a very detailed level. Agriculture is an 
important contributor to these environmental indicators. The analysis focuses on the different 
effects of restricting single environmental indicators, the effects of restricting different 
environmental indicators simultaneously and the tradeability of emission permits. 
The results in this chapter show large differences in welfare losses as result of 
restricting different environmental indicators, which can be explained by the extent to which 
inputs, aggregate output, consumer goods and aggregate consumption can be substituted. In 
the case of waste emissions and to a lesser extent of eutrophication, where emissions are 
related to aggregate output and aggregate consumption, substitution is hardly possible and a 
reduction of emissions will therefore be very costly. In the case of acidification and 
greenhouse gas emissions, however, a reduction can be achieved by substitution of zero or 
low emission commodities for high emission commodities, which entails relatively low costs. 
Moreover, in the latter case, emissions are widely distributed over all industries and 
consumers, which, especially in the case of tradeable emission permits, offers scope for an 
efficient allocation of the emission reduction. These results emphasise the need for a very 
detailed emission matrix at a disaggregated level as applied in this chapter. The simulations 
also show that environmental policies might interact, when different environmental indicators 
are related to the same economic variables. When two or more environmental policy goals 
are set simultaneously, individual restrictions are less restrictive and hence shadow prices of 
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restrictions will be lower. In addition, the welfare loss of an additional environmental 
restriction is relatively small. Finally, the simulations in this chapter show the potential 
benefits of a system of tradeable permits over a system of non-tradeable permits. When 
permits are tradeable, permit prices for 1 kg CO2 equivalent (greenhouse effect), 1 mole it 
(acidification), 1 kg N equivalent (eutrophication) and 1 kg waste (waste accumulation) at 10 
per cent reduction of the a)ncerning emissions are 0.04, 0.18, 1.52 and 3.37 guilders (1993) 
respectively. These are lower than the average shadow prices in the case of non-tradeability 
(0.13, 1.03, 21.43 and 9.41 respectively). The difference in welfare loss between non-
tradeable and tradeable permits is largest in the case of eutrophication (5476 vs. 1060 million 
guilders) which is due to the large differences in eutrophication emission coefficients 
between agents. 
From a policy perspective, the simulations in this chapter give insight into the potential 
effects of achieving different environmental policy goals. Since both direct and indirect 
effects are taken into account in the AGE framework used, the links between environmental 
problems and economic activity are placed in a broad perspective. The simulation results 
show that the economic impact of an emission reduction depends largely on substitution 
possibilities. Since these possibilities are often limited, especially when emissions are related 
to output, there is a potential pay-off to increasing the search for low-emission technologies. 
Moreover, confirming the results obtained in earlier studies, the gain of a tradeable emission 
permit system over a non-tradeable system shows the need for a market-based approach when 
emissions have to be reduced. Finally, since restrictions on different environmental indicators 
might interact, there is clearly scope for policy co-ordination when multiple environmental 
policy goals are to be met. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the environmental and economic effects of an agricultural policy 
change. It analyses the effects of an increase in milk quota in the Netherlands when nitrogen 
(N) emissions in agriculture are restricted. This policy simulation is an example of an 
agricultural policy change that entails environmental effects. In addition, it clearly shows the 
linkages between agricultural industries. The AGE model applied in this chapter is written in 
mixed-complementarity format (AGE-MC model), in which dairy farming is represented by a 
series of different Leontief technologies. Each technology is characterised by a different 
emission-input-output mix. Consequently, technology switches make it feasible to reduce 
emissions without necessarily reducing output, which would be the case if emissions were 
related to output in a well-behaved neoclassical production technology. 
The results show that as milk quota rights become less scarce, the value of milk quota 
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reaches zero. Since N emissions in agriculture are restricted, a higher production in dairy 
farming will lead to a positive and increasing shadow price of N emissions. At the point 
where milk quota is no longer restrictive, the shadow price is 0.99 guilders (1993) per kg N. 
A welfare gain can be reached by increasing milk quota while keeping N emissions at the 
same level. Under such a policy change, inactive N-extensive technologies in dairy farming 
become active and (partly) replace N-intensive technologies, while output in other 
agricultural industries decreases. The latter shows that policy measures taken in one industry 
may indirectly (through the market for N emissions) entail effects in other industries. 
The simulations in Chapter 6 show that results are sensitive to the specification of 
technology in dairy farming. The AGE-MC approach, using multiple Leontief technologies, 
seems to be more flexible than using the single CES technology. If the AGE-MC approach is 
adopted, results depend on the specification of the alternative (both existing and latent) 
technologies. Especially latent technologies are difficult to specify because of a lack of 
information. However, if this information is available the AGE-MC approach is a useful tool 
for policy analysis in cases where technology switches can be expected as a result of policy 
changes. 
The policy simulations in this thesis clearly reveal the economy-wide environmental 
and economic effects of agricultural and environmental policies and the interactions between 
these policies, in the Netherlands. However, the results should be interpreted with care for 
several reasons. First, since real policies are usually too complicated to be tackled in an 
economic model, there is always the chance of a certain degree of policy mis-specification. 
For example, the presence of energy covenants (in horticulture) or seasonal manure 
application norms are difficult to deal with in an AGE model. Second, it is worth mentioning 
that policies could be subject to large changes during the period in which applied policy 
research can be completed. Policies that first look premature, may eventually be implemented 
and finally turn out to be replaced or supplemented by other policies. Finally, the results are 
conditional on the model and data characteristics; for example, functional forms, 
specification of agents and commodities, and the static nature of the model. Therefore, for 
some of the critical assumptions (factor mobility, trade, and labour supply) sensitivity 
analyses were performed. 
Considering the remarks and conclusions in the preceding chapters, several suggestions 
for future research are coming to the fore. First, in order to get more insight into the 
interaction between agricultural and environmental policies, there are still some policy 
simulations left to deal with, like a simulation on pesticides policy and policy simulations 
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related to the CAP reform. Second, since a drawback of the AGE model is that it is not 
econometrically estimated, maximum entropy econometrics (an estimation techniques for 
small samples) in combination with frequently published SAMs could be used in the future to 
(partially) estimate AGE models. Third, an interesting area of research might be to incorporate 
micro-econometric simulation models into AGE models. Many issues in environmental 
economics require both detailed insights at the level of the decision-making units (e.g., 
individual farms) and the consequences of such decisions for the environment and the 
economy as a whole. Micro-econometric simulation models,- on the one hand, provide 
detailed insight at the level of the farm (sometimes sector) and incorporate technological 
differences between farms. AGE models, on the other hand, consider the linkages with the 
rest of the economy but are less detailed. Theoretically, a link is possible given that both 
types of model are based on micro-economic theory. Finally, it may be interesting in further 
research to consider regional differences in agriculture, using regional Social Accounting 
Matrices (SAMs). The appearance and functioning of rural areas is receiving increasing 
attention because of issues like rural employment, nature production and countryside 
maintenance and conservation. Since agriculture contributes to rural activity and largely 
determines the appearance of the countryside, regional differentiation is appropriate. 
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SAMENVATTING (Summary in Dutch) 
Er is een groeiend bewustzijn van actuele en potentiële bedreigingen van het milieu in de 
vorm van uitputting van natuurlijke hulpbronnen, de vervuiling van lucht, grond en water, en 
verslechtering van de biodiversiteit. Zoals in de meeste geïndustrialiseerde landen, heeft de 
zorg voor het in stand houden en verbeteren van de milieukwaliteit een vaste plaats 
ingenomen op de beleidsagenda in Nederland. Dientengevolge is het voor zowel 
beleidsmakers als belangengroepen van belang om de achtergrond van de verschillende 
milieuproblemen, de verbanden tussen economie en milieu, en de gevolgen van 
overheidsingrijpen voor economie en milieu te kunnen doorgronden. 
De Nederlandse economie, landbouw en het milieu hangen in hoge mate met elkaar 
samen. De landbouw, industrieën rechtstreeks verbonden met de landbouw (agribusiness) en 
internationale handel in landbouw- en voedselproducten vormen een substantieel deel van de 
Nederlandse economische activiteiten. Daarnaast veroorzaakt de landbouw een aantal 
specifieke milieuproblemen, voornamelijk gerelateerd aan het gebruik van industriële inputs 
als kunstmest en pesticiden. Bovendien draagt de landbouw bij aan een aantal algemene 
milieuproblemen, zoals het broeikaseffect, verzuring en eutrofiëring. 
Drie belangrijke categorieën beleid kunnen worden onderscheiden die de veranderende 
beleidsomgeving en de verbanden die bestaan tussen economie, milieu en landbouw, 
benadrukken: (1) Milieubeleid die specifiek is voor de landbouw; (2) algemeen milieubeleid 
die invloed heeft op de landbouw; en (3) landbouwbeleid die milieueffecten veroorzaakt. 
Bovendien neemt de importantie van milieubeleid relatief tot ander beleid in de landbouw 
toe. Derhalve is empirische analyse van de landbouw en agribusiness van belang om de 
kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve relatie tussen milieu en economische activiteit bloot te leggen. 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om de economische- en milieueffecten van landbouw-
en milieubeleid, en de interactie daartussen, voor de gehele Nederlandse economie te 
kwantificeren. Een aantal van de belangrijkste beleidsissues worden behandeld in dit 
proefschrift. Beleidssimulaties zijn: (1) het mestbeleid; (2) de introductie van een 
Memverbruikerheffing op energie; (3) de reductie van emissies die bijdragen aan de milieu-
indicatoren eutrofiëring, het broeikaseffect, verzuring en afvalophoping; en (4) het vergroten 
van melkquota onder een restrictie op stikstofemissies in de landbouw. 
Het basisinstrument dat gebruikt is in dit proefschrift betreft een toegepast algemeen 
evenwichtsmodel (Applied General Equilibrium model; AGE model) voor de Nederlandse 
economie, waarin milieurelaties expliciet zijn opgenomen. Gegeven de hierboven beschreven 
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verbanden en de effecten voor de gehele economie en internationale handel die verwacht 
kunnen worden van landbouw- en milieubeleid, is het gebruik van een AGE model voor een 
kleine open economie geschikt. Bovendien maakt de beschikbaarheid van nieuwe milieudata 
voor Nederland op een zeer gedesaggregeerd niveau het mogelijk en wetenschappelijk 
interessant om binnen een AGE model milieudata te koppelen aan economische activiteiten. 
Tenslotte verschaft een AGE model bruikbare informatie over verschillende variabelen die 
van belang zijn voor beleidsmakers en belangengroepen. 
Hoofdstuk 2 presenteert en bediscussieert de basisversie van het AGE model en de 
gebruikte data. Omdat in de verschillende beleidssimulaties verschillende varianten van het 
model worden gebruikt, is de beschrijving van het model niet uitputtend. Varianten van het 
model die voor de verschillende beleidssimulaties worden gebruikt, worden in de betreffende 
hoofdstukken behandeld. Een complete beschrijving van het basismodel vindt plaats in 
appendices. Het hoofdstuk behandelt ook de gebruikte economische- en milieudata. Data die 
zijn verkregen door eigen berekeningen (bijvoorbeeld gedetailleerde milieudata en de 
desaggregatie van landbouwdata) zijn samengevat in appendices. 
In hoofdstuk 3 worden de effecten van een reductie van de intensieve veehouderij voor 
de Nederlandse economie geanalyseerd. Zo'n reductie is een mogelijke oplossing voor 
milieuproblemen die gerelateerd zijn aan het overschot van mineralenaanvoer naar het milieu. 
Een inloimping van de intensieve veehouderij om een fosfaatverlies van 30 kg/ha te 
bereiken (beleidsdoel in 2002) zal het inkomen van de varkens- en pluimveehouderij doen 
afnemen met respectievelijk 2.6 en 1.0 procent. Als alleen de varkensproductie wordt 
ingekrompen, neemt het inkomen in de varkenshouderij af met 4.8 procent. De lagere 
productie in de varkens- en pluimveehouderij heeft grotere gevolgen voor de productie en het 
inkomen in de veevoederindustrie en de vleesverwerkende industrie dan voor de intensieve 
veehouderij zelf, omdat de waarde van de productie quota, die deel uitmaakt van het inkomen 
in de intensieve veehouderij, ontbreekt. De effecten voor de internationale handel zijn dat de 
netto exporten van vee en netto importen van veevoer afnemen. Bovendien apprecieert de 
wisselkoers in alle simulaties hetgeen aangeeft dat de handelspositie van Nederland 
verslechtert ten gevolge van de inkrimping van de veestapel. In het geval van een 
fosfaatverlies van 30 kg/ha, waarbij alleen de varkenshouderij wordt ingekrompen, neemt de 
welvaart af met 800 miljoen gulden (1990) hetgeen slechts 0.15 procent van het nationaal 
inkomen is. Deze welvaartsafhame zou moeten worden gecompenseerd door een 
milieuverbetering die echter geen deel uitmaakt van de gebruikte welvaartsmaatstaf. 
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De simulaties geven een goed inzicht in de gevolgen van een strikter mineralenbeleid. 
Er wordt duidelijk weergegeven dat de introductie van milieubeleid die specifiek is voor de 
landbouw gevolgen heeft voor de gehele economie, wat de verbanden tussen de landbouw en 
de rest van de economie aantoont. De resultaten vormen de achtergrond voor discussies over 
de voor- en nadelen van het inkrimpen van de Nederlandse veestapel en voor het ontwerpen 
van beleid in andere landen, die te maken hebben met dezelfde milieuproblemen. Een 
belangrijke beleidsimplicatie vormt het feit dat de gevolgen voor industrieën die gerelateerd 
zijn aan de intensieve veehouderij (veevoederindustrie en de vleesverwerkende industrie) 
groter zijn dan voor de intensieve veehouderij zelf. Dit resultaat is met name het gevolg van 
het compenserende effect van de waarde van de productiequota voor de huidige veehouders. 
Echter, de waarde van de productiequota (productierechten) vormt tevens een 
toetredingsbarrière hetgeen een negatief effect heeft op de structuur van de intensieve 
veehouderij. 
Hoofdstuk 4 handelt over een algemeen milieubeleid die ook consequenties heeft voor 
individuele landbouwsectoren. In 1996 heeft de Nederlandse overheid een energieheffing 
ingevoerd op het gebruik van elektriciteit en fossiele brandstoffen t.b.v. verwarming door 
huishoudens en andere kleine verbruikers (Meinverbmikerheffing op energie). De revenuen 
van de energieheffing worden gebruikt om de reeds bestaande verstorende belastingen op 
arbeid te verlagen (terugsluizen). Het onderzoek in dit hoofdstuk geeft de gedetailleerde 
milieu- en economische effecten weer van deze Nederlandse unilaterale hervorming van 
belasting op milieu. Speciale aandacht wordt besteed aan het argument van het 'dubbel 
dividend' dat de introductie van zo'n belastinghervorming niet alleen het milieu verbetert 
(eerste dividend) maar ook de welvaart verhoogt in economische zin (tweede dividend) ten 
gevolge van een verbetering van de efficiëntie van de belastingstructuur. De effecten van een 
Meinverbruikerheffing worden vergeleken met een algemene energieheffing terwijl tevens 
alternatieve terugsluizingsmechanismen worden beschouwd. 
De simulaties in dit hoofdstuk tonen aan dat de kleinverbruikerheffing (25 procent voor 
gas, 15 procent voor elektriciteit, 25 procent voor steenkool en 20 procent voor andere 
brandstoffen voor verwarming) een C 0 2 reductie teweegbrengt van 3.5 procent terwijl de 
totale emissies van broeikasgassen verminderen met 3.1 procent. Door de revenuen van de 
kleinverbruikerheffing terug te sluizen, neemt de werkgelegenheid toe met 0.1 procent en 
bestaande belastingverstoringen nemen af, hetgeen resulteert in een hogere nationale welvaart 
van 0.06 procent. Deze second best welvaartsverbetering ontstaat door de herverdeling van 
bestaande belastingverstoringen van arbeid naar kapitaal. Indien de grondslag van de 
192 Samenvatting 
belastingen wordt verbreed naar alle energieverbruikers en vrijstellingen genegeerd worden 
(algemene energieheffing), neemt de welvaart af met 0.02 procent en de wisselkoers stijgt 
met 0.25 procent. Dit illustreert dat in het geval van een algemene energieheffing, de 
internationale concurrentiepositie van de grote energieverbruikende industrieën verslechtert. 
Alhoewel de effecten klein zijn, zijn de gevolgen binnen de landbouw voor de glastuinbouw 
het grootst. Gevoeligheidsanalyses tonen aan dat de positieve welvaartseffecten van een 
klemverbruikerheffing alleen van toepassing zijn bij lage belastingtarieven. Bij hogere 
belastingtarieven domineren de negatieve verstorende effecten van de introductie van de 
energieheffing de positieve effecten van het herverdelen van de belastingverstoring van 
arbeid naar kapitaal. Bij een C 0 2 reductie die hoger is dan 25 procent zijn de welvaartskosten 
van een kleinverbruikerheffing zelfs groter dan die van een algemene energieheffing hetgeen 
wordt veroorzaakt door de bredere belastinggrondslag van de algemene energieheffing. 
De resultaten tonen aan dat het rationeel is om grote energieverbruikers vrij te stellen 
van een energieheffing om een verlies aan internationale concurrentiekracht te voorkomen. 
Alleen bij hoge reductieniveaus zou het efficiënter kunnen zijn om ook grote 
energieverbruikers te belasten, omdat dan de grotere belastinggrondslag minder verstorend 
blijkt te zijn. Onder de condities van het gebruikte model kan een tweede dividend worden 
bereikt ten gevolge van de introductie van een Memverbruikerheffing. Bij lage 
belastingtarieven is zelfs een welvaartsverbetering mogelijk door de revenuen van de 
kleinverbmikerheffing lumpsum terug te sluizen. Deze typische second best resultaten treden 
op door een inefficiënte initiële verdeling van de belastingverstoring. Vanuit 
beleidsperspectief blijft echter de vraag of het introduceren van een energieheffing een 
adequaat instrument is om verstoringen, die door andere belastingen worden veroorzaakt, te 
verlagen. 
De Nederlandse overheid heeft milieubeleidsdoelen ontwikkeld, uitgedrukt in milieu-
indicatoren die verschijnselen meten als het broeikaseffect, verzuring, eutrofiëring en 
afvalophoping. Kenmerkend is dat elk beleidsdoel een reductie teweegbrengt van emissies 
die het milieuprobleem veroorzaakt die wordt gemeten met de betreffende milieu-indicator. 
Hoofdstuk 5 analyseert de milieu- en economische effecten van het beperken van deze 
indicatoren, gebruikmakend van een systeem van emissierechten voor Nederland. Indicatoren 
zijn gerelateerd aan inputs, geaggregeerde output, consumptiegoederen en geaggregeerde 
consumptie, op een zeer gedetailleerd niveau. De landbouw levert een belangrijke bijdrage 
aan deze milieu-indicatoren. De analyse concentreert zich op de verschillende effecten van 
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het beperken van elke milieu-indicator apart, de effecten van het beperken van verschillende 
milieu-indicatoren gelijktijdig en de verhandelbaarheid van emissierechten. 
De resultaten in dit hoofdstuk laten grote verschillen in welvaartsverliezen zien als 
gevolg van het beperken van de verschillende milieu-indicatoren hetgeen kan worden 
verklaard door de mate waarin inputs, geaggregeerde output, consumptiegoederen en 
geaggregeerde consumptie kunnen substitueren. In het geval van afvalemissies en in mindere 
mate van eutrofiëring, waar emissies gerelateetü zijn aan geaggregeerde output en 
geaggregeerde consumptie, is substitutie nauwelijks mogelijk en zal een reductie van 
emissies derhalve zeer kostbaar zijn. In het geval van verzuring en broeikasgasemissies kan 
een reductie echter wel plaatsvinden door substitutie van goederen met hoge emissies door 
goederen met lage of geen emissies, hetgeen relatief lage kosten teweegbrengt. Bovendien 
zijn in het laatste geval de emissies ook veel breder verspreid over alle industrieën en 
consumenten, hetgeen, met name in het geval van verhandelbare emissierechten, ruimte biedt 
voor een efficiënte allocatie van de emissiereductie. Deze resultaten benadrukken de 
noodzaak van een zeer gedetailleerde emissiematrix op een gedesaggregeerd niveau, zoals 
toegepast in dit hoofdstuk. De simulaties laten ook zien dat verschillende milieubeleidsdoelen 
interactie kunnen vertonen indien verschillende milieu-indicatoren gerelateerd zijn aan 
dezelfde economische variabelen. Wanneer twee of meer milieubeleidsdoelen tegelijkertijd 
worden nagestreefd, zijn de individuele restricties minder beperkend en zal dientengevolge de 
schaduwprijs van de restricties lager zijn. Bovendien is het welvaartsverlies van een 
additioneel milieubeleidsdoel relatief klein. Tenslotte laten de simulaties in dit hoofdstuk zien 
wat de potentiële voordelen van een systeem van verhandelbare emissierechten zijn ten 
opzichte van een systeem van niet verhandelbare emissierechten. Bij verhandelbare 
emissierechten zijn de prijzen voor de rechten van 1 kg CO2 equivalent (broeikaseffect), 1 
mol FT (verzuring), 1 kg N equivalent (eutrofiëring) en 1 kg afval (afvalophoping) bij een 10 
procent reductie van de betreffende emissies, respectievelijk 0.04, 0.18, 1.52 en 3.37 gulden 
(1993). Deze prijzen zijn lager dan de gemiddelde schaduwprijzen indien emissierechten niet 
verhandelbaar zijn (respectievelijk 0.13, 1.03, 21.43 en 9.41 gulden). Het verschil in 
welvaartsverlies tussen een systeem van verhandelbare en niet verhandelbare emissierechten 
is het grootst voor eutrofiëring (1060 vs. 5476 min gulden), wat het gevolg is van de grote 
verschillen in emissiecoëfficiënten tussen de verschillende economische agenten. 
Vanuit beleidsperspectief geven de simulaties in dit hoofdstuk inzicht in de potentiële 
effecten van het bereiken van verschillende milieubeleidsdoelen. Omdat zowel directe als 
indirecte effecten in ogenschouw worden genomen in het gebruikte AGE framework, worden 
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de verbanden tussen milieuproblemen en economische activiteit in een breder perspectief 
geplaatst. De simulaties laten zien dat de economische impact van een emissiereductie in 
hoge mate afhangt van de substitutiemogelijkheden. Omdat deze mogelijkheden vaak beperkt 
zijn, met name wanneer emissies gerelateerd zijn aan output, kan er een potentieel, voordeel 
behaald worden door te zoeken naar lage-emissie-technologieën. Het voordeel van een 
systeem van verhandelbare emissierechten ten opzichte van een systeem van niet 
verhandelbare emissierechten toont aan dat een marktgerichte benadering vereist is indien 
emissies gereduceerd moeten worden. Dit bevestigt de resultaten die ook in andere studies 
worden verkregen. Tenslotte, omdat restricties op verschillende milieu-indicatoren interactie 
vertonen, is beleidscoördinatie in het geval van meerdere beleidsdoelstellingen van grote 
betekenis. 
Hoofdstuk 6 concentreert zich op de milieu- en economische effecten van een 
verandering in landbouwbeleid. Het analyseert de effecten van een verraiming van melkquota 
in Nederland terwijl stikstofemissies (N) in de landbouw beperkt worden. Deze 
beleidssimulatie is een voorbeeld van een verandering van landbouwbeleid die milieueffecten 
teweegbrengt. Bovendien worden de verbanden tussen de landbouwsectoren duidelijk 
aangetoond. Het AGE model dat toegepast is in dit hoofdstuk, is geschreven in mixed-
complementarity format (AGE-MC model), waarin de melkveehouderij wordt 
gerepresenteerd door een reeks Leontief technologieën. Elke technologie wordt 
gekarakteriseerd door een verschillende emissie-input-output mix. Dientengevolge maken 
technologiewisselingen het mogelijk emissies te reduceren zonder dat noodzakelijkerwijs 
output wordt gereduceerd, hetgeen het geval zou zijn geweest indien emissies worden 
gerelateerd aan output onder een well-behaved neoklassieke productietechnologie. 
De resultaten laten zien dat de waarde van melkquota daalt indien melkquota worden 
verruimd. Omdat N emissies in de landbouw beperkt zijn, leidt een hogere productie in de 
melkveehouderij tot een positieve en toenemende schaduwprijs van N emissies. Op het punt 
waar melkquota niet langer restrictief zijn, bedraagt de schaduwprijs 0.99 gulden (1993) per 
kg N. Een welvaartswinst kan worden bereikt door het uitbreiden van melkquota terwijl N 
emissies op hetzelfde niveau worden gehouden. Ten gevolge van de beleidsverandering 
worden inactieve N-extensieve technologieën in de melkveehouderij actief en vervangen zij 
(gedeeltelijk) N-intensieve technologieën, terwijl de productie in andere landbouwsectoren 
afneemt. Dit laatste toont aan dat beleidsmaatregelen die worden genomen in de ene sector 
indirect (via de markt voor N emissierechten) effecten teweegbrengen in andere sectoren 
binnen de landbouw. 
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De simulaties in hoofdstuk 6 tonen aan dat de resultaten gevoelig zijn voor de 
specificatie van de technologie in de melkveehouderij. De AGE-MC benadering, die gebruik 
maakt van meerdere Leontief technologieën, lijkt flexibeler dan het gebruik van een enkele 
CES technologie. Als de AGE-MC benadering gebruikt wordt, hangen de resultaten af van de 
specificatie van alternatieve (zowel bestaande als latente) technologieën. Vooral latente 
technologieën zijn moeilijk te specificeren wegens een gebrek aan informatie. Als deze 
informatie echter beschikbaar is, vormt de AGE-MC benadering een bruikbaar instrument 
voor beleidsanalyses in gevallen waarin technologiewisselingen verwacht kunnen worden ten 
gevolge van beleidsveranderingen. 
De beleidssimulaties in dit proefschrift tonen duidelijk de milieu- en economische 
effecten aan van landbouw- en milieubeleid en de interacties daartussen, voor de Nederlandse 
economie. Echter, de resultaten moeten met zorg worden geïnterpreteerd voor verschillende 
redenen. Ten eerste, omdat het echte beleid vaak te gecompliceerd is om te simuleren met een 
economisch model, bestaat er altijd een bepaalde mate van foute specificatie van het beleid. 
Bijvoorbeeld, het bestaan van energie convenanten (in de tuinbouw) of de seizoensgebonden 
voorschriften voor het verspreiden van mest zijn moeilijk te vertalen naar een AGE model. 
Ten tweede dient opgemerkt te worden dat beleid vele malen kan veranderen in de tijd waarin 
toegepast onderzoek kan worden afgerond. Beleidsmaatregelen die in eerste instantie 
voorbarig lijken, worden later toch ingevoerd om tenslotte weer vervangen of aangevuld te 
worden door andere maatregelen. Tenslotte zijn de resultaten afhankelijk van het model en de 
data karakteristieken; bijvoorbeeld de functievormen, de specificatie van de economische 
agenten en goederen, en de statische eigenschappen van het model. Daarom zijn in dit 
proefschrift voor enkele kritische aannames (factor mobiliteit, handel en arbeidsaanbod) 
gevoeligheidsanalyses uitgevoerd. 
Met het oog op de opmerkingen en conclusies uit voorgaande hoofdstukken, komen 
enkele suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek naar de voorgrond. Ten eerste, om meer inzicht 
te krijgen in de interactie tussen landbouw- en milieubeleid is er nog een aantal 
beleidssimulaties mogelijk zoals een simulatie van het pesticidenbeleid of simulaties van de 
hervorming van het gemeenschappelijk landbouwbeleid in de Europese Unie. Ten tweede, 
omdat een belangrijk nadeel van het AGE model is dat het niet econometrisch geschat is, kan 
in de toekomst maximum entropy econometrie (een schattingstechniek voor kleine 
steekproeven) worden gebruikt om AGE modellen (gedeeltelijk) te schatten. Ten derde vormt 
een interessant onderzoeksterrein wellicht het incorporeren van micro-econometrische 
simulatiemodellen in AGE modellen. Veel aspecten in de milieu-economie vereisen zowel 
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een gedetailleerd inzicht op het niveau van de beslissende economische agent (bijvoorbeeld 
op boerderij niveau) als de consequenties van zulke beslissingen voor het milieu en de 
economie als geheel. Micro-econometrische simulatie modellen verschaffen een gedetailleerd 
inzicht op boerderijniveau (soms sectorniveau) en bevatten technologische verschillen tussen 
bedrijven. AGE modellen beschouwen met name de verbanden met de rest van de economie, 
maar zijn minder gedetailleerd. Theoretisch is een koppeling mogelijk, gegeven het feit dat 
beide typen modellen gebaseerd zijn op micro-economische theorie. Tenslotte is het in verder 
onderzoek wellicht interessant de regionale verschillen in de landbouw te beschouwen, 
gebruikmakend van regionale rekeningen. Het aanzicht en functioneren van rurale gebieden 
krijgt in toenemende mate aandacht door issues als rurale werkgelegenheid, natuurproductie 
en instandhouding van het platteland. Omdat de landbouw bijdraagt aan de rurale activiteit en 
in grote mate het aanzicht bepaalt van het platteland, is regionale differentiatie gewenst. 
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